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ABSTRACT
Emmanuel Levinas's political thought is best 
understood as a tension between an-archy and justice. 
Levinas claims that the aim of philosophy has most 
often been a search for an arche, or a neuter term 
that accounts for all of reality. Levinas argues that 
the reduction of reality to an arche obliterates all 
transcendence and subordinates man to a totality.
Against the predominance of totality in the 
Western tradition, Levinas proposes a philosophy of 
transcendence. This transcendence is not found in the 
direct relationship with God, but in the face of the 
other person, the Other. Since the face of the Other 
cannot be thematized, it calls the sovereignty of the 
ego into question. The ego is called to respond 
infinitely, concretely, and asymmetrically. Thus, 
Levinas establishes ethics without positing a 
fundamental arche.
Levinas's philosophy moves from this an-archical, 
ethical relationship with the Other to the totalizing 
realm of politics with his phenomenology of the third 
person, the Third. With the appearance of the Third, 
the ego must respond to more than one Other. The ego
viii
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must decide whom to respond to first. This decision 
is the foundation of all politics.
Although the Third universalizes the an-archical 
relationship with the Other into politics, it does not 
supplant the original ethical relationship. Instead, 
there is a never-ending oscillation between ethics and 
politics. The world of institutions and impersonal 
justice must be held in check by the an-archical 
responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both 
an-archy and justice.
By establishing a tension between ethics and 
politics, Levinas's thought changes the foundations of 
modem political thought. Against the selfishness of 
the liberal state, Levinas proposes a heteronomous 
political thought, that is, a politics based on the 
Other. Against Hegelian totality, Levinas proposes a 
radical pluralism based on the irreducible alterity of 
the Other. This pluralism places the Other person, 
not the State or impersonal history, as the ultimate 
value. Thus, Levinas's heteronomous philosophy is a 
humanism, a humanism of the Other.
ix
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of his ground breaking work 
Totality and Infinity in 1961, the Franco-Jewish 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has gradually become 
recognized as one of the most important thinkers of 
the twentieth century. Although a plethora of works 
discuss Levinas*s ethical and metaphysical theories, 
very little research has been done on his political 
thought. This dissertation is an attempt to fill the 
void.
Levinas1 s political thought offers a plausible 
antidote to modern political thought and to the 
Heideggerian project. Against modem political 
thought, which emphasizes individual freedoms and 
rights, Levinas argues that the only proper 
justification for politics is justice. Freedom is not 
given by God or found by reason in the state of 
nature, but is an investiture from the other person, 
the Other.1 For Levinas, the fundamental relation is
"Levinas uses the French term autrui, to refer to 
the other person, the "Other", while autre, refers to 
otherness or alterity. Unfortunately, Levinas and his 
translators have not always been consistent with 
capitalizing "Other". For the sake of consistency,
1
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the ethical face-to-face encounter with the Other, an 
encounter which precedes Being. Thus, Levinas, 
against Heidegger, replaces ontology with ethics as 
first philosophy.
The Other cannot be reduced by thought to 
ontological categories. According to Levinas the vast 
majority of Western philosophy since Plato has 
attempted to reduce all alterity to the Same, that is, 
an attempt by the subjective ego to grasp or 
appropriate that which is different and make it fit 
pre-conceived ontological categories. This tradition 
culminates in the Hegelian system which equates being 
and knowing. According to Levinas, this equation is a 
gross perversion of the uniqueness of the Other. In 
his earlier works, Levinas denounced politics because 
it reduces all alterity to the Same by treating each 
individual as interchangeable. Yet, in his later 
writings, he acknowledged the key role that politics 
must play.
"Other" will be capitalized in this essay whenever it 
refers to the unique other person, who approaches the 
ego in the face-to-face relationship. Likewise,
"Same" will be capitalized, when it is used, like 
Heidegger's Being, to refer to an ultimate neuter 
concept, which encompasses all of 'reality1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Intellectual Biography
Levinas's life, more than most thinkers, betrays 
the multitude of inspirations for his thought. The 
major events in his life; from his youth in 
revolutionary Russia and his studies under Husserl and 
Heidegger, to his confinement in a Nazi prisoner of 
war camp, each left an indelible imprint on his 
philosophy.
Emmanuel Levinas was b o m  in 1906 to a middle- 
class Jewish family in Kaunas, Lithuania.2 In the 
early twentieth century, Kaunas was famous for its 
orthodox Jewish community and yeshivas. Ironically, 
Levinas, who would become one of the century's most
2Levinas rarely discussed his life in print.
There is a brief, dense, autobiographical essay, 
(Emmanuel Levinas, "Signature," in Difficult Freedom; 
Essays on Judaism, trams. Sedn Hand [Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990], 291-295.) and 
some snippets from an interview with Phillipe Nemo 
(Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations 
with Phillipe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen 
[Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985]). Also 
helpful is an excellent study of Lithuanian-Jewish 
philosophers (Judith Friedlander, Vilna on the Seine: 
Jewish Intellectuals in France since 1968 [New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1990], chap. 5). In addition, 
Richard Cohen has gathered much of the available 
biographical information along with some personal 
remembrances in Elevations: The Height of the Good in 
Rosenzweig and Levinas (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 115-121. Levinas died in December of 
1995.
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important Talmudic scholars, was not sent to the 
fabled yeshivas. Instead, his family moved away from 
the Jewish Quarter and young Emmanuel received a 
typical Russian education, reading the literary giants 
Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevsky. After studying in 
Russian schools, seventeen year old Emmanuel left for 
France to study at the University of Strasbourg, where 
he encountered the great writers of what he called 
"the Christian tradition," Shakespeare, Racine, and 
Hugo. In France, his interest in philosophy grew, 
especially through the writings of Durkheim, Bergson, 
and Husserl. Levinas left France in 1929 to attend 
Husserl's lectures in Freiburg. He became close 
acquaintances with the master of phenomenology and 
even tutored Husserl1 s wife in French. Levinas1 s 
dissertation at the University of Strasbourg, 
translated into English as The Theory of Intuition, in 
Husserl’s Phemonenology, is credited with introducing 
phenomenology to France.3 In particular, this work 
had a lasting influence on Jean-Paul Sartre.
3Bmmanuel Levinas. The Theory of Intuition in 
Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Andre Orianne 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) .
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However, like many other young scholars, Levinas 
was attracted to the lectures of Martin Heidegger, who 
two years earlier had published Being and Time.
Levinas was to call it "one of the finest books in the 
history of philosophy. . . . One of the finest among 
four or five others."4 During the next thirty years, 
Levinas attempted to come to terms with Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology and supplant it with a 
fundamental ethics.
While in Germany, in 1935, Levinas first read 
Franz Rosenzweig's Star of Redemption, a work which 
had great influence on his own. Not only did it allow 
him to "come to terms with all this Europe, which is 
undeniably great and unquestionably Christian, "5 but 
as Cohen has convincingly shown, Levinas's work 
mirrors Rosenzweig's.4 Whereas Rosenzweig sought to 
subvert the Hegelian totalizing system, Levinas 
attempted to subvert the Husserlian-Heideggerian 
system of ontological supremacy.
4Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 37.
sQuoted in Friedlander, Vilna on the Seine, 86.
6Richard A. Cohen, "Levinas, Rosenzweig, and the 
Phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger," Philosophy 
Today 32 (1988): 165-178.
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In 1939 Levinas was mobilized into the French 
army, and like so many others, was quickly captured in 
the blitzkrieg. He would remain a prisoner of war for 
the remainder of the war. While in slave labor camps, 
Levinas was somehow able to continue his studies, 
reading Hegel, Proust, Diderot, and Rousseau. He was 
unaware of what was happening to Jews throughout 
Europe. Only after the war did he learn that his 
entire family in Lithuania had been killed in 
Auschwitz.
After the war, Levinas was tutored by the 
enigmatic Rabbi Shushani.7 This modem day 
"Wandering Jew" traveled throughout Burope after World 
War II teaching the Talmud, Torah, and Zohar.
Shushani was fluent in thirty languages and had 
mastered modem physics and mathematics. This 
polymath, would appear, offer lessons, then vanish. 
While living with Levinas, Shushani was also tutoring 
the future Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel. This contact 
with Shushani made a lasting impression on Levinas.
7For a fascinating portrait of Rabbi Shushani, 
see Elie Wiesel, Legends of Our Time (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, 1968), 87-109 and Wiesel, One Generation 
After (New York: Random House, 1970), 120-5.
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What remains of this contact that filled me 
with wonder, made me anxious, and caused me 
sleepless nights? A new way to approach 
rabbinic wisdom and to understand what it 
meant to be human. Judaism is not the 
Bible, it is the Bible as seen through the 
Talmud, through the wisdom and questions of 
rabbinic religious life. . . . Shushani 
gave me reason again to have confidence in 
the books. The phrase I frequently use now,
"the books are deeper than consciousness and 
the inner-self" comes from this period of my 
life when I studied with him.8
Levinas sought to fuse his newfound respect for
Talmudic Judaism with his philosophical training.
While writing Talmudic commentaries of the first rank
and instructing hundreds of Jewish scholars, Levinas
also wrote profound philosophical essays on a broad
range of topics. However, his central concern was to
restore a place for ethics in the Western tradition.
Totality and Infinity
in Totality and Infinity, published in 1961,
Levinas searched for a new ground within the Western
philosophical tradition for the ethical relationship
with the Other. Levinas argued that an adequate
ethics can only be found in transcendence, but the
predominant traditions in philosophy have erected
totalizing systems which subordinate all elements of
“Quoted in Friedlander, Vilna on the Seine, 88-9.
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transcendence. Totalizing philosophies are grounded 
in an arche, usually a neuter term, like Being, 
spirit, reason, or history, which is declared to be 
the origin and guiding principle of reality. 
Philosophers desire to comprehend all experience in 
terms of this neuter term. Even theologians 
subordinate the divine to a neuter term "by expressing 
it with adverbs of height applied to the verb being; 
God is said to exist eminently or par excellence."9 
The transcendent can be subordinated because all 
objects are reduced to a thing, and as a thing they 
can be com-prehended or grasped.
This objectifying "science" has led to great 
technological advances but at the expense of 
transcendence. Whatever is other can always be 
reduced to the Same; thus, there is nothing beyond the 
grasp of the Same. Although relative alterity, that 
is, qualitative differences between objects, may 
remain, radical alterity or transcendence is 
destroyed. Commenting on Gagarin's claim that he did 
not find God in outer space, Levinas said
*Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," in The 
Levinas Reader, ed. Se£n Hand (Oxford: Blackwell,
1989), 168.
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To take this seriously, we may hear in it a 
very important assertion: the new condition 
of existence in the weightlessness of a 
space 'without place1 is still experienced 
by the first man sent there as a here, as 
the same, without genuine otherness. The 
marvels of technology do not open up the 
beyond where science, their mother, was 
bom. In spite of all these movements, 
there is no outside here! What immanence!
What a wretched infinite! Hegel expresses 
it with remarkable precision: 'something 
becomes an Other, but this Other is itself a 
Something, therefore it likewise becomes an 
Other, and soon ad infinitum.'10
This reign of ontology has important political
consequences. The reduction of the human Other to a
neuter term such as Being elevates the neuter term
over man himself.
"I think" comes down to "I can"— to an 
appropriation of what is, to an exploitation 
of reality. Ontology as first philosophy is 
a philosophy of power. . . .  A philosophy 
of power, ontology is, as first philosophy 
which does not call into question the same, 
a philosophy of injustice.11
Ontologically based politics have been especially 
pernicious in their nineteenth and twentieth century 
manifestations, where final totalizing answers are
10Emmanuel Levinas, "Ideology and Idealism," in 
The Levinas Reader, ed. Sedn Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989), 241.
“Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An 
Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 47.
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closely tied to final totalizing solutions. According 
to Levinas, Heideggerian ontology with its pagan roots 
is especially deleterious. "Heideggerian ontology, 
which subordinates the relationship with the Other to 
the relation with Being in general, remains under 
obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to 
another power, to imperialist domination, to 
tyranny. "12
Therefore, Levinas makes two serious accusations 
against ontology as first philosophy. First, since it 
does not consider true transcendence, ontology is 
incomplete. Second, ontology leads to tyranny.
How is it possible to break the stranglehold of 
ontology? How can transcendence be rediscovered in 
the Western tradition? According to Levinas, the 
face-to-face relationship with the other person, the 
Other, is beyond the grasp of ontology. The face 
cannot be totalized because it expresses infinitude.
In other words, the ego can never totally know the 
Other. This inability to comprehend, to grasp, calls 
the ego into question. Have I, merely by existing, 
already usurped the place of another? Am I somehow
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 46-7.
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responsible for the death of the Other? "In its 
mortality, the face before me summons me, calls for 
me, begs for me, as if the invisible death that must 
be faced by the Other, pure otherness, separated, in 
some way, from any whole, were my business."13 The 
face calls the ego to respond before any unique 
knowledge about the Other.
This ethical, face-to-face relationship, not only 
cannot be thematized, that is, reduced to a theme or 
neuter concept, but it is the foundation of all 
meaning. Without the Other there would be no need for 
signification or communication. More dramatically, 
before the encounter with the Other, the ego would 
have no conception of itself. The ego would be 
content to dwell, consume, and enjoy, without thought. 
Only when confronted with the Other will the ego begin 
to contemplate itself. Thus, the relationship with 
the Other precedes the "I think" of Descartes' famous 
formulation.
“Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics as Pirst Philosophy," 
The Levinas Reader, ed. SeSn Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989), 83.
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Derrida's Analysis of Totality and Infinity
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas opposed the 
totalizing system of philosophy with the infinity of 
the face-to-face relationship. He has established an 
originary ethics based on transcendence. Therefore, 
ethics supplants ontology as first philosophy.
The radical critique of Western philosophy in 
Totality and Infinity received scant attention until 
the publication in 1964 of Derrida's extended 
analysis, Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the 
Thought of Emmanuel Levinas.14 Derrida claims that 
Levinas failed in his attempt to establish 
transcendence beyond totality for two reasons. First, 
a philosophy which seeks to think otherwise than 
totality cannot rely on the dominant logos of the 
tradition. Levinas who desires to replace ontology 
with ethics, relies, at least in Totality and 
Infinity, on terms which axe permeated with 
ontological connotations such as 'being1, 'truth', 
'objectivity', and 'in-finite'. In other words,
14Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An 
Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing 
and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1978), 79-153.
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Levinas cannot transcend the philosophical tradition 
because he is using its language.
Second, Levinas has failed to move beyond the 
tradition because language is presupposed in the 
encounter with the Other and language itself is 
ontological and violent. In Totality and Infinity 
Levinas claimed that the ethical relation is 
"originally enacted as conversation."15 Derrida 
argues that if discourse with the Other is primary, 
then the first relation cannot be ethical. Since 
language is thematizing, violent, and appropriative, 
our first encounter with the Other will be 
thematizing, violent, and appropriative. Thus, the 
first relationship is not ethical. Further, language 
is ontological, so if discourse is fundamental, then 
Levinas has not found an original ground for 
ethics.15
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39. The French 
is discours.
16Peter Atterton ("Levinas and the Language of 
Peace: A Response to Derrida," Philosophy Today 36 
[Spring, 1992], 59-70) and Robert Beraasconi ("Levinas 
and Derrida: The Question of the Closure of 
Metaphysics," in Face to Face With Levinas, ed.
Richard A. Cohen [Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1986], 181-202) have both refuted this 
criticism based on Levinas' distinction between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Most commentators either claimed that Derrida 
convincingly disproved Levinas1 s main theses or that 
Derrida has misread Levinas and that his criticisms 
sure irrelevant.17 Often overlooked in these, at 
times, acrimonious debates between epigones have been 
the close affinity and mutual respect between Derrida 
and Levinas. Robert Bemasconi, in a series of 
essays, has carefully shown how Derrida's "criticisms" 
should be seen as a deconstruction based on a double 
reading of Levinas.1* Yes, Derrida does argue that
discourse and pre-original discourse. In Totality and 
Infinity, Levinas was negligent in distinguishing 
between the non-linguistic discourse (expression) 
which the face calls to the ego, and the rational, 
thematizing discourse based in ontology and society.
In his later writings, Levinas attempts to clarify the 
distinction using the saying and the said (See the 
discussion below in Chapter 4) .
l7For the Derridean refutation of Levinas, see 
John Patrick Burke, "The Ethical Significance of the 
Pace," Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 56 (1982) : 194-206. Por 
Derrida's misreading of Levinas, see, for example, 
Cohen, Elevations: The Height of the Good in 
Rosenzveig and Levinas, ch. 14 and Atterton, "Levinas 
and the Language of Peace," 59-70. For a novel 
reading of the debates between Levinas and Derrida, 
see John Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of 
Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1995), esp. 163-79.
18See, for example, Robert Bemasconi, "The 
Silent Anarchic World of the Evil Genius," in G . 
Moneta, J. Sallis, and J. Taminiaux eds. The Collegium 
Phaenomenologicum: The First Ten Years (Dordrecht:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Levinas has failed to get beyond the limits of Western
philosophy, but Derrida also insists on the necessity
of the effort. The attempt to move beyond philosophy
is always needed to breathe life into philosophy.
Derrida argues that philosophy is at its best when it
knows itself to be dying, when its very existence is
called into question. It needs to justify itself
before its others. Derrida describes Levinas's
intentions:
All the classical concepts interrogated by 
Levinas are thus dragged toward the agora, 
summoned to justify themselves in an ethico- 
political language that they have not always 
sought— believed that they sought— to speak, 
summoned to transpose themselves into this 
language by confessing their violent 
aims.19
This project of confronting philosophy with its 
Other is also very much Derrida's project. Derrida 
says, "I often feel that the questions I attempt to 
formulate on the outskirts of the Greek philosophical 
tradition have as their "other" the model of the Jew,
Kluwer, 1988), 257-72 and Bemasconi, "Re-Reading 
Totality and Infinity," in The Question of the Other, 
ed. A. B. Dallery and C. B. Scott (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989), 23-34.
l9Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 97.
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that is, the Jew-as-other."20 In many other ways, 
Derrida's project is similar to Levinas's. For 
example, Derrida seems to have appropriated Levinas' s 
conception of the trace as a past that was never 
present, and, in this context, Derrida's celebrated 
"diff France" is admittedly akin to Levinas's critique 
of classical ontology.21 Derrida makes it clear that 
his concerns about Levinas' s thought have already been 
considered by Levinas. In fact, Levinas had earlier 
conceded that a major flaw of Totality and Infinity 
was its reliance on "classical rationalist 
terminology."22 Recently, Derrida seems to have 
moved even closer to Levinas's positions with his 
essay "The Politics of Friendship" which outlines an
20Quoted in Susan A. Handelman, Fragments of 
Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in 
Benjamin, Scholem, and Levinas (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1991), 264.
21 Jacques Derrida, "DiffFrance," in Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 21.
22Emmanuel Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 
trans. Tina Chanter, Simon Critchley, and Nick Walker 
(Unpublished Translation), 22. See also, Levinas, 
Totality and Infinity, 221.
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ethical theory based on asynmetry and infinity, 
centred, terms from Totality and Infinity
Nonetheless, Derrida and Levinas diverge on the 
relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy. 
Derrida stresses the resilience of philosophy or, as 
he and Levinas label it, the Greek tradition. Only by 
using its concepts can we attempt to move outside of 
it, an attempt that must fail but an attempt that must 
be made. Derrida concludes citing "A Greek:" "If one 
has to philosophize, one has to philosophize; if one 
does not have to philosophize, one still has to 
philosophize.
Otherwise than Being
Levinas, without explicit reference, responded to 
Derrida's concerns in his second major work, Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence.” Derrida provoked
“Jacques Derrida, "The Politics of Friendship," 
trans. Gabriel Motzkin, Journal of Philosophy 85 
(1988): 632-644.
“Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 152.
“Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). The debate between Levinas 
and Derrida also encompasses severed, essays including: 
Emmanuel Levinas, "Wholly Otherwise," trans. Simon 
Critchley, in Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert 
Bemasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington: Indiana
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Levinas to rethink how difficult it is to think 
otherwise, that is, to think transcendence beyond 
totality. As Bemasconi said, "one cannot simply pass 
beyond the confines of Western ontology by edict 
alone."2* Levinas begins Otherwise than Being by 
asking, "what is Being's other?"27 He stresses that 
neither the traditional category of "not-Being" nor 
death can be considered otherwise than Being, because 
the void of not-Being will be quickly filled with 
Being. "To be or not to be is not the question where 
transcendence is concerned. The statement of being's 
other, of the otherwise them being, claims to state a 
difference over and beyond that which separates being 
from nothingness. "2S Levinas then analyzes other 
traditional means of surpassing Being, such as
University Press, 1991), 3-10 and Jacques Derrida, "At
this very moment in this work here I am," trans. Ruben
Berezdivin, in Re-Reading Levinas, 11-48.
“Robert Bemasconi, "The Trace of Levinas in 
Derrida," in Derrida and DiffSrance, ed. David Wood 
and Robert Bemasconi (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988), 26.
"Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 3.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 3.
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language, freedom, time, and egoism, and concludes 
that none have escaped Being.
Levinas reintroduces the face-to-face relation 
with the Other, but changes his focus and his 
terminology. Instead of the infinitude of the face, 
Levinas concentrates on the moment of transcendence 
that is experienced in the encounter. In particular, 
how does the expression of the face differ from 
ontological discourse? Levinas calls the former, "the 
saying," while he calls the latter "the said." The 
expression of the face is a saying, which exists prior 
to any linguistic concepts, which axe fundamental to 
the said. What is this saying? It is a 
responsibility before any signification, it is a pre- 
archical or an-archical responsibility. However, the 
an-archical saying must be thematized into the said, 
"the subordination of the saying to the said, to the 
linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that 
manifestation demands."29 However, steps can be 
taken to maintain the potency of the ethical saying.
29Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 6.
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In Otherwise than Being, Levinas also tried to 
remove all traces o£ ontology from his writing, to 
maintain the saying inside the said. Levinas went so 
£ar as to avoid using the copula in the entire 
work.30 Instead, he relied on participial 
constructions and, at times, replaced sentences with 
clauses. Further, Levinas replaced terms permeated 
with ontological connotations. For example, he 
replaces essence, and its derivatives, with 
derivatives o£ eidos. Also, he no longer uses 
totality, exteriority, and separation, but refers to 
proximity, subjectivity, obsession, and an-archy.
Despite the altered terminology, Levinas was 
steadfast to his original position that Western 
philosophy had based ethics on ontology, and this had 
dire political consequences. It is only by re­
introducing transcendence that a place can be carved 
out for ethics. Transcendence is present in the an­
archical relationship with the Other, a relationship 
which precedes ontology. Philosophy must be dragged
30Alphonso Lingis, "Translator's Introduction," 
in Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, xxxviii.
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to the agora to justify itself in front of its other.
So, Levinas responds to Derrida:
It is not always true that not-to- 
philosophize is still to philosophize. The 
forcefulness of the break with ethics does 
not evidence a mere slackening of reason, 
but rather a questioning of the validity of 
philosophizing which cannot lapse again into 
philosophy.31 . . . .  Not to philosophize 
would not be 'to philosophize still.32
Judaism and Philosophizing Otherwise
Who or what is philosophy's other? Levinas finds
the model for beyond being in the ethical relation
with the Other, which is called for by Judaism. Thus,
Levinas claims that the ethical impulse of the Jewish
tradition is philosophy's other.33 It must be
31Levinas, "Ideology and Idealism," 235.
32Levinas, "God and Philosophy," 186.
“Levinas has also claimed that skepticism has 
steadfastly served as philosophy's other (Otherwise 
than Being, 165-171) . For a discussion of Levinas's 
use of skepticism see below, chapter 4. Also, see 
Adriaan Peperzak, "Presentation," in Re-Reading 
Levinas, ed. Robert: Bemasconi and Simon Critchley 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 51-66. 
and Robert Bemasconi, "Skepticism in the Face of 
Philosophy," in Re-Reading Levinas, 149-161. Robert 
Gibbs has written, "philosophy's other is skepticism, 
which disrupts the system and universal reasoning. 
What skepticism objects to is not important: what is 
important is the perennial need for philosophy to 
apologize, to justify its answers to another." ("A 
Jewish Context for the Social Ethics of Marx and 
Levinas," in Autonomy and Judaism: Papers from the
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stressed that Levinas uses the term "Judaism" in two 
distinct but related senses. First, Levinas will 
refer to Judaism as a religion based on the Torah and 
the Talmud. This sense is mostly restricted to his 
Talmudic commentaries and rarely used in his 
philosophical texts.34 Second, Levinas uses the term 
"Judaism" to refer to the Jewish moments in any 
tradition, including Western philosophy. These 
moments are not Jewish because they embrace the God of 
the Old Testament, but because they point to something 
beyond Being that can be used as a justification for 
ethics. Thus, any moment, in any tradition, that 
calls for an an-archical ethics is a Jewish moment. 
This definition groups Plato's Good beyond Being, 
Aristotle's active intellect, and Descartes' idea of 
the infinite as Jewish moments in the Greek tradition.
Academy for Jewish Philosophy Conference 1989 
[Philadelphia: Academy for Jewish Philosophy, 1987]), 
173.
34For the effects of traditional Judaism on 
Levinas's philosophical thought, see Adriaan Peperzak, 
"Emmanuel Levinas: Jewish Experience and Philosophy," 
Philosophy Today 27 (1983) : 297-306 and Catherine 
Chalier, "Emmanuel Levinas: Responsibility and 
Election," in Ethics, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 63-76.
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When Levinas refers to traditional Judaism, the
Judaism of the Old Testament, he only uses a
particular type of Judaism and in a specific way. For
Levinas, following Rabbi Shushani, Judaism is to be
understood through the Talmud.
Rabbinical Judaism, in the centuries that 
preceded and followed the destruction of the 
Second Temple, is the primordial event in 
Hebraic spirituality. If there had been no 
Talmud, there would have been no Jews 
today.35
Why is the Talmud unique? According to Levinas, 
the Talmud is infused with hermeneutics and 
responsibility for the Other. The endless 
interpretations of the Talmud, which may be 
frustrating to some, open up the ethical testimonies 
of the Bible for each generation. "What is taught at 
the school of R. Akiba is said to be incomprehensible 
to Moses, but is yet the very teaching of Moses."36 
The dialectical structure of the Talmud calls for new
35Emmanuel Levinas, "Israel and Universalism," in 
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. SeSn Hand 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 
175.
36Emmanuel Levinas, "Spinoza's Background," in 
Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, 
trans. Gary D. Mole (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), 170.
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interpretations, that is, it demands a response from 
its readers.
Levinas also discovers a call to responsibility
for the Other, or what he labels prophetism, in the
Talmud. This responsibility exists prior to faith,
politics, and ontology. "This responsibility prior to
the Law is God's revelation. There is a text of the
prophet Amos that says: 'God has spoken, who would not
prophecy?, (Amos 3:8) where prophecy seems posited as
the fundamental fact of man's humanity."37
Besides the Talmud, Levinas also finds
inspiration in the Shoah.
If there is an explicitly Jewish moment in 
my thought, it is the reference to 
Auschwitz, where God let the Nazis do what 
they wanted. . . . Either this means that 
there is no reason for morality and hence it 
can be concluded that everyone should act 
like the Nazis, or the moral law maintains 
its authority. Here is freedom; this choice 
is the moment of freedom.3*
37Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 113-4.
“Emmanuel Levinas, et al., "The Paradox of 
Morality: an Interview with Emmanuel Levinas," trans. 
Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright, in The Provocation 
of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed. Robert 
Bemasconi and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988), 
175-6.
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This reference to Auschwitz should not be separated 
from Levinas's critique of ontologically based 
politics. Levinas demands there be a place for the 
ethical order of Judaism to counteract the rational, 
violent, ontological order of the Greek tradition.
The Jewish tradition may be an important 
motivation for Levinas's philosophical writings, but 
Levinas refrains from using the Hebrew Scriptures as a 
proof in his philosophical texts. Instead, they serve 
as an illustration, just as Heidegger often calls upon 
Hdlderlin's poetry. The Jewish passages introduce a 
strangeness to philosophy, which can be a source of 
new thinking, a re-thinking of philosophy. "All one 
can say is that the Septuagint is not yet complete, 
that the translation of biblical wisdom into the Greek 
language remains unfinished.1,39
Many commentators misrepresent Levinas's 
intention of translating Judaism into Greek. It is 
frequently claimed that Levinas is adding something to 
the Greek tradition that it lacks. For example,
39Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, "Dialogue 
with Emmanuel Levinas," in Face to Face with Levinas, 
ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1986), 19.
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Friedlander argues that Levinas is trying to 
incorporate into Greek thought "a set of ethical 
principles found among the ancient Hebrews, but not 
among the people of Greece."40 Levinas's goal was 
not to introduce something alien to the tradition but 
to revive a part of the tradition that has been 
subordinate. These "Jewish elements" are scattered 
throughout the history of Western philosophy. 
Transcendence beyond being has been a recurrent theme 
in philosophy beginning with Plato's Good beyond being 
from the Republic, which Levinas claims is equivalent 
to the "invisible of the Bible."41 Further, 
responsibility for the Other demanded by the Talmud is 
equivalent to the radically Other of the Platonic 
dialogues. Levinas writes
40Friedlander, Vilna on the Seine, 89. Cf.
Rudolph J. Gerber, "Totality and Infinity: Hebraism & 
Hellenism: The Experiential Ontology of Emmanuel 
Levinas," Review of Existential Psychology and 
Psychiatry 7 (1967) : 177-88. Levinas is not always 
clear on this issue. For example, "our great task is 
to express in Greek those principles about which 
Greece knew nothing." (Emmanuel Levinas, "Assimilation 
and New Culture," in Beyond the Verse: Talmudic 
Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Hole 
[Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994], 200) .
41 Emmanuel Levinas, "Humanism and An-Archy," in 
Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 136.
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Against the Heideggerians and neo-Hegelians 
for whom philosophy begins with atheism, we 
have to say that the tradition of the Other 
is not necessarily religious, that it is 
philosophical. Plato stands in this 
tradition when he situates the Good above 
Being, and, in the Phaedrus, defines true 
discourse as a discourse with gods.42
Other moments of transcendence beyond being include
Socrates' daimon, the active intellect of Aristotle,
the trace in Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius's doctrine of
via eminetiae, and the idea of the infinite in
Descartes' Third Meditation. Also, Levinas often
praises the ethical impulse or prophetic cry in the
wilderness of thinkers such as Marx and other
Marxists. Thus, he can claim that the infinite,
ethical relationship with the face is the "first
truth" of both Greek and Judaism.
What does it mean to translate Judaism into Greek
and why must this translation take place? First,
Levinas usually uses Judaism and Greek as metaphors:
where Judaism refers to the ethical relation for the
Other, while Greek refers to the rational order, which
42Emraanuel Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of 
the Infinite," in Adriaan Peperzak, To the Other: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas 
(West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993), 
106.
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en$>hasizes universality, discourse, and the political. 
In Judaism pre-philosophical experiences are non- 
thematized, while the Greek tradition thematizes every 
pre-philosophical experience it encounters; that is, 
it reduces all of transcendence to a neuter category.
A prime example is Plato's good beyond being which is 
immanentized by Aristotle in Book l of The Nicamachean 
Ethics.
Levinas insists that the an-archical, pre- 
philosophical experiences must be a constant check on 
the rational, philosophical, and political order. 
Nonetheless, Levinas is not calling for a renunciation 
of the Greek tradition. The Greek tradition is needed 
to universalize the ethical truths of the Jewish 
tradition. "At no moment did the Western 
philosophical tradition in my eyes lose its right to 
the last word; everything must, indeed, be expressed 
in its tongue; but perhaps it is not the place of the 
first meaning of beings, the place where meaning 
begins."43 So, Levinas insists that the ethics of 
the face-to-face relationship must be extended to the 
political realm, that is, the political realm should
43Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 24-5.
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be held in check by the ethical. Thus, his writings
fuse the Jewish and Hellenic traditions.
But it's the fundamental contradiction of 
our situation (and perhaps of our 
condition), which I called Hypocrisy in my 
book, that both the hierarchy taught by 
Athens and the abstract and slightly 
anarchical ethical individualism taught by 
Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in 
order to suppress violence. Bach of these 
principles, left to itself, only furthers 
the contrary of what it wants to secure. Do 
you not think, especially in our epoch, that 
we must be particularly sensitive to the 
value of this protest against the hierarchy 
and that it demands a metaphysical 
explanation?44
Levinasian Politics
Although rarely discussed systematically,
politics is ubiquitous in Levinas's writings. At
root, politics serves as the motive for his writings,
but it is also a necessary step that his philosophy
must take. "I do not believe, however, that pure
philosophy can be pure without going to the 'social
problem."45
However, for Levinas, politics will be secondary 
to re-establishing an ethics. Only on an ethical 
basis can an adequate politics be judged. Thus,
44Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 24-5.
45Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 56.
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Levinas's primary concern is to establish a foundation
for ethics before moving to politics. In many ways,
the creation of a political thought is an unfinished
project in Levinas's works. This is the task of the
current essay.
Justice, society, the state and its 
institutions, exchanges and work are 
comprehensible out of proximity. This means 
that nothing is outside of the control of 
the responsibility of the one for the other.
It is important to recover all these forms 
beginning with proximity, in which being, 
totality, the state, politics, techniques, 
work are at every moment on the point of 
having their center of gravitation in 
themselves, and weighing on their own 
account."46
Levinas's politics have been directly explored 
only infrequently. Only two book-length works have 
been written primarily about his politics. Donald 
Awerkamp's dissertation at De Paul University was the 
first work to directly tackle Levinasian politics.47 
Drawing heavily on Totality and Infinity, Awerkarap 
attempts to clarify the relationship between ethics 
and politics in Levinas's thought. Awerkamp presents
4SLevinas, Otherwise than Being, 159.
4TReprinted as, Donald Awerkamp, Emmanuel 
Levinas: Ethics and Politics (New York: Revisionist
Press, 1977) .
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many of the complexities of this question, but 
concludes that politics for Levinas is independent of 
ethics. "Politics, even at its best, remains 
murderous. "** Chapter 5 will show how Levinas is 
much more optimistic about the role of politics, that 
politics is essential to balance the excesses of 
ethics. Also, Awerkamp's research is dated. His work 
was published before Levinas wrote his second major 
work, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence in 1974. 
Further, Awerkamp makes scant use of the numerous 
short essays which have only recently been translated 
into English, in particular, the collections of 
Talmudic exegeses Difficult Freedom, Beyond the Verse, 
and In the Time of Nations.
The most thorough examination of Levinas's 
politics, and the standard by which all works on 
Levinasian politics must be judged, has been conducted 
by Roger Burggraeve.49 Burggraeve incorporates most
48Awerkamp, Emmanuel Levinas: Ethics and 
Politics, 37.
49Roger Burggraeve, "The Ethical Basis for a 
Human Society According to Emmanuel Levinas," 
Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 57 (1981): fasc.
1, 5-57. Burggraeve also wrote a lengthy essay that 
focuses on Levinas' conception of desire as formulated 
in Totality and Infinity. (Roger Burggraeve, From
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of Levinas's works, including the Talmudic essays, 
into a coherent picture of his politics. Especially 
important is Burggraeve*s juxtaposition of the 
autonomic political theory based on the social 
contract and Levinas's heteronomic politics based on 
the ethical relation with the Other. The present 
essay, especially chapter 5, is indebted to 
Burggraeve *s ground breaking work on Levinas ian 
politics.
In many ways, this essay is an extension of 
Burggraeve*s work. It will develop more thoroughly 
the ethical foundations of Levina si an politics. This 
development is especially crucial for understanding 
the oscillating relationship between ethics and 
politics in Levinas's thought. Further, chapter 6 
will place Levinas*s politics in the context of modern 
political thought. Levinas*s political thought will 
be presented as an alternative to the egoistic
Self-Development to Solidarity: An Ethical Reading of 
Human Desire in its Socio-Political Relevance 
According to Emmanuel Levinas, trans. C. Vanhove- 
Romanik [Leuven: Center for Metaphysics and Philosophy 
of God, 1985)]. Burggraeve has also written several 
other essays on Levinasian social and political theory 
which sadly have, as yet, not been translated into 
English.
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political thought of Hobbes and Locke, the totalizing 
political thought of Hegel, and the anti-humanistic 
political thought of Heidegger. Thus, chapter 6 will 
examine Levinas' s radical reformulations of such key 
political concepts as freedom, natural rights, 
pluralism, and humanism.
Levinas's politics have also been discussed in 
several recent essays. Foremost among these, is a 
chapter in Simon Critchley* s The Ethics of 
Deconstruction.50 Critchley uses Levinas's 
theoretical movement from ethics to politics 
(discussed below in chapter 5) to provide a feasible 
alternative to Derrida's apolitical philosophy. In 
Critchley* s words, Levinas's politics provides "a 
political supplement to deconstruction, in the full 
sense of that word, as something which both makes up 
for a lack and adds to what is already complete."51
50Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: 
Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 188- 
247. Also worth mentioning are Harold Durfee's 
analysis of pluralism in "War, Politics, and Radical 
Pluralism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
35 (1975) : 549-58. and Adriaan Peperzak's extended 
discussion of "the Third" in To The Other, 167-184.
“Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, 236-7.
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In a recent essay, George Salemohamed alleges 
that Levinas's political thought is "not much more 
them a justification of theology and of the State of 
Israel."52 He claims that although Levinas seems to 
analyze ethics from a stance that precedes ontology, 
his ethics are but a servant for his theological views 
and it follows that Levinas's politics are but a 
simple extension of his theological and ethical views. 
"Faith and fidelity to the notion of the Jews as 
'ethical nation1 rather than ethics or justice is the 
true basis of his political philosophy."53 Although 
Levinas has acknowledged the unconscious role which 
the Bible has played in shaping his philosophical 
thought, his philosophical inquiries must be judged by 
philosophical standards.
Finally, Levinas's ethical thought has been used 
to analyze two contemporary political realities.
David Campbell has utilized Levinas's thought to open 
up new vistas in international relations. In an essay
“George Salemohamed, "Levinas: From Ethics to 
Political Theology," Economy and Society 21 (1992) : 
192.
53Salemohamed, "Levinas: From Ethics to Political 
Theology," 205-6.
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written with Michael Dillon, Campbell uses Levinas's 
thought to establish an ethical foundation for 
international, relations against the rationalist and 
the Nietzschean approaches.54 The rationalist 
approach seeks an ontological imperative to justify 
action, while the Nietzschean approach with its 
disavowal of any telos leaves no basis on which to 
act. Levinas, they argue, presents a radical 
alternative to these two positions; namely, an­
archical justice or justice which precedes an arche.
In his most ambitious use of Levinasian ethics, 
Campbell analyzes the Persian Gulf War from an an­
archical perspective.55 He concludes, "to be judged 
as having acted in an ethical way, it would have been 
more fitting for the United States to acknowledge this 
heteronomous responsibility than to assert its 
autonomous freedom. "s* The autonomous paradigm which
S4David Campbell and Michael Dillon, "The Ethical 
and the Political, " in The Political Subject of 
Violence, ed. Campbell and Dillon (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993), 161-75.
ssDavid Campbell, Politics Without Principle: 
Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf 
War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) .
“ Campbell, Politics Without Principle, 93.
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the U.S. government adopted led to a creation of an 
appropriative narrative that reduced the Iraqis to a 
single image, that of Saddam Hussein.. There was 
little attempt by the American public to reach out and 
feel responsibility toward the radically Other, i.e., 
the Iraqi solider. There was no feeling of 
responsibility for the more than 100,000 Iraqi 
military deaths or even the 13,000 civilian deaths.57
The Argentine philosopher, Enrique Dussel, has 
also used Levinas's ethical thought to analyze 
contemporary political problems. Dussel fuses 
Levinas's heteronomous ethical thought with Marxism to 
provide a more ethical basis for liberation 
theology.58 Dussel equates Levinas's concept of
57Precise figures have not been provided by the 
U.S. or the Iraqis. The numbers given are based on 
estimates made by U.S. military sources and reported 
in Campbell, Politics Without Principle, 68-70.
58See, for example, Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of 
Liberation, trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine 
Morkovsky (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985) and Enrique 
Dussel, Ethics and Community, trans. Robert R. Barr 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1986) . David Tracy has also 
analyzed the connection between Levinas's thought and 
liberation theology. See, Tracy, "Response to Adriaan 
Peperzak on Transcendence," in Ethics as First 
Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for 
Philosophy, Literature and Religion, ed. Adriaan 
Peperzak (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
194-6.
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philosophical totality with Marx' s concept of 
ideology. Thus, Dussel believes that he can use 
Levinas1 s ethical thought to move beyond the 
ideological, totalizing moments in Marxism.
Even more interesting is Dussel fs use of 
Levinasian ethics as an anthropological principle for 
understanding the relationships between nations. 
Oppressed, or in his terms, peripheral, nations are 
equated with the Other, while imperialism is equated 
with totalizing philosophies. Imperialism fails to 
appreciate the uniqueness of the Other, the oppressed 
nation. Instead, the oppressed nation exists only to 
be conquered or com-prehended. Only by a praxis of 
otherness, or revolution, will the oppressed nation be 
treated ethically.
Conclusion
The principal aim of this essay is to extend 
Levinas's ethical philosophy into the political realm. 
This task was called for by Levinas, but never 
completed. Thus, the central question of this 
dissertation: is it possible to construct a politics 
which maintains the ethical relationship with the 
Other, one which does not reduce the Other, but
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preserves alterity? To paraphrase Levinas, the 
crucial question is not "to be or not to be?" but 
rather "how can politics be justified in the face of 
the Other?"
In order to answer these crucial questions, 
Levinas's thought must first be considered in relation 
to the dominant strands of the Western philosophical 
tradition. Thus, chapter 2 will detail Levinas's 
extensive critique of the Western philosophical 
tradition, especially his critique of totalizing and 
autonomous thought. Special attention will be paid to 
his analysis of Heidegger; who, although on the 
surface has escaped a philosophy of totality, in fact, 
takes this strand of thought to its logical 
conclusion.
Chapter 3 will explore the major themes in 
Levinas's ethical thought as they appeared in Totality 
and Infinity. Levinas claims that the sovereignty of 
the ego is shattered by the face of the Other which 
calls the ego into question, by calling for it to 
justify its life. Instead of a concern for self- 
preservation, the ego is primarily concerned with the
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Other. Being is not primary and thus, ethics precedes 
ontology as first philosophy.
Chapter 4 develops Derrida's criticisms of 
Totality and. Infinity and Levinas's response as it 
appears in his second major work, Otherwise than 
Being. Although Levinas, in response to Derrida, 
modifies the metaphysical underpinnings of his 
thought, the conclusion remains; the ego is 
infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely responsible 
for the Other.
Chapter 5 will discuss the foundations of a 
Levinasian politics. This chapter has three main 
functions. First, it shows that Levinas is not an 
apolitical thinker even though he is deeply suspicious 
of most strands of Western political thought. Second, 
Levinas fs phenomenology of the third person, the 
Third, is shown to be the bridge between Levinas' s 
ethics and his politics. Finally, the liberal state 
is shown to be the type of government that balances 
the needs of both ethics and politics.
Chapter 6 will place Levinas's heteronomous 
political thought in the perspective of the Western 
political tradition. His thought will be presented as
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an alternative to the autonomous and totalizing 
political thought of Hobbes, Locke, and Hegel. In 
this opposition, it will be shown how Levinas's an­
archical politics provides a new foundation for some 
of the key concepts of political thought; namely, 
freedom, natural rights, and pluralism.
Chapter 7 shows how Levinas's thought contributes 
to one of the most inport ant political debates of the 
twentieth century, the debate between humanism and 
anti-humanism. Levinas agrees with many of the 
charges of anti-humanism, but he disagrees with their 
nihilistic conclusions. Instead, he advances a new 
type of humanism, a humanism based on the other 
person, the Other.
The fined, chapter steps back and examines 
Levinas's thought from a broader emd more critical 
perspective. Levinas's thought will be summarized 
using Plato's phenomenology of desire. Each major 
aspect of Levinas's thought, metaphysics, ethics, and 
politics, makes use of the paradoxical structure of 
desire. Scholars have criticized Levinas's philosophy 
for being merely a justification of Judaism, for his 
failure to establish a non-ontological philosophy, and
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for his failure to found ethics before ontology. Each 
of these criticisms will be explored in the second 
section of the chapter. The essay concludes by 
reiterating Levinas's main criticisms of Western 
philosophy. Levinas's questions call for a radical 
re-thinking of metaphysics, ethics, and politics.
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CHAPTER. TWO
AUTONOMY, TOTALITY, AND ANTI-HUMANISM:LEVINAS'S CRITIQOB OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION
Levinas's criticism of Western philosophy can be 
summarized as an opposition to autonomous and 
totalizing philosophies, which together lead to anti- 
humanism. Autonomous and totalizing philosophies 
reduce all of reality, including man, either to a 
sovereign ego or to a totalizing neuter term. The 
goal of Western philosophy has been to obliterate all 
traces of alterity or transcendence.
Autonomous thought props up an ego, assured of 
itself, who is free to initiate action and free to 
complete the act. The free thinker analyzes the world 
objectively, appropriating the world with logos, like 
consuming food. That which is other is reduced to the 
Same, i.e., placed into neuter categories that the 
mind has already created. The external object "falls 
into the network of a priori ideas, which I bring to 
bear so as to capture it."1
lLevinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 97.
42
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Autonomous thought requires a detached, free 
thinker who perceives the world from an Archimedean 
point. Disinterested, theoretical reason reigns 
supreme.
Perceived in this way, philosophy would be 
engaged in reducing to the Same all that is 
opposed to it as Other. It would be moving 
toward auto-nomy, a stage in which nothing 
irreducible would limit thought any longer, 
in which, consequently, thought, nonlimited, 
would be free. Philosophy would thus be 
tantamount to the conquest of being by man 
over the course of history . . . the 
conquest of being by man over the course of 
history.2
The autonomous ego ventures into the world but always 
returns to its lair, unchanged by its worldly 
experiences. "So many events happen to it, so many 
years age it, and yet the Ego remains the Same!"3
Levinas opposes autonomous thought with 
heteronomic philosophy, a philosophy based on the 
Other. The Other shakes the contemplative ego to its 
foundations, forcing the ego to concede that it is not 
sovereign in its own sphere. A philosophy based on 
the Other drags the ego out of its dwelling and leads
2Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 91.
3Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 92.
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it to the beyond. "Truth would thus designate the
outcome of a movement that leaves a world that is
intimate and familiar, even if we have not yet
explored it completely, and goes toward another
region, toward a beyond, as Plato puts it."* Thus,
the relationship with the Other jolts the ego from its
dwelling and leads to transcendence.
Levinas contrasts Odysseus and Abraham to
illustrate the difference between autonomic and
heteronomic philosophy. The journey of autonomic
philosophy is a return to the Same, to the ego's
homeland. It is the journey of Odysseus.
Phi 1 osophical knowledge is a priori: it 
searches for the adequate idea and assures 
autonomy. In every new development it 
recognizes familiar structures and greets 
old acquaintances. It is an Odyssey where 
all adventures are only the accidents of a 
return to self.5
Heteronomic philosophy, in contrast, leads the 
soul to a beyond. "It appears as movement going forth 
from a world that is familiar to us . . . from an 'at 
home' which we inhabit, toward an alien
*Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 89.
sLevinas, "Transcendence and Height," 6. Cf. 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 271.
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outside-of-oneself, toward a yonder."* This journey
is the wanderings of Abraham who "leaves his
fatherland forever for a yet unknown land, and forbids
his servant to even bring back his son to the point of
departure."7
Autonomous thought is closely related to
totalizing thought. The a priori ideas of the
autonomous thinker are often grounded in a totalizing
neuter term, a term that accounts for all of reality.
To remain sovereign the thinker appropriates the world
into categories, which are then reducible to one
neuter term such as Being, spirit, reason, or history.
The reduction of all of reality to this neuter term
becomes the goal of philosophy. Totalizing
philosophy, which appropriates and grasps all of
reality, violates the uniqueness of individuals.
To understand the non-1, access must be 
found through an entity, an abstract essence 
which is and is not. In it is dissolved the 
other's alterity. The foreign being . . . 
becomes a theme and an object. It fits 
under a concept already or dissolves into
‘Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 33.
7Emmanuel Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," 
trans. Alphonso Lingis, in Deconstruction in Context, 
ed. Mark Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986), 348.
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relations. . . . Cognition consists in 
grasping the individual, which alone exists, 
not in its singularity which does not count, 
but in its generality, of which alone there 
is science. And here every power begins.
The surrender of exterior things to human 
freedom through their generality does not 
only mean, in all innocence, their 
comprehension, but also their being taken in 
hand, their domestication, their 
possession.*
The autonomic and totalizing traditions have 
their roots in Parmenides1 dictum "there is the same 
for Being end knowing." Aristotle, in the Nicamachean 
Ethics, takes Parmenides one step further by granting 
freedom from the polis to the contemplative man.
Hegel, in his introduction to the Phenomenology, 
claims victory for the autonomous position when 
knowing is equated with Being. Subjective knowing has 
finally won out over Being. Autonomous thought, which 
posits men as the self-mover in Aristotle, ends up 
subordinating man to the system of Hegel. What began 
in the guise of humanism culminates in a profound 
anti-humanism.
This chapter will examine the development of 
autonomous and totalizing thought in Western
‘Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 97-8.
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philosophy. It is not the goal of this chapter to 
evaluate Levinas's criticisms or even to defend any of 
the thinkers against Levinas's charges. Instead, this 
chapter will show how, according to Levinas, many of 
the leading thinkers of Western philosophy, from 
Parmenides to Heidegger, have been involved in a 
project that emphasizes autonomy and totality at the 
expense of transcendence. The result, in Levinas's 
view, is a pernicious anti-humanism.
Parmenides: Being and not: Nan-Being
Philosophical anti-humanism begins with the 
father of Western philosophy, Parmenides. According 
to Levinas, Parmenidean philosophy reduces all 
alterity (otherness) to the neuter term, "Being".
Thus, Levinas asserts that "since Parmenides across 
Plotinus we have not succeeded in thinking 
otherwise. "*
Protevi has carefully read the Parmenidean 
fragments from a Levinasian perspective.10 The key
9Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 104.
10John Protevi, "Repeating the Parricide: Levinas 
and the Question of Closure," Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology 23 (1992) : 21-32. The 
following arguments are also indebted to discussions 
with Dr. Protevi during Spring 1995. Por an analysis
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text for establishing a philosophy of the Same is 
Fragment 3, to gar auto noein estin te kai einai (for 
there is the same for thinking and Being) . Anything 
that exists can be known, so nothing can escape the 
grasp of the knower. Thus, there is no place in the 
Parmenidean schema for radical alterity or 
transcendence.
An analysis of Fragment 2 reinforces this 
interpretation. In this fragment, the young 
Parmenides is instructed by an unnamed goddess about 
the ways of truth. The goddess describes two paths of 
thinking; the first has to do with Being, the second 
has to do with non-Being. However, she says that the 
second path is unknowable and unsayable. Thus, the 
only possible path for transcendence, non-Being, is an 
empty path. Therefore, only the path through Being is 
feasible. For Parmenides there is Being and not non- 
Being. According to Levinas, this repudiation of 
transcendence has dominated Western philosophy from 
Parmenides to Heidegger.
of Parmenides that emphasizes the transcendental 
aspects of Being, see, Eric Voegelin, The World of the 
Polis, vol. II of Order and History (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 203-19.
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Plato: The Forms, Anamnesis, and the Good beyond Being
In the Sophist, Plato claims that a parricide 
must be committed against father Parmenides. In 
particular, the Eleatic Stranger calls for a 
discussion to establish "that what is not, in some 
respect has Being, and conversely that what is, in a 
way is not."11 Nevertheless, Levinas asserts that 
Parmenides has escaped every parricide, including 
Plato's.13 Plato failed in his parricide because he 
attempts to totalize the world through his theory of 
forms. The forms are neuter categories that can 
account for all of reality and, in the Parmenides, the 
forms are modified to exclude all radical alterity. 
Under interrogation by Parmenides, Socrates is forced 
to concede that if the forms exist separate from the 
things of this world, then they can have no 
interaction with worldly things. This is what Levinas 
is referring to when he writes, "the relation with the
“Plato, Sophist, 241d.
“Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. 
Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 
1987) , 43. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas appears 
to proclaim victory for his heteronomic philosophy 
over Parmenidean Being. "We thus leave the philosophy 
of Parmenidean Being." (Levinas, Totality and 
Infinity, 269) .
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Absolute would render the Absolute relative.1,13 If 
the forms have no interaction with worldly things, 
including men, then men cannot know anything beyond 
the world of Becoming. Plato's attempted parricide 
fails.
Further, Plato's philosophy explicitly totalizes
all of alterity to the Same. In the Sophist, the
highest categories are proclaimed to be the same and
other.14 However, in the myth of creation in the
Timaeus, the demiurge encloses the circle of the other
within the circle of the same.15 Levinas claims that
his heteronomous philosophy will reverse this
relationship.
By this ' turn,' philosophy changes 
radically. If the Other is taken seriously, 
the inclusion of its circle within the 
circle of the Same, which according to 
Plato's Timaeus (35ab) constitutes the
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50. Levinas is 
referring to Plato's Parmenides 133b- 135c and I41e- 
142b. For a thorough discussion of this "two world" 
argument, see Charles p. Bigger, Participation: A 
Platonic Inquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1968), 49-68. Also, see Protevi, 
"Repeating the Parricide," 27. The "two-world" 
problem between the realms of Being and Becoming is 
developed in some detail in chapter 3 below.
“ Plato, Sophist, 254b-256d.
“ Plato, Timaeus, 35a.
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ultimate horizon o£ the cosmos, is undone 
and the ultimate meaning of all things and 
humans has been changed.18
Levinas further opposes Plato's autonomous
epistemology, which claims that knowledge can be
brought out by maieutics and anamnesis. Truth, in
some parts of Plato, consists in memory (anamnesis),
whereby the truth is discovered in oneself. The
teacher only facilitates this remembrance by an act of
midwifery (maieutics) . "The primacy of the same was
Socrates' teaching: to receive nothing of the Other
but what is in me, as though from all eternity I was
in possession of what comes to me from the
outside."17 This epistemology rejects any form of
learning which is exterior or transcendent. It is a
philosophy dominated by the Same. "The ideal of
Socratic truth thus rests on the essential self-
sufficiency of the same, its identification in
ipseity, its egoism. Philosophy is an egology."18
Nonetheless, Plato occupies an ambiguous place in
Levinas's philosophy. Levinas portrays Plato as a
lsPeperzak, To the Other, 99 n.33.
17Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43.
18Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 44.
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philosopher of the Same, but he also advocates a 
return to Platonism. Levinas claims that Plato's to 
agathon (The Good) can serve as the foundation for an 
ethics that transcends Being and history. Therefore, 
a return to Platonism would be necessary to restore 
"the independence of ethics in relation to history" 
and to trace "a limit to the comprehension of the real 
by history."19 In fact, the agathon beyond Being of 
Plato' s Republic is the very model for Levinas1 s 
heteronomic philosophy grounded on transcendence.20 
"Plato nowise deduces being from the Good: he posits 
transcendence as surpassing the totality. . . . The 
Place of the Good above every essence is the most 
profound teaching, the definitive teaching, not of 
theology, but of philosophy."21 
Aristotle: Autonomous Thought and Com-prehensian
The Platonic ambiguity between totality and 
transcendence becomes an almost total victory for 
totality in Aristotle. Aristotle's thought, in many 
ways, exemplifies the philosophy of the Same which
19Levinas, "Signature," 295.
20Plato, Republic, 509b.
21Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 103.
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reduces all absolute alterity to iitmanence. Much has 
been written of Aristotle's reduction of Plato's 
transcendent Good, a Good which is beyond being, to an 
immanent entity.22 However, Aristotle's work 
exemplifies autonomous and totalizing thought in 
several other ways.
Aristotle posits the thinker as sovereign and 
autonomous. Man is "the principle and the generating 
force of his own acts as he is the parent of his 
children."23 Not only is the self free to initiate 
action but Aristotle equates freedom and wisdom in 
Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. The contemplative 
man is the most self-sufficient man and lives a life 
of leisure. His contemplation is explicitly not for 
political reasons but for its own sake. "This is a 
regal and as it were unconditioned activity, a 
sovereignty which is possible only as solitude. . . .
“Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1096ab. 
Nevertheless Aristotle maintained some notion of 
radical alterity. For example, Levinas praises the 
transcendence inherent in the active intellect of De 
Anima 430a. Of course, in the same section, Aristotle 
reduces all of reality to the nous, which can become, 
in a way, all things.
23Catherine Chalier, "Emmanuel Levinas: 
Responsibility and Election," 65.
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[It permits] the notion of the pure theoretic, of its 
freedom, of the equivalence of freedom and wisdom."34
The free thinker, who is at a distance from the 
world, grasps objects and places them into neuter 
categories. Thinking has literally become a com­
prehending, a grasping of objects by logos to put them 
into their genus. Thus, the individuality of a thing, 
the tode ti (a this) is violated. Levinas criticizes 
Aristotle's epistemology because "the individuality of 
a thing, the tode ti, that which is the designated and 
seems to alone exist, is in reality only accessible 
starting with generality, the universal, ideas and 
law. One grasps hold of a thing out of its 
concept."35 This com-prehending is a form of 
violence which "denies that being all its 
individuality, by taking it as an element of its 
calculus, and as a particular case of a concept."34
34Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," 77. 
Levinas refers to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,
1177b. The happiness inherent in freedom is also 
discussed in Rhetoric 1360b.
“Emmanuel Levinas, "Freedom and Command," in 
Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 19-20.
34Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 20.
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Aristotle's philosophy of species and genus
differentiates members of a species by qualitative
properties. However, these logical distinctions are
not equivalent to Levinas's conception of radical
alterity. Instead, they involve only a relative
alterity, where individuals sure distinguished in
relation to each other. Radical alterity or
transcendence is not possible because nothing escapes
the grasp of the a priori categories.
Alterity is not at all the fact that there 
is a difference, that facing me there is 
someone who has a different nose than mine, 
different colour eyes, another character.
It is not difference, but alterity. It is 
alterity, the unencorapassable, the 
transcendent. It is the beginning of 
transcendence. You are not transcendent by 
virtue of a certain different trait.27
Descartes: Freedom of the Cogito and the Idea of the 
Infinite28
Aristotle's autonomous man, who can comprehend 
the world through logos, is taken to new heights by 
Descartes. For Descartes, knowledge is only possible
27Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality," 170.
28 For an excellent analysis of Levinas1 s 
relationship with Descartes, see, Bemasconi, "The 
Silent Anarchic World of the Evil Genius," 257-72.
Also helpful is Anthony F. Beavers, Levinas beyond the 
Horizons of Cartesianism: An Inquiry into the 
Metaphysics of Morals (New York: Peter Lang, 1995).
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through the freedom of the ego. Only by stepping away 
from all worldly objects, which may be the works of an 
evil genius, can the ego be confident of its 
knowledge. Descartes "sets up reason as an ego and 
truth as dependent on a movement that is free, and 
thus sovereign and justified."39 Descartes 
epitomizes the desire for an autonomous philosophy.
Also, Levinas criticizes Descartes for propping 
up the autonomous ego unchanged after facing the 
absurdity of the evil genius. Descartes overlooks the 
tortures of skepticism in his rush to certainty, "as 
though the being that, in the cogito, came out of a 
coma were still the same as the being that had fallen 
into a coma."30
However, Levinas is not adverse to appropriating 
theoretical snippets from thinkers with whom he has 
fundamental disagreements. For example, Descartes 
with his extreme subjectivism, also provides a useful 
framework for understanding the irreducible infinite. 
Levinas employs Descartes' formulation of the idea of
39Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 96-7.
30Levinas, "Humanism and An-Archy," 129.
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the infinite in the Third Meditation to explain the 
absolute alterity shown in the face's epiphany.
Descartes introduces the Idea of the Infinite as 
his proof of God. After assuring the existence of the 
cogito, Descartes asks himself how he could possibly 
know that God exists. After all, Descartes is but a 
finite being, yet he is able to contemplate the 
infinite goodness of God, an infinite being.
Descartes argues that the idea of the infinite must 
have been placed in him by God. Therefore, God must 
exist.
I must necessarily conclude from all I have 
said hitherto, that God exists; for, 
although the idea of substance is in me, for 
the very reason that I am a substance, I 
would not, nevertheless, have the idea of an 
infinite substance, since I am a finite 
being, unless the idea had been put into me 
by some substance which was truly 
infinite.31
Descartes' idea of the infinite is central to 
Levinas's ethical theory, but he does not use the 
formulation as a proof of God's existence. Such
31Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and the 
Meditations, trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (Hammondsworth, 
England: Penguin, 1968), 124.
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proofs are foolish in Levinas's eyes.32 Instead,
Levinas employs the idea of the infinite as a way of
revolting against the supremacy of the Same.
It is not the proof that Descartes sought 
that interests me here. I am thinking here 
of the astonishment at this disproportion 
between what he calls the 'objective reality 
and the 'formal reality1 of the idea of God, 
of the very paradox— so anti-Greek— of an 
idea 'put' into me, even though Socrates 
taught us that it is impossible to put an 
idea into a thought without it already 
having been found there.33
Descartes1 radical freedom of the ego and
Aristotle's desire to place the world into neuter
categories are fused into the grand philosophical
system of Hegel. Whereas Aristotle and his epigones
maintained a modicum of transcendence, Hegel reduces
all of reality to the neuter, system. "The Hegelian
system represents the fulfillment of the West's
thought and history, understood as the turning back of
a destiny into freedom. Reason penetrating all
32 "The existence of God is not a question of an 
individual soul's uttering logical syllogisms. It 
cannot be proved." (Levinas and Kearney, "Dialogue 
with Emmanuel Levinas," 54) Levinas's theory of the 
idea of the infinite will be developed in some detail 
in chapter 3.
“Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 91-2.
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reality or appearing in it. An unforgettable 
enterprise 11,34
Hegel: Totality and the Master-Slave Relationship35
Levinas lists Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as 
one of the "finest" works in the history of Western 
philosophy and yet, Hegel often serves as chief foil 
for his critiques of Western philosophy. This section 
will show how Hegel's thought embodies the autonomous 
and totalizing traditions and how Hegel's master-slave 
relationship differs from Levinas's phenomenology of 
the face-to-face relationship with the Other.
The Hegelian system is the consummation of the 
totalizing and autonomous traditions. Hegel, not only 
reduces all of reality to his system, but the system 
is incarnate in an individual's free self- 
consciousness. Hegel solves the two-world problem of
34Emmanuel Levinas, "Hegel and the Jews," in 
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sedn Hand 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 
235.
“ For good discussions of Levinas's relationship 
with Hegel, see Robert Bemasconi, "Hegel and Levinas: 
The Possibility of Forgiveness and Reconciliation," 
Archivio di Filosofia 54 (1986) : 325-46 and 
Bernasconi, "Levinas Face to Face— with Hegel,"
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 13 
(1982): 267-76.
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Plato's Parmenides by identifying consciousness with 
universality, or in Leibniz's terms; A = A. "The 
Wisdom of first philosophy is reduced to self- 
consciousness. Identical and non-identical cure 
identified. The labour of thought wins out over the 
otherness of things and men."36 Further, Hegel's 
system actualizes Parmenides' dictum that there is the 
same for Being and knowing; all objects can be known 
by the subjective consciousness. "Hegelian 
phenomenology . . . expresses the universality of the 
same identifying itself in the alterity of objects 
thought."37
This desire for an absolute system coincides with 
a subordination of ethics. The purpose of Hegel's 
thought is to make self-consciousness aware of its 
freedom, in spite of the individuals abandoned on the 
slaughter-bench of history. For Levinas it is no 
coincidence that the culmination of philosophy in 
Hegel is coupled with a diachronic relation with 
Judaism and a subordination of that which is other 
than the Greek tradition. Previous epochs must be
3<Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," 78.
37Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 36.
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made to fit into Hegel's philosophy of history. For 
example, Judaism is labeled an outmoded stage on the 
way to universal spirit, a stage which has failed to 
reconcile individuality and spiritual universality.
In fact, "the Judaic spirit is the negation of 
spirit."38 For Hegel, Judaism must be overcome.
Nonetheless, there is a famous dialogical point 
in Hegel's system; the relationship between the master 
and the slave. Is there an affinity between Levinas's 
derivation of reason from the Other and Hegel's 
derivation of subjectivity and reason from the master- 
slave relationship? How can Levinas and Hegel both 
derive consciousness from the Other but still remain 
diametrically opposed?
Hegel and Levinas both agree that Descartes 
erroneously emphasized the subjective ego and the free 
theoretic. Hegel criticizes Descartes dictum "I think 
therefore I am," because it emphasizes thinking and 
not the I. According to Hegel, the ego does not 
become conscious of itself through contemplation, 
because in thinking we become absorbed in the object 
and lose the subject. Instead, the ego is discovered
38Levinas, "Hegel and the Jews," 236.
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in relation to the worldly objects and other people. 
Further, both Hegel and Levinas seek to find 
subjectivity beyond Spinoza's coaatus essendl, the 
effort to exist. Hegel argues that for man to reach 
self-consciousness he must desire more than pure 
animal preservation.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel develops 
the master-slave relationship to transcend both 
Descartes and Spinoza. In Hegel's conception, history 
begins with a confrontation between two antagonists, 
each seeking recognition from the other. However, 
recognition is not granted if one of the antagonists 
is killed in the confrontation. Recognition is only 
granted when one decides to submit to the mastery of 
the other. In his subjugation, the slave must create 
objects to please the master. In these objects and in 
the battle with the master, the slave recognizes an 
objectified version of himself. He gains self- 
consciousness. "We come to know ourselves not by 
isolated introspection in the manner of a Descartes 
but through interaction with others."39
39Steven B. Smith, "What is 'Right' in Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right," American Politicsil Science 
Review 83:1 (1989), 9.
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Levinas ' s theory of consciousness also originates
in a primordial relationship with the Other. However,
this relationship is not a fight to death, nor is it
even a battle for recognition. Instead, the ego
becomes self-conscious when the Other confronts it in
its shame. This confrontation calls the ego's very
existence into question. "I begin to ask myself if my
being is justified, if the Da of my Dasein is not
already the usurpation of somebody else's place."40
The Other is not initially a fact, is not an 
obstacle, does not threaten me with death; 
he is desired in my shame. To discover the 
unjustified facticity of power and freedom 
one must not consider it as an object, nor 
consider the Other as an object; one must 
measure oneself against infinity, that is, 
desire him. It is necessary to have the 
idea of infinity, the idea of the perfect, 
as Descartes would say, in order to know 
one's own imperfection.41
Husserl: Self-Consciousness and Time Consciousness
Husserl attempts to break from the Hegelian
system with his emphasis on consciousness and
presence. Husserl charged that most of Western
philosophy had been reduced to an egology, which
champions the freedom of the subjective ego. He
40Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," 85.
41Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 84.
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contested the primacy of the autonomous ego, who 
observes the world objectively, by insisting upon the 
"medieval idea of intentionality . . . where all 
consciousness is consciousness of something."42 This 
consciousness of something cannot be separated from 
the world, so, on the surface, Husserl has broken away 
from the autonomous tradition.
Levinas praises Husserlian phenomenology for its 
focus on concrete, non-formal ways of thinking, which 
break up the formal categories of thought.43 Truth 
must be based on "direct intuition into the 
phenomenon" and not on theoretical ideas. Thus, 
Husserl's phenomenology reveals the pre-philosophical 
experiences that ground philosophy. Levinas often 
employs Husserl's phenomenological method to break 
from the totalizing tradition.
42Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," 77.
43For Levinas's relationship with Husserl's 
thought see, John E. Drab inski, "The Hither-Side of 
the Living-Present in Levinas and Husserl," Philosophy 
Today 40 (1996), 142-50, Steven G. Smith, The Argument 
to the Other: Reason beyond Reason in the Thought of 
Karl Barth and Emmanuel Levinas (Chico, CA: Scholar's 
Press, 1983), 180-9, and Edith Wyschogrod, Emmanuel 
Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 26-50.
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Nevertheless, Levinas criticized Husserl for 
remaining within the autonomous and totalizing 
traditions. Husserl's phenomenology belies its battle
charge, "to the things themselves", because it does
not let the things stand on their own, but attempts to 
reduce them to another arche, namely, consciousness. 
For Husserl, consciousness is always consciousness of 
an object. In Husserl's epistemology, the object or 
noema presents itself to consciousness, the noesis.
"To the things themselves" is a strategy for 
comprehending the noema by removing it from its 
surroundings. The noema is "inseparable from a world 
out of which it is torn when it is first picked out 
and grasped, and yet such an act of separation is 
presupposed in every relation to or between things or 
beings."44 Nothing can escape the grasp of
consciousness. All of reality can be com-prehended by
consciousness.
Self-consciousness also follows the noesis-noema 
structure, but consciousness is both noema and noesis.
44Bmmanuel Levinas, "Beyond Intentionality, " ‘ 
trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, in Philosophy in France 
Today, ed. A. Montefiore (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 103.
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Self-consciousness is a com-prehension of
consciousness. For Husserl, the highest form of
knowledge is an adequation between thought and
consciousness. This adequation is only possible
because of the phenomenological reduction that
brackets the subjective states and liberates the ego
to com-prehend the world.
The phenomenological reduction is a special 
mode of existence, motivated by a desire to
be contemporaneous and present at the
origins of oneself and the world. . . .
[It] establishes a total coincidence of the 
subject with itself and therewith the 
highest autonomy. Husserlian phenomenology 
is a realization, not a questioning, of 
liberty.45
Finally, Husserl's conception of time, denies any 
temporal alterity. Husserl posits time as a series of 
instants that can be re-presented. "The past is 
representable, retained or remembered or reconstructed 
in an historical narrative; the future is pro-tension, 
anticipated, presupposed by hypo-thesis. "4‘ Of 
course, the ego would be the gathering site for all of 
these instants. Thus, all of history, can be
45Adriaan Peperzak, " Phenomenol ogy - Ont o 1 ogy - 
Metaphysics: Levinas' Perspective on Husserl and 
Heidegger," Man and World 16 (1983): 120.
4SLevinas, "Beyond Intentionality," 104.
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re-presented in the ego's consciousness. In Husserl's
thought, transcendence is impossible.
The rigorous correlation between what is 
manifested and the modes of consciousness 
enables Husserl to affirm both that 
consciousness bestows sense and that Being 
commands the modalities of consciousness 
which reach it, that Being controls what 
appears as phenomenon. This final phrase 
receives an idealist interpretation: Being
is immanent in thought and thought does not 
transcend itself in knowledge. Whether 
knowledge be sensible, conceptual or even 
purely symbolical, the transcendent or the 
absolute, claiming, as it does, to be 
unaffected by any relation, can in fact bear 
no transcendental sense without immediately 
losing; the very fact of its presence to 
knowledge signifies the loss of 
transcendence and of absoluteness. In the 
final analysis, presence excludes all 
transcendence. 47
Husserl's noesis-noema structure is just another 
moment in the philosophy of the Same. In his doctored, 
dissertation, Levinas used Heidegger's fundamental 
ontology to supersede the noesis-noema structure. If 
consciousness is consciousness of something, he 
argued, "then a theory of conscious acts and 
consciousness is at the same time a theory of the 
meaning of their objects. This in its turn is a
47Levinas, "Beyond Intentionality," 106. Emphasis 
added.
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theory o£ the inodes of being of these objects."4*
Thus, Levinas claims that Husserlian phenomenology is 
best understood as an ontology. Levinas further 
implicates Husserl in his critiques of Heidegger. 
Heidegger: Dasein, Mitsein, and Anti-Humanism*9
Levinas claimed that Heidegger's thought remained 
the great event of our century because he had shown 
philosophy a new way to look at the world. No longer 
was the philosopher disengaged from Being, free to 
contemplate his existence. Now the philosopher found 
himself thrown into the world, being-together-with- 
others, with objects ready at hand, and perhaps most 
importantly, the philosopher is a being-towards-death. 
Coincidentally, the philosopher's occupation now 
shifted from understanding beings to understanding 
Being itself, without any predicates. Ontology is the 
comprehension of the verb "to be" and the philosopher 
reaches Being not through contemplation but through 
lived experience. Thus, Heidegger seems to have
4*Peperzak, "Phenomenology-Ontology-Metaphysics,"
115.
49For a defense of Heidegger's thought against 
Levinas's charges, see John E. Drab inski, "The Status 
of the Transcendental in Levinas' Thought," Philosophy 
Today 38 (1994): 149-58.
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overturned the Western tradition's reliance on the
pure-theoretic.
However, Levinas places Heidegger squarely in the
autonomic and totalizing traditions, because of his
idolization of Being. Heidegger had censured Husserl
for placing autonomous theory above Being, but in
doing so, Heidegger elevated neutral and impersonal
Being over man. Furthermore, in Heidegger's world,
Being grants Dasein its freedom, but does not place
limits on it, except in death. Thus, Dasein1 s freedom
is never called into question. "He puts over man a
Neuter which illuminates freedom without putting it in
question. And thus he is not destroying, but Slimming
up a whole current of Western philosophy."50
Dasein's autonomy is exemplified by its
fundamental mode of existence, com-prehension. As
with Husserl's thought, comprehension destroys all
radical alterity and celebrates subjectivity.
Being is inseparable from the comprehension 
of Being; Being already invokes 
subjectivity. Heideggerian philosophy 
precisely marks the apogee of a thought in 
which the finite does not refer to the 
infinite.
S0Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 100-101.
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Defenders of Heidegger might assert that the 
Heideggerian project allows a place for alterity in 
Heidegger's phenomenologies of mitsein (being-with} 
and seinlassen (letting-be) . They claim that 
Heidegger's conception of mitsein, in the sense of 
being-with others, is equivalent to Levinas's theory 
of radical alterity based on the Other. Not only is 
this mitsein one of the fundamental structures of 
Dasein, but authentic existence demands the letting-be 
(seinlassen) of other beings.S1 Thus, defenders of 
Heidegger might claim that Heidegger accords a 
privileged place to the Other.52
However, Levinas claims that Heidegger's 
formulations of mitsein and seinlassen do not 
establish a radical transcendence. In fact, they 
reveal how much Heidegger remains a subjectivist 
thinker. For Levinas, the Other is the primary
slFor Heidegger's most thorough analysis of 
mitsein, see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. 
John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1962), 153-63. This discussion is indebted to 
Peperzak, " Phenomenology-Ontology-Metaphysics," 124-5.
S3See, for example, Ed Wingenbach, "Liberating 
Responsibility: The Levinasian Ethic of Being and 
Time," International Philosophical Quarterly 36 
(1996): 29-45.
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relation, but for Heidegger the ego's relation with
itself is primordial. "Only by authentically Being-
one-self in resoluteness, it is possible to be
authentically with one another."53 Subjectivity
retains its central place in Heidegger's analysis.
Also, subjectivity appears in Heidegger's insistence
on the xnineness (Jemeinigkeit) of Dasein.
That's also the first word of Heidegger's, 
which I haven't forgotten. Dasein is a 
being who, in being, is concerned with its 
own being. . . . Later he changed it a 
little: Dasein is a being concerned with the 
meaning of being.54
Moreover, Heidegger's famous analysis of being-
towards-death exposes the subjectivity of Dasein. If
nothingness is the secret of time and the authentic
fundament of existence, the human person cannot rely
on anything other than itself. Dasein is left alone,
to face its death heroically, but in solitude. Thus,
Levinas concludes, "being-with-one-another seemed to
53Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), 203.
54Levinas is referring to Heidegger, Being and 
Time, 68. "As modes of Being, authenticity and 
inauthenticity . . . are both grounded in the fact 
that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by 
mineness."
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me always to be a marching-together. That isn't my 
way, that isn't a face."55
Levinas claims that the supremacy of fundamental 
ontology, the idolization of Being, in Heidegger's 
thought has dire political consequences. It is 
instructive that Heidegger, the philosopher of Being, 
who rejects all vertical transcendence, sided with the 
National Socialists. However much he hoped that this 
connection was coincidental, Levinas could not help 
wonder if there was some connection between Being and 
Time and Mein Kampf. He insists we must praise Being 
and Time, but "can we be assured, however, that there 
was never any echo of Evil in it?"ss
After the rector's address of 1933, Levinas 
increasingly distanced himself from Heidegger. He was 
most dismayed after the War by Heidegger's silence 
about the holocaust. How could Heidegger remain 
silent during peacetime about the Fined. Solution, gas 
chambers, and death camps? Levinas asks, does it not
55Emmanuel Levinas emd Florian Rdtzer, "Emmanuel 
Levinas," in Conversations With French Philosophers, 
trans. Gary E. Aylesworth (Atlemtic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1995), 63.
“Levinas, "As if Consenting to Horror," 488.
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"lie beyond the realm of feeble excuses and reveal a
soul completely cut off from any sensitivity, in which
can be perceived a kind of consent to the horror?"57
Besides the overt actions of Heidegger, Levinas
was alarmed by the pagan elements in Heidegger's
thought which elevate place and "mineness" over
transcendence and the Other. Authentic existence
required Dasein to act heroically in the face of
Being, not to act ethically responsible when
confronted with the face of the Other. Heidegger's
philosophy is a continuation of the tradition that
grants supremacy to ontology over metaphysics and
freedom over justice.
To conclude, the well-known theses of 
Heideggerian philosophy— the preeminence of 
Being over beings, of ontology over 
metaphysics--end up affirming a tradition in 
which the same dominates the Other, in which 
freedom, even the freedom that is identical 
with reason, precedes justice.5*
Conclusion
Levinas claims that the history of philosophy has 
been dominated by autonomous and totalizing thought.
S7Levinas, "As if Consenting to Horror," 487.
“Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 105.
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Autonomous thought requires a detached thinker who 
observes the world from an Archimedean point.
"Thought is an activity, where something is 
appropriated by a knowledge that is independent, of 
course, of any finality exterior to it, an activity 
which is disinterested and self-sufficient."59 The 
ego may venture out to understand the world, but it is 
unaffected by its journeys.
The autonomous ego understands the world through 
appropriation or com-prehension. All of reality is 
reduced by thought to neuter categories. These 
categories cure often grounded in one totalizing term, 
that accounts for all of reality. Totalizing 
philosophies cannot do justice to individual things, 
including individual people. Instead, individuals are 
only understood through a neuter term. Also, these 
philosophies of the Same sacrifice any attempt at pure 
transcendence and any possibility of ethics beyond 
Being itself. Although Husserl and Heidegger both 
claim to have broken the dominance of the philosophy 
of the Same, Levinas shows they have failed.
"Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," 77.
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Levinas stresses that the drive for autonomy and 
totality leads to a brutal anti-humanism. As Peperzak 
writes:
The secret of Western ontology is its basic 
sympathy with political oppression and 
tyranny. In this sense, the celebration of 
physis as an impersonal and generous mother 
without face could conspire with the vulgar 
guide for terror that was Mein Kampf. A 
society based on ontology cannot be just, 
although it might try to create a balance 
out of the polemos to which the liberties of 
its monads inevitably lead. Originary 
respect, metaphysics as critique of 
spontaneously violent autonomy, is the only 
possibility of a just society.*0
Philosophy needs its other, needs to be called
into question. Unrestrained, the Western tradition
will lead to tyranny. For Levinas, it is no
coincidence that the culmination of the ontological
tradition is associated with the apotheosis of anti-
humanism and anti-semitism, the Shoah. Against the
tyranny of ontology, the Jewish, or ethical tradition
must be resuscitated. "The terms must be
reversed. "61
60Peperzak, To The Other, 139.
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 47.
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEVIHASIAN ETHICS I: TOTALITY AHD INFINITY
Chapter 2 examined how autonomy and totality have 
governed the Western philosophical tradition. Both 
totalizing and autonomous philosophies result in a 
tyranny of the Same. All of reality is reduced to 
either an autonomous ego or a totalizing neuter term 
and nothing can transcend the comprehension of the ego 
or the encompassing neuter term. All of reality is 
the Same. According to Levinas, philosophies of the 
Same destroy transcendence and without transcendence 
ethics is untenable. This chapter and chapter 4 will 
develop Levinas's overturning of the tyranny of the 
Same and his grounding of ethics in radical 
transcendence. The present chapter will develop the 
argument as it appeared in his first major work, 
Totality and Infinity, while chapter 4 will show how 
Levinas transformed his metaphysical and ethical 
thought in his later works, primarily in response to 
Derrida's criticism.
Overturning the Tyranny of the Same
The tyranny of the Same will only reluctantly 
surrender its privileged position. The autonomous
76
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ego, secure with its knowledge of the world and 
comfortable with its sovereignty, possesses a good 
conscience. It "settles down with a good conscience, 
in its non-culpability, to take refuge in itself."1 
The only resistance confronting the ego is subjective 
death. However, death, which is the end of all 
possibilities for the ego, does not shake its good 
conscience.
Nonetheless, in the twentieth century, it has
become banal to claim that subjective death shakes the
ego to its foundations. For thinkers such as
Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus, anxiety in the face of
death gives meaning to life and is the basis for
morality. But, according to Levinas, subjective death
only shows the derisory nature of selfishness.
Death renders meaningless every concern that 
the ego would like to take for existence and 
for its destiny— an enterprise without issue 
and always ridiculous. Nothing is more 
comical than the concern that a being 
destined to destruction takes for itself.3
Further, subjective death alone cannot be the
basis for ethics. For Levinas, ethics only has
1Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 11.
2Levinas, "Humanism and An-archy, " 138.
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meaning when it is separate from Being itself, that
is, when it is established in transcendence. Ethics
must exist prior to Being. Thus, death as merely a
subjective event, based on the preservation of being,
is meaningless. Levinas, as opposed to Heidegger,
Sartre and Camus, holds that subjective death is
inadequate for building an ethics.
If subjective death, the very destruction of the
ego, cannot call into question the ego's autonomy,
what can? According to LevdLnas, the confrontation
with the other human person, the Other, shatters the
complacency of the ego. The approach of the human
Other breaks the ego away from a concern for its own
existence; with the appearance of the Other, Dasein is
no longer a creature concerned with its own being.
What I want to emphasize is that the human 
breaks with pure being, which is always a 
persistence in being. This is my principal 
thesis. . . . The being of animals is a 
struggle for life. A struggle for life 
without ethics. It is a question of might. 
Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and 
Time that Dasein is a being who in his being 
is concerned for this being itself. That's 
Darwin's idea: the living being struggles 
for life. The aim of being is being 
itself. However, with the appearance of the 
human— and this is my entire philosophy- -
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there is something more important than my
life, and that is the life of the other.3
Levinas argues it is the approach of the human 
Other, not the death of the self, which displaces the 
ego. By extension, the Other breaks down any 
philosophy based on the primacy of the Same; including 
realism, which is based on the objective ego, 
phenomenology, which calls for a sovereign noesis, and 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology, which is grounded in 
Jemeingikeit (mineness) . In short, "the resistance of 
the other to the Same is the failure of philosophy."4
Consequently, the Other breaks down any political 
thought based on the primacy of the Same. Ancient 
political thought with its emphasis on the mature man 
(spoudaios) and modem political thought with its 
emphasis on a social contract between free individuals 
are both undermined by Levinas's claim that the Other 
is primary.
Desire and the Idea of the Infinite
How can Levinas reject the Cartesian hypothesis 
and claim that the relationship with the Other is
3Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality," 172. 
Emphasis added.
‘Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 6.
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primary? How can the relationship with the Other 
precede my being? How can the Other be an-archical?
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas develops an an­
archical ethics by modifying Plato's conception of 
eros and Descartes' idea of the infinite. Levinas's 
heteronomous phenomenology begins by reviving the 
Platonic distinction between need and eros or 
desire.5 A need is a privation which can be sated, 
but a desire cannot be satisfied. The ego satisfies 
its needs, and remains within itself, by appropriating 
the world. "Need opens upon a world that is for-me; 
it returns to the self. . . .  It is an assimilation 
of the world in view of coincidence with oneself, or 
happiness. "s As the desired is approached, on the 
other hand, the hunger increases. It pulls the ego 
away from its self-sufficiency. Thus, needs belong to 
the realm of the Same, while desires pull the ego away 
from the Same and toward the beyond. Nonetheless, 
desires also originate in an ego, who longs for the 
unattainable. Therefore, desire has a dual structure
5For Plato's distinction between eros and need, 
see Symposium, 189C-193 and Phaedrus, 265.
‘Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," 350.
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of transcendence and interiority. This dual structure 
includes an absolutely Other, the desired, which 
cannot be consumed and an ego who is preserved in this 
relationship with the transcendent. Thus, there is 
both a relationship and a separation.
This dual structure of relationship and 
separation is also key to Levinas's central concept, 
infinity. Levinas claims that any theory of the 
infinite that does not include both separation and 
relationship is inadequate. If the infinite does not 
include separation then it encompasses all of reality, 
forming a totality. Transcendence would be 
impossible. If the ego cannot have a relationship 
with the infinite then the infinite is irrelevant.
Of course, the infinite has been a serious 
philosophical question for centuries. To understand 
Levinas' s conception of infinity it is necessary to 
examine previous formulations. A recurrent problem 
with theories of the infinite has been labelled the 
"two-world" problem. This problem presupposes that 
any true infinite must be separate from the finite 
things of this world. Thus, any knowledge of the 
infinite would require a radical separation from this
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world. Plato, analyzes the major facets of the "two- 
world” problem in his Parmenides. In this dialogue, 
Plato's theory of forms are put to their harshest 
test. Socrates must defend the theory before the 
father of unity, Parmenides. Parmenides argues that 
if the forms are truly transcendent and always exist, 
then they can have no relationship or concern with the 
world of becoming. "The significance of things in our 
world is not with reference to things in that other 
world, nor have these their significance with 
reference to us."7 It follows that our worldly 
knowledge could not possibly know anything about the 
forms, because the two worlds do not intersect. 
Consequently, as finite beings it is not possible to 
have knowledge of infinity or transcendence. The 
"more formidable consequence" would be that a 
transcendent entity such as God, would have no 
knowledge or concern with this world. "Extreme 
transcendence must always pay the price of religious 
irrelevancy, whatever other apparent values it may 
possess."8
7Plato, Parmenides, 133e-134a.
•Bigger, Participation: A Platonic Inquiry, 54.
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Hegel, in Book 2 of his Logic, rejects smother 
common conception of the infinite. According to 
Hegel, the infinite cannot simply be a negation of the 
finite. Hegel labels this simplistic definition, the 
"bad infinite”. Hegel reasons that a simple negation 
of the finite must be finite, because nothing can 
negate something which is finite, unless it was finite 
itself. In other words, the infinite is finite's 
other. As other, it is something in a relationship 
with another something. The infinite is thus limited 
by its relation to the finite, and as limited, it 
cannot possibly be infinite by-itself. ”The infinite 
is only one of the two; but, as only one of the two, 
it is itself finite, it is not the whole but only one 
side; it has its limit in that which is opposed to it; 
it is thus the finite infinite."9
Hegel argues that this relationship between the 
finite and the infinite is a mutual negation. In 
turn, each is posited and each is rejected by the 
other. This negation is a never ending process of 
positing, opposing, and overcoming. This
9Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel • s Science 
of Logic, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, 
vol I. (New York: MacMillan, 1929), 157.
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relationship, itself, is without limit and thereby is 
the true infinite. However, this infinite excludes 
all radical alterity. Nothing can transcend the 
opposition between finite and infinite. The finite 
and the infinite form a unity which "has for image the 
circle, the line which has reached itself, closed and 
wholly present and having neither beginning nor 
end."10 According to Levinas, this theory 
exemplifies Hegel's philosophy of totality. All of 
reality is encompassed in this relationship. No 
transcendence is possible.
Hegel's circular infinite is similar to the 
infinite embraced by the mystical tradition. In this 
tradition, the self is risen up and, however briefly, 
unites with the transcendent. This is often referred 
to as a loss of the self. According to Levinas, this 
mystical union should be rejected just as Plato 
rejected suicide at the beginning of the Phaedo. 
"Socrates refuses the false spiritualism of the pure 
and simple and immediate union with the Divine, 
characterized as desertion; he proclaims ineluctable 
the difficult itinerary of knowledge starting from the
X0Hegel, Hegel's Science of Logic, 162.
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here below."11 In both the trystical tradition and 
Hegel's positive formulation of infinity, all of 
reality, including the individual person is subsumed 
under this unity or totality. Levinas, on the other 
hand, claims that the infinite must maintain the dual 
structure of Platonic desire; separation and relation.
To summarize: the philosophical problem of the 
infinite centers around two questions 1) How can the 
infinite exist and yet be beyond Being or, put another 
way, how can the infinite be known to exist and still 
be beyond Being? 2) How can the ego participate in 
the infinite without being consumed by it?
Levinas's conception of infinity struggles to 
preserve the dual structure of desire, both related 
and separated. Levinas believes he has found the 
formal structure for such an infinite in Descartes' 
Third Meditation. Descartes used the idea of the 
infinite as a proof of God's existence. He asks, how 
can a being such as the ego which is finite, have a 
conception of the infinite glory of God? "These 
attributes are so great and eminent, that the more
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 48. Cf. Plato, 
Phaedo, 61-3.
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attentively I consider them, the less I am persuaded 
that the idea I have of them can originate in me 
alone.1112 Descartes concludes that the idea of the 
infinite must have been planted in him by an infinite 
being. Thus, God, an infinite being, must exist.
Levinas is not interested in Descartes' 
formulation as a proof of God's existence. Instead, 
Levinas uses the formal structure of Descartes' 
argument to establish both relation and separation 
between the ego and the infinite. First, the idea of 
the infinite allows Levinas to claim that the infinite 
can participate in the finite without being subsumed 
under the Same. Descartes' idea of the infinite is an 
idea which cannot be reduced to consciousness. It 
overflows thought itself. In Descartes' words, it is 
an idea without an ideatum. The idea is separated 
from the ideatum in a qualitatively different way than 
the separation between object and mind. It is an idea 
which cannot be reduced by the noesis, nor can 
rationality claim to have discovered it. Thus, the
“Descartes, Discourse on Method and the 
Meditations, 124.
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idea of the infinite is the ultimate non-adequation
between the noesis and the noema.
It has been put into us. It is not a 
reminiscence. It is experience in the sole 
radical sense of the term: a relationship 
with the exterior, with the Other, without 
this exteriority being able to be integrated 
into the Same.13
The idea of the infinite as non-adequation seems 
to solve Plato's "two-world" problem; the infinite is 
transcendent, yet it is still known.14 Of course, 
this knowledge has a different structure than the 
knowledge of objects. Descartes seems to grant this 
when he closes the Third Meditation by pausing "to 
consider, admire and adore the incomparable beauty of 
this immense light, as far, at least, as the strength 
of my mind, which is so to speak, dazzled by it will 
permit."1S Levinas also avoids the term knowledge
13Levinas, "Philosophy and the Idea of the 
Infinite," 107-8.
14 "To affirm the presence in us of the idea of 
infinity is to deem purely abstract and formal the 
contradiction the idea of metaphysics is said to 
harbor, which Plato brings up in the Parmenides--that 
the relation with the Absolute would render the 
Absolute relative." (Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 
50) .
“Descartes, Discourse on Method and the 
Meditations, 131.
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when discussing the infinite, instead he will refer to
an experience, expression, or epiphany.
For Levinas, the second theoretical question of
the infinite is crucial. How can the ego participate
in the infinite without being consumed by it? If the
ego is consumed, the responsible self disappears.
Further, if the infinite embraces all of reality,
including the ego, transcendence would be shattered.
Levinas finds the necessary separation in the double
origin of Descartes. Recall, that Descartes begins
not with God, but with the cogito. Only later would
he discover the glory of God. This double origin
allows Levinas to posit separation.
The ambiguity of Descartes’ first evidence, 
revealing the I and God in turn without 
merging them, revealing them as two distinct 
moments of evidence mutually founding one 
another, characterized the very meaning of 
separation. The separation of the I is thus 
affirmed to be non-contingent, non- 
provisional. The distance between me and 
God, radical and necessary, is produced in 
being itself.14
Relation is only possible between two separate 
entities and Hegel has shown that this separation 
cannot rely on pure opposition. For Levinas to
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 48.
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establish transcendence, then, the self must have
meaning independent of its relationship with the
Other. The self must exist prior to its relationship
with infinity. Levinas locates the needed separation
in his phenomenology of inferiority.
Before encountering the Other, the self eats,
drinks, and breathes. It is self-sufficient, living
within itself. This inferiority does not constitute a
drive for existence, a conatus essendi. Instead of
preserving its own being, the self lives from
enjoyment. As humans, we do not live on pure
sustenance, instead we enjoy life, we seek
contentment. "We live from 'good soup,1 air, light,
spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc. . . . Thus,
things are always more than strictly necessary; they
make up the grace of life."17 In fact, we will
often pursue enjoyment at the expense of our very
being. Levinas, in his analysis of inferiority, is
already moving away from ontology.
The reality of life is already on the level 
of happiness, and in this sense beyond
l7Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 110-2.
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ontology. Happiness is not an accident of
being, since being is risked for happiness.1*
The self, by itself, does not ex-ist. It is only 
drawn out of its self-sufficiency by the encounter 
with the Other. Prior to this encounter, the self is 
content to dwell, consume, and enjoy, without thought. 
Only when confronted with the Other will the self 
begin to contemplate itself. The ego is bora when the 
Other shakes it to its foundations. Thus, the 
relationship with the Other precedes the "I think" of 
Descartes' famous formulation. Levinas, like 
Descartes, postulates a double origin. "Just as the 
interiority of enjoyment is not deducible from the 
transcendental relation, the transcendental relation 
is not deducible from the separated being as a 
dialectical antithesis forming a counterpart to the 
subjectivity, as union forms the counterpart of 
distinction among two terms of any relation."19
The idea of the infinite, approached as desire 
has the dual structure of relationship and separation. 
The desire for the infinite, leads the ego from its
18Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 112.
19Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 148.
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lair, but cannot be satisfied. As Descartes writes,
in the face of the infinite "I know that I am an
imperfect, incomplete and dependent being, and one who
tends and aspires unceasingly towards something better
and greater than I am."30 Also, as desire, the idea
of the infinite maintains a separated structure. By
desiring the infinite, it becomes both worldly and
otherworldly without forming a totality. It is both
infinite and in-the-finite.
Infinity is produced by withstanding the 
invasion of a totality, in a contraction 
that leaves a place for the separated being.
Thus relationships that open up a way 
outside of being take form. An infinity 
that does not close in upon itself in a 
circle but withdraws from the ontological 
extension so as to leave a place for a 
separated being exists divinely.31
The Face
Descartes employed the idea of the infinite to 
prove the existence of God but Levinas uses the 
infinite to refer to the human Other. They both agree 
that infinitude overflows human thought, but Levinas 
asserts that the concrete form of this overflowing is
30Descartes, Discourse on Method and the 
Meditations, 130.
31Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 104.
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not initially a direct relationship with God, but the 
face to face relationship with the human Other. In 
Levinas's philosophy, the Other person is this 
exceptional thought which overflows thinking itself. 
According to Levinas, the face of the Other cannot be 
thematized. Thus, the ego has a conception of the 
Other, but cannot com-prehend it, just as Descartes' 
cogito could not com-prehend God. "So little does the 
other deliver himself over to me that he cannot be 
contained within the adequate idea of being but only 
within the inadequation par excellence of the idea of 
infinity.
How can the face lie beyond thematization? Of 
course, Levinas is not addressing the outward face, 
which can be comprehended by the senses or manipulated 
by doctors, but a face which is beyond perception. It 
is beyond thematization and the accusations of 
ontological categories. So, properly speaking, we 
cannot construct a philosophy of the face, or even a 
phenomenology of the face.
Therefore, Levinas usually refers to the face in 
the negative. The face does not really appear, it is
“Levinas, "Transcendence and Height, " 3.
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not a "representation, it is not a given of knowledge, 
nor is it a thing which comes to hand."23 In its 
positive formulation, the face is the direct 
relationship with a substance kath auto, by itself.
It is "the archetype of direct relationship . . .  a 
relationship with that which is."24 In Aristotelian 
terms, the face is a substance without form. The face 
"puts us in contact with a being that is not simply 
uncovered, but divested of its form, of its 
categories, a being becoming naked, an unqualified 
substance breaking through its form and presenting a 
face. "2S
Substance without form is naked, unclothed by any 
countenance. "Prior to any particular expression and 
beneath all particular expressions, which cover over 
and protect with an immediately adopted face or 
countenance, there is the nakedness and destitution of
23Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality," 169.
“Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 21.
“Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 20. Levinas is 
referring to Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book VII.
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the expression as such, that is to say extreme 
exposure, defencelessness, vulnerability itself."26 
"The face is a hand in search of recompense, an open 
hand. That is, it needs something. It is going to 
ask you for something."27
The face of the Other has a paradoxical dual 
structure. While it is extreme frailty, it is also 
ultimate authority. The vulnerability of the face, 
commands me to respond, to do something, to ease its 
misery. This command does not carry the threat of 
force, instead it originates in frailty. The face is 
so destitute that it can only command. Thus, the face 
is pure expression. It expresses alterity itself, an 
alterity which overflows thought.
The content of the face's command is "thou shall 
not kill." This is the first word in Levinas1 s 
ethics. The face, which approaches as pure 
expression, as substance itself, beseeches the ego not 
to destroy it. In its mortality, the face summons me, 
as if its invisible death was my business. 
Responsibility for the Other's death is not limited to
2*Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," 83.
27Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality, " 169.
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the ego's overt actions. Killing the Other can take 
on many forms. Does my very existence put the Other 
in harm, am I usurping a place that the Other needs to 
live? "I begin to ask myself if ay being is 
justified, if the Da of ay Dasein is not already the 
usurpation of somebody else's place.”2* Just by 
existing, by eating, drinking, taking shelter, have I 
not "already oppressed or starved, or driven out into 
a third world. . . .  It is the inability to occupy a 
place, a profound utopia."29 The ego is called by 
the face of the Other to justify its very existence. 
Has the ego done something to justify the space it 
appropriates? No longer is the primary question to be 
or not to be, but how can ay existence be justified in 
the face of the Other? Levinas has moved from Dasein 
as a Being-toward-death to an ego concerned for the 
death of the Other. The ego knows that the Other will 
die, so the question is, what can be done in the 
meanwhile?
28Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy,1* 85.
29Levinas, "Ethics as First Philosophy," 82.
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Responsibility
The face as pure expression calls the ego to 
respond, to do something to justify its existence. 
However, Levinas's theory of responsibility does not 
call for the annihilation of the ego. Levinasian 
responsibility maintains the dual structure of desire; 
that is, it questions the privileged place of the 
Same, but it keeps the ego intact, albeit in a 
subordinate position. Without a responsible self, 
responsibility loses its meaning.
Instead, Levinas furnishes a new way to think 
about responsibility: the ego does not choose to 
answer the Other's demand, to be human, it must 
respond to the Other. Responsibility is so extreme 
that it is the very definition of subjectivity, the 
ego is subject to the Other. "The I is not simply 
conscious of this necessity to respond . . . rather 
the I is, by its very position, responsibility through 
and through."30 The epiphany of the Other's face 
draws the ego from its comfortable dwelling. 
Responsibility founds the ego. This primordial
30Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 12.
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responsibility is concrete, infinite, and 
asymmetrical.
Levinas insists that the ethical relation is 
concrete and must be "enacted with full hands." A 
relationship with the infinite cannot be used as an 
excuse not to care about the world. Levinas often 
cites a Jewish proverb, "the other's material needs 
are my spiritual needs."31 "To give, to be for the 
other, in spite of oneself, but while interrupting the 
for-oneself, is to take the bread out of one's mouth, 
to feed the hunger of the other with my own 
abstinence. Thus, Levinas*s ethics demand 
concrete hospitality for the Other, be it the 
stranger, the widow, or the orphan.
What are the limits of this responsibility? 
According to Levinas, the face of the Other calls the 
ego to respond infinitely. The ego cannot comfortably 
rest from this responsibility. "At no time can one
3lLevinas and Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas, " 24. A thorough examination of this 
concreteness is found in Robert Gibbs, Correlations in 
Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 229-254.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 56.
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say: I have done all my duty. Except the 
hypocrite.1,33 Just like desire, the more I respond 
to the Other, the more I am responsible.
Responsibility is so extreme that the ego is 
responsible for the Other's responsibility. Levinas 
often cites Alyosha Karamazov as an example of this 
infinite responsibility. Alyosha boldly claims that 
"each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone 
and for each one, and I more than others."34
Is the Other also infinitely responsible for the 
ego? Is the ethical relationship symmetrical? No, 
Levinas calls for a radical asymmetry. The Other may 
be responsible for the ego, but that is his own 
affair. "I am responsible for the Other without 
waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. . . . 
The I always has one responsibility more than all the 
others."35 Without this asymmetry ethics would lose 
its meaning because ethics, for Levinas, must be 
grounded in the beyond Being. Ethics requires the ego
33Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 105-6.
34Levinas, "God and Philosophy," 182. Cf. Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Constance 
Garnett (New York: New American Library, 1957), 264.
35Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 98-9.
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to be radically dis-inter-es ted.iS The ego cannot 
demand reciprocity.
The recent movie Schindler's List nicely 
illustrates Levinasian responsibility.37 Oskar 
Schindler, a member of the Nazi party, had profited 
during World War II through the exploitation of Jewish 
slave labor. When he becomes aware of the atrocities 
committed by the Nazis, Schindler vows to save as many 
Jews as possible. Before his factory workers are 
disbanded and sent to Auschwitz for extermination, 
Schindler bribes the Nazi officers to allow him to 
export his workers to a factory in Czechoslovakia. 
Thus, Schindler was able to save over one thousand
36 It is on this question of symmetry that 
Levinas's thought decisively breaks with Buber's I- 
thou relationship. In Buber's formulation the I 
approaches and speaks first to the Thou, as if the I 
was investing the Thou with the right to respond. For 
Levinas, the Other speaks first, from an infinite 
height. For a discussion of Levinas's relationship 
with Buber see Robert Bemasconi, "Failure of 
Communication' as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of 
Dialogue between Buber and Levinas," in The 
Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed. 
Bemasconi and David Wood (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1988), 100-35.
37Steven Spielberg, Gerald R. Molen, and Branko 
Lustig (producers), Schindler's List (Hollywood, CA: 
Universal City Studios, 1993) . Cf. Thomas Keneally, 
Schindler's List (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993).
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Jews. For his actions, he was given a plague in the
Park of Heroes in Tel Aviv and declared a Righteous
Person by the state of Israel.
Although he had saved so many, Schindler had not
done enough. As he fulfilled his responsibilities,
his responsibilities grew. Near the end of the movie,
Schindler understands that all the money he had spent
previously prevented him from buying the lives of a
few more Jews. By eating, drinking, and taking
shelter, Schindler has usurped the place of the Other.
Schindler: I could have got more out. I 
could have got more. I don't know, if I'd 
just  I could have got more.
Itzhak Stem: Oskar, there are eleven
hundred people alive because of you. Look 
at them! . . . There will be generations 
because of what you did.
Schindler. I didn't do enough.
Stem: You did so much.
Schindler: This Car! Goeth would've bought
this car. Why did I keep the car? Ten 
people right there. Ten people. Ten more 
people. This pin: two people. This is gold: 
two more people. He would've given me two 
for it--at least one, he would've given me 
one. One more person. A person's who's 
dead. For this! (crying) I could've got one 
more person and I didn't--and I didn't!38
38Spielberg, Molen, and Lustig, Schindler's List. 
Note: this exchange is not found in Keneally's novel.
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Hie Divine
Like Descartes, who establishes the ego before
discussing the idea of the infinite, Levinas
establishes the ego and the Other before establishing
the divine. Indeed, for Levinas it is only through
the face of the Other that the divine appears. After
a lecture, Levinas was asked by a fellow professor why
he places ethics before divinity: "Is morality
possible without God?" Levinas responded: "Is
divinity possible without relation to a human
Other?"39 Levinas is not atheistic, but is
attempting to ground ethics in the beyond Being.
I am able to define God through human 
relations and not the inverse. The notion 
of God— God knows, I'm not opposed to it!
But when I have to say something about God, 
it is always on the basis of human 
relations. . . .  I do not start from the 
existence of a very great and all-powerful 
being. Everything I wish to say comes from 
this situation of responsibility which is 
religious and which the I cannot elude.
Levinas's conception of God contrasts with
ontological and participatory theologies. Ontological
theories assert that God is being par excellence.
Such a conception places God in Being itself, thereby
“Levinas, "Ideology and Idealism," 247.
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enslaving God to Being. More importantly, God as an 
eminent being, is within the grasp of the com­
prehending ego. A thematizable God is no longer 
transcendent. Against participatory theologies, 
Levinas's formulation retains the dual structure of 
separation and relationship. "The comprehension of 
God taken as a participation in his sacred life, an 
allegedly direct comprehension is impossible, because 
participation is a denial of the divine, and because 
nothing is more direct than the face to face, which is 
straightforwardness itself.1,40
Responding to the face of the Other renounces the 
drive toward being, and testifies to the infinite.
Life tends toward self-preservation; to act otherwise 
is to give testimony to the glory of the otherwise 
than being which is the glory of God. The "otherwise 
them being" is worshipped only by a radioed, di s-inter - 
est-edness.
Conclusion
To summarize Levinas's theory of radical alterity 
as it appeared in Totality and Infinity: the face, 
because it cemnot be thematized, overflows all
40Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78.
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ontological categories. Thus, the face calls into
question the ego's sovereign knowledge. The ego
wishes to understand the Other, is drawn to the Other,
but its desire can never be satisfied. Thus, the
face, like the infinite, cannot be put into the
accusative case. Instead, the face is experienced in
the imperative or vocative cases. The face commands
the ego to respond infinitely, a responsibility that
grows as it is fulfilled. This desire guides the ego
to the beyond, to God.
The phenomenology of the relation with the 
Other suggests this structure of Desire 
analysed as an idea of the Infinite. . . .
The privilege of the Other in relation to 
the I--or moral consciousness--is the very 
opening to exteriority, which is also an 
opening to Highness.41
Levinas's formulation for radical alterity breaks 
down the tyranny of the Same. In its place, he 
discovers a transcendental basis for ethics in the 
face of the Other. Against Heidegger and Spinoza for 
whom the conatus essendi, the effort to exist, is the 
supreme law, Levinas proclaims a new law: "Thou shalt 
not kill." This new law is "a limitation on the 
conatus essendi. . . .  A rupture is produced with
41Levinas, "Signature," 294.
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being's own law, with the law of being. The law of 
evil is the law of being."42
42Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality," 175.
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CHAPTER POOR 
LEVINAS IAN ETHICS II: OTHERNISE THAN BEING
Chapter 3 outlined Levinas's heteronomic 
philosophy as it appeared in Levinas's first major 
work, Totality and Infinity. Levinas argued that the 
ego was shaken to its foundations by the face of the 
Other. The face of the Other calls the ego out of its 
selfish lair and demands a response. The ego is 
called by the Other to respond infinitely, concretely, 
and asymmetrically. In this ethical relationship, the 
ego is no longer primarily concerned with self 
preservation. Instead of subjective death, the death 
of the Other is the ego's primary concern.
Fundamental ethics supplants fundamental ontology.
This chapter is devoted to Derrida's insightful 
criticisms of Totality and Infinity and Levinas's 
responses to Derrida. Although Levinas, in response 
to Derrida, changed the metaphysical underpinnings of 
his ethics, the fundamental conclusion remains: the 
ego is still infinitely, concretely, and 
asymmetrically responsible for the Other.
Levinas's radical interpretation of the Western 
tradition remained largely ignored until Jacques
105
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Derrida published his extensive commentary, "Violence 
and Metaphysics". Although Derrida praised the 
Levina si an project, he claimed that Levinas had 
ultimately failed in his attempt to establish a 
transcendent ethics beyond Being. Derrida argued that 
a philosophy that seeks to think otherwise than Being 
cannot rely on the dominant logos of the tradition.
"If one thinks, as Levinas does, that positive 
Infinity tolerates, or even requires, infinite 
alterity, then one must renounce all language, and 
first of all the words infinite and other."1 
Levinas, who desires to replace ontology with ethics, 
relies, at least in Totality and Infinity, on terms 
laden with ontological undertones, such as,
1 interiority1, 1 obj ectivity', ' in- finite', and 
'epiphany1. Derrida claims that the philosophical 
tradition cannot be transcended with its own language.
Further, Derrida argued that Levinas's attempt to 
establish an originary ethics had failed because 
language is vital to the encounter with the Other. In 
Totality and Infinity, Levinas had claimed that the 
face appears as expression or discourse. From this
lDerrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 114.
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foundation, Levinas has claimed that he had developed 
a primary ethical relationship that preceded ontology. 
Derrida counters that if the Other relates to the ego 
linguistically, then ethics cannot be primary. After 
all, Derrida and Levinas had agreed that language 
itself is ontological and violent. Since language is 
theraatizing, violent, and appropriative, our first 
encounter with the Other will then be thematizing, 
violent, and appropriative.2 A relationship based on 
violence and appropriation is hardly ethical. Thus, 
ontology precedes ethics.
More radically, Derrida argues that Levinas has 
failed in his attempt to discuss the positive 
infinite. In other words, Levinas failed in his 
attempted parricide of father Parmenides. Recall, 
that Parmenides had asserted that true transcendence 
was impossible because anything that can be known was 
caught inside Being. In the Sophist, Plato urges a 
parricide against Parmenides. The Eleatic Stranger 
calls for a discussion to establish "that what is not, 
in some respect has being, and conversely that what
2Cf. Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 115-7.
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is, in a way is not."3 The attempted parricide was 
foiled because the Stranger was unable to name 
anything that was beyond Being. Iievinas, on the other 
hand, adapted Descartes' idea of the infinite to show 
how a positive infinite could exist and be named and 
yet, remain separate from the ego.
Derrida argues that Levinas has failed in his 
attempt to formulate both separation and relationship 
with the infinite. First, Derrida revives Hegel's 
argument against the simple infinite. If the Other is 
the opposite of the Same, or even known only in 
relationship to the Same, then the Other is not the 
infinite because it is limited by its relationship 
with the Same. "If I cannot designate the (infinite) 
irreducible alterity of the Other except through the 
negation of (finite) spatial exteriority, perhaps the 
meaning of this alterity is finite, is not positively 
infinite."4 Furthermore, if Levinas claims that the 
Other is radical alterity or positive infinity, then 
the Other is unthinkable and unutterable. Thus,
3Plato, Sophist, 241d.
4Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 114.
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Levinas's attempted parricide will fall short just as
the Eleatic Stranger had.
As soon as one attempts to think Infinity as 
a positive plenitude (one pole of Levinas's 
nonnegative tramscendence), the other 
becomes unthinkable, impossible, 
unutterable. Perhaps Levinas calls us toward 
this unthinkable-impossible-unutterable 
beyond (tradition's) Being and Logos. But 
it must not be possible either to think or 
state this call.s
Derrida is willing to grant this radical 
alterity, but argues that it will not break from the 
totalizing philosophical tradition. "Contemplation" 
of the unthinkable-impossible-unutterable might be 
non-philosophy, but non-philosophy is bound to 
philosophy. Using Hegel's oppositional logic, Derrida 
claims that non-philosophy can only be known through 
philosophy, and thus is within its domain. He quotes, 
'a Greek': "if one has to philosophize, one has to 
philosophize; if one does not have to philosophize, 
one still has to philosophize (to say it and think 
it) . One always has to philosophize."6
Also, Levinas's attempt to break out of the Greek 
tradition was doomed to fail, because he relied on the
sDerrida, "Violence and Metaphysics, " 114.
‘Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics, " 152.
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Greek logos, the language of philosophy. Derrida 
claims that Levinas must move outside the reach of the 
Greek tradition to accomplish what a Greek, Plato, 
could never do. "Will a non-Greek ever succeed in 
doing what a Greek in this case could not do, except 
by disguising himself as a Greek, by speaking Greek, 
by feigning to speak Greek in order to get near the 
king?"7 In short, it is impossible to break out of 
the Greek tradition. It is impossible to articulate 
radical alterity. Pather Parmenides lives!
Otherwise than Being
Levinas answered Derrida's three main concerns in 
his second major work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence. In response to Derrida's criticism of using 
the tradition's logos to break from the tradition, 
Levinas replaced such ontologically laden words as 
' essence', ' totality', ' infinity', 1 substance1, and 
'exteriority' with 'proximity', 'substitution', 
'obsession', 'recurrence', and 'an-archy'. Thus, he 
purged, as much as possible, his later work of all 
ontological terminology.
7Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 89.
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Levinas also clarified the difference between the 
expression of the face and the language which Derrida 
claims is violent. Levinas concurs with Derrida: 
language, as it is usually conceived, is thematizing 
and thus violent to individuals. However, the 
primordial expression of the face is a non-thematizing 
saying that exists prior to the linguistic concepts, 
which are fundamental to the said. Against Derrida, 
Levinas is proposing an original discourse which is 
non-violent.
Now more aware of the distinctions between the 
saying and the said and the difficulty in discussing 
transcendence, Levinas's method in Otherwise than 
Being- becomes much less thematic or logical., and much 
more repetitive and cyclical. Levinas writes in the 
preface, "the themes in which these concepts present 
themselves do not lend themselves to linear 
exposition, and cannot be really isolated from one 
another without projecting their shadows and their 
reflections on one another."8 Indeed, Otherwise 
than Being blends form and content. The content of 
the essay, the unthinkable-impossible-unutterable
"Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 19.
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beyond Being is expressed in a non-ontological, non- 
thematizing form. For example, Levinas refrained from 
using the verb "to be" in its predicative sense. In 
its place he relied on participial constructions and 
series of clauses instead of sentences. Caution about 
terminology and syntax alone does not prevent the 
saying from being thematized. Any expression of the 
saying will reduce it to the said. Levinas confronts 
this problem by repetition, a continuous resaying of 
the said. The said will win out in the end, but it is 
the philosopher's task to retain an echo of that which 
cannot be thematized, the saying. "As the truth of 
what does not enter into a theme, it is produced out 
of time or in two times without entering into either 
of them, as an endless critique, or skepticism, which 
in a spiralling movement makes possible the boldness 
of philosophy, destroying, the conjunction into which 
its saying and its said continually enter."9 Thus, 
Otherwise than Being- is not so much a proof of the 
beyond Being, but an oscillating, repetitive essay 
where the beyond Being is insinuated. Transcendence
9Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 44.
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or non-philosophy does not rely on philosophical 
reasoning, as much as it shines forth.
Despite the terminological changes, the changes 
in emphasis, and the difficulty of expressing the 
ineffable, Levinas's conclusions remain the same. The 
ego is called to a responsibility for the Other, a 
responsibility which is concrete, asymmetrical, and 
infinite. Since this responsibility comes from an an­
archical relationship with the Other, ethics still 
precedes ontology.
The Saying and the Said
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas goes to great 
lengths to clarify the distinction between the saying 
and the said. This distinction is used on severed, 
different levels. Most simply, it is a direct answer 
to Derrida's charge that the initial relationship with 
the Other is violent if it based on language or 
discourse. More importantly, Levinas uses the 
relationship between the saying and the said, just as 
he earlier employed the Platonic concept of desire, as 
the paradigm for other aspects of his theory. The 
oscillating, but non-encompassing relationship between 
the saying and the said is extended to cover the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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relationships between philosophy and non-philosophy, 
Hellenism and Judaism, and ethics and politics.
First, Levinas distinguishes between the saying 
and the said to counter Derrida's criticism about the 
violence of the primordial relationship with the 
Other. Derrida argued that if the original 
relationship with the Other was enacted as discourse 
or language, then the original relationship is not 
ethical but violent. After all, language categorizes 
(accuses) the individual into a priori concepts. 
Individuality is subsumed by the genus. Derrida 
offers Levinas the means to overcome this obstacle.
The original discourse would be ethical and "coherent 
if the face was only glance, but it is also speech 
. . . now there is no phrase which is indeterminate, 
that is, which does not pass through the violence of 
the concept."10 If Levinas claimed that the 
original discourse was a discourse before language, 
then Derrida's objection would be moot. This original 
discourse Levinas labels the saying, while the 
violent, ontological language he labels the said.
10Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 147.
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The distinction between the saying and the said 
is best understood in juxtaposition to traditional 
theories of expression. In the traditional view, 
language originates with the speaker. The speaker 
intends to speak, formulates thoughts into words, then 
expresses them. The ego is preeminent. Levinas, on 
the other hand, emphasizes the role of the addressee. 
The focus is thus shifted from the ego to the Other. 
"The activity of speaking robs the subject of its 
central position; it is the depositing of a subject 
without refuge. The speaking subject is no longer by 
and for itself; it is for the other."11
The traditional view of expression emphasizes the 
content of the communication, the said. In the realm 
of the said, the speaker assigns meanings to objects 
and ideas. It is a process of identification, a 
kerygmatics, a designating, a process of labeling "a 
this as that."12 This is the realm of totality and 
autonomy, "a tradition in which intelligibility 
derives from the assembling of terms united din a 
system for a locutor that states an apophansis. . . .
11Peperzak, To the Other, 221.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 35.
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Here the subject is origin, initiative, freedom, 
present.1,13 This realm is the domain of Husserlian 
time, where time is a series of instants which can be 
re-presented in the consciousness of the ego. "It is 
only in the said, in the epos of saying, that the 
diachrony of time is synchronized into a time that is 
recallable, and becomes a theme."14 This synchronic, 
totalizing world is the world of Derrida's violent 
language.
The realm of the said overlooks the most 
important aspect of communication, the Other. Prior 
to the speech act, the speaker must address the Other, 
and before the address is the approach of the Other or 
proximity. Before any speech, before any intention to 
speak, there is an "exposure of the ego to the other, 
the non-indifference to another, which is not a simple 
' intention to address a message. "1S The saying 
includes not only the content of the speech, but the 
process itself which includes the Thou who is 
addressed and the speaker as attendant to the spoken
13Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 78.
14Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 37.
lsLevinas, Otherwise than Being, 48.
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word. As Peperzak writes, "saying is a sort of
foreword or 'preface' to the message that follows.15
The Saying signifies otherwise than by its 
function as an attendant! Beyond the 
thematization of the Said and of the content 
stated in the proposition, apophansis 
signifies as a modality of the approach to 
the other person. The proposition is 
proposed to the other person. The Saying is 
a drawing nigh to one's neighbor.17
While the said emphasizes the autonomous position
of the ego, the saying tears the ego from its lair.
The autonomous ego is forced out of his skin. The
"saying uncovers the one that speaks, not as an object
disclosed by theory, but in the sense that one
discloses oneself by neglecting one's defenses,
leaving a shelter, exposing oneself to outrage, to
insults and wounding.nl* in the saying, the ego is
more than just exposed to the Other, it is assigned to
the Other. Assignation supplants identification.
"The one assigned has to open to the point of
separating itself from its own inwardness, adhering to
16Peperzak, "Presentation," 60.
17Btnmanuel Levinas, "Everyday Language and 
Rhetoric Without Eloquence," in Outside the Subject, 
trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), 142.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 49.
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esse; it must be dis - interestedness.1,19 The saying
is a de-posing or de-situating of the ego. Thus, the
saying is otherwise than Being.
But, is it not possible to thematize this saying,
to account for it with the concepts of the said? Is
our understanding limited to the thematizable, or is
there something beyond? According to Levinas, the
saying cannot be entirely encompassed within the said.
Saying- Thou is not an aim, but precisely an 
allegiance to the Invisible, to the 
Invisible thought vigorously not only as the 
non-sensible, but as the unknowable and 
unthematizable per se, of which one can say 
nothing. The saying of Thou to the 
Invisible only opens up a dimension of 
meaning in which, contrary to all the other 
dimensions of thought, there occurs no 
recognition of being depicted in the 
Said.*0
The approach toward the Other is non- 
thematizable, nonutterable, impossible because the 
saying is diachronous to the said. The realm of the 
said, is a synchronic time, where all of reality can 
be thematized and made present to the mind of the ego. 
The saying, on the other hand, "is the inpossibility
l9Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 49.
*°Emmanuel Levinas, "Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel 
and Philosophy," in Outside the Subject. (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 34.
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of the dispersion of time to assemble itself in the 
present, the insurmountable diachrony of time, a 
beyond the said.1,21 The saying comes from a time 
before the time of Being, and is thus irreducible to 
ontology. It is the past that was never present. 
"Dia-chrony is a structure that no thematizing and 
interested movement of consciousness--memory or hope-- 
can either resolve or recuperate in the simultaneities 
it constitutes."22
The distinction between the saying and the said, 
is not unique to Levinas's philosophy. Similar 
distinctions have been made by other thinkers, such 
as, Heidegger and Derrida. Levinas's formulation is 
made unique by his claim that the saying is ethical. 
This ethical dimension is brought out in his analysis 
of proximity and substitution.
21Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 38.
“Emmanuel Levinas, "The Old and the New," in 
Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987),
137. This "un-reasonable concept" of a past that was 
never present is discussed below in the section on the 
trace.
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Proximity23
Levinas develops his theory of proximity, again, 
in response to Derrida's criticisms about language. 
Levinas had subtitled Totality and Infinity, "An Essay 
on Exteriority". Through his analysis of desire and 
the infinite, Levinas claimed the Other was truly 
exterior to the subj ect. However, he insisted that 
this relationship could not be reduced to spatial 
categories. Derrida rightly asks why Levinas still 
employs spatial vocabulary, such as exterior and 
interior "in order to signify a nonspatial 
relationship?"24 According to Derrida, this is 
another example of discussing infinity's excess in the 
language of totality; "that it is necessary to state 
the other in the language of the Same."25 Further, 
Derrida argued that Levinas's analysis of the face 
relied too much on Husserlian presence. The epiphany
23 For an excellent account of proximity in 
Levinas, see Joseph Libertson, Proximity. Levinas, 
Blanchot, Bataille and Communication, Phaenomenologica 
87, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).
24Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 112.
2SDerrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 112.
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of the face closely resembled Husserl's notion of an 
object coming to presence before consciousness.
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas dis-stances 
himself from spatial language and Husserlian presence 
by downplaying the face and concentrating on 
proximity. For Levinas, proximity is not a spatial or 
locative term. "It is not even the overcoming or 
neglecting or denying distance--it is purely (though 
not at all simply), 'a suppression of distance."26 
Instead, proximity is the original approach of the 
Other, an approach which is prior to language and even 
address. Proximity, the pre-original approach, is 
prior to the ontological said, and is therefore, 
before Being.
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas conducts an 
extensive phenomenology to de-scribe this pre-original 
proximity. Before speaking, the Other must approach, 
must somehow beckon the ego to speak. The Other 
affects the ego before the ego intends to be affected. 
"The neighbor strikes me before striking me, as though 
I had heard before he spoke. 1,27 Proximity is a
“Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 87.
27Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 88.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
response before any question, a saying before any
said. Before the ego has a chance to designate the
Other as a tode ti (a this), the ego has been assigned
by the Other. This assignation disturbs the tranquil
world of the ego and calls it to respond to the Other.
Thus, proximity, like the face, does not originate in
the ego, but is beyond cognition and intentionality.
The ego is called out of its lair despite itself.
In proximity, a subject is implicated in a 
way not reducible to the spatial sense 
. . . .  As a subject that approaches, I am 
not in the approach called to play the role 
of a perceiver that reflects or welcomes, 
animated with intentionality, the light of 
the open and the grace and mystery of the 
world. Proximity is not a state, a repose, 
but, a restlessness, null site, outside of 
the place of rest. . . .  No site then, is 
ever sufficiently a proximity.*®
This proximity of the Other affects the ego
despite the ego. It is a radical patience, in the
etymological sense. It is a passivity, but not a
passivity as opposed to an action. It is passivity
without choice. The ego does not intend to be
affected, it is affected, affectation itself.
Proximity is a radical exposure of the ego. "It
is in the risky uncovering of oneself, in sincerity,
*®Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 82.
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the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all
shelter, exposure to traumas, vulnerability.
Proximity is a vulnerability which can only be for-
the-other, non-indifferent, and dis-interest-ed. As
non-intentional, this passivity signals an an-archical
responsibility.
The face itself constitutes the fact that 
someone summons me and demands my presence. 
Ethical proximity begins here: in my 
response to this summons. This response 
cannot be conceived of as the communication 
of information; it is the response of 
responsibility for the other man. In the 
approach to others indebtedness takes the 
place of the grasp of the comprehension of 
knowledge.30
Ethics precedes ontology because the realm of the 
saying is diachronous to the realm of the said. The 
passivity of proximity, which belongs to the realm of 
the saying, cannot be synthesized into presence. 
Passivity does not belong to a time which can be 
reduced to an instant, com-prehendable to 
consciousness; it is "incommensurable with the
29Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 48.
30Levinas, "Beyond Intentionality, " 110.
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present, unasetnblable in it, it is always 'already in 
the past."31
In conclusion, proximity is a contact, a contact
which exposes the Other to a diachronous time. This
contact cannot be reduced to themes or presence.
Levinas responds to Derrida:
This exteriority has to be enqphasized. It 
is not objective or spatial, recuperable in 
immanence and thus falling under the orders 
of— and in the order of— consciousness; it 
is obsessional, non-thematizable and, in the 
sense we have just described, anarchic.32
Proximity is an an-archical assignation. The
Other assigns the ego in a primordial time. Levinas,
without using ontological language has revived his
conception of an-archical responsibility. This
responsibility is so extreme that the ego must
substitute itself for the Other.
Such a placing in question signifies not a 
fall into nothingness but a responsibility 
for the other, a responsibility that is not 
assumed as a power but responsibility to 
which I am exposed from the start, like a 
hostage; responsibility that signifies, in 
the end, to the very foundation of my 
position in myself, my substitution for 
others. To transcend being through 
disinterestedness! Such a transcendence
31Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 100.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 102.
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comes under the species of an approach to 
the neighbour without hesitation, even 
substitution for him!33
The Trace
Before discussing the radical responsibility 
found in substitution, a possible objection to 
Levinas's later philosophy must be addressed. If the 
saying, the proximity of the Other is diachronous to 
the ego, then how can this proximity affect the ego? 
Has Levinas, by moving away from Descartes' idea of 
the infinite, re-opened the two-world problem?
Levinas uses the trace, just as he used the idea of 
the infinite, to show how the infinite can affect the 
finite without being com-prehended. "This way of 
passing, disturbing the present without allowing 
itself to be invested by the arche of consciousness, 
striating with its furrows the clarity of the 
ostensible, is what we have called the trace."34
“Levinas, "Ideology and Idealism," 243.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 100. For 
excellent analyses of Levinas's conception of the 
trace, see Edward Casey, "Levinas on Memory and the 
Trace," in The Collegium Phaenomenologicum: The First 
Ten Years, ed. J. Sallis, 6. Moneta, and J. Taminiaux 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 241-55 and Michael J. 
MacDonald, "Jewgreek and Greekjew:' The Concept of the 
Trace in Derrida and Levinas," Philosophy Today 35 
(1991): 215-27.
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The trace refers to the approach of the Other, to 
saying, to the an-archical, which affects the 
objective world, but without leaving any inprint. 
Levinas qua phenomenologist follows the traces of the 
infinite, just as the hunter follows the traces of the 
game or as a detective studies fingerprints. However, 
this trace is an exceptional sign, it leads to a 
signifier who cannot be found, who in fact, was never 
present. The trace is the only evidence from the 
perfect crime; it is unrectitude. The trace is 
accompanied by its own effacing; that is, it is wholly 
ab-stract, a drawing away. "To be qua leaving a trace 
is to pass, to depart, to absolve oneself."35 It is 
an absence that was never present. The trace belongs 
to the diachronous time of saying. It is an absence, 
which can never be re-presented. "A trace is a 
presence of that which properly speaking has never 
been there, of what is always past."3*
A trace, which affects the phenomenal order, and 
was not present, is an unreasonable concept. It
3SEttmanuel Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," in 
Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 105.
3*Levinas, "Meaning and Sense," 105.
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defies logic. How is such a non-concept known?
Perhaps, it is only known by a 'bastard reasoning1,
just as Plato describes the receptacle in the Timaeus.
The receptacle "is an invisible and formless being
which receives all things and in some mysterious way
partakes of the intelligible, and is most
incomprehensible.1,37 As beyond com-prehension the
trace breaks down the sovereignty of the ego. In
fact, it points to the otherwise them Being.
How could one understand the conatus of 
being in the goodness of the Good? How in 
Plotinus, would the One overflow with 
plenitude and be a source of emanation, if 
the One preserved in being, if it did not 
signify form before or beyond being, out of 
proximity, that is, out of
disinterestedness, out of signification, out 
of the-one-for-the-other?3*
Divinity is experienced through the trace. The 
enigmatic trace could not have been left by objects of 
this world, it is beyond the sphere of cause and 
effect. The trace was left by he who was not caused, 
but is origin itself. Levinas coins a term 1 illeity1, 
or he-ness to refer to this divinity. "Illeity is the 
origin of the alterity of being in which the in itself
37Plato, Timaeus, 51ab.
3#Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 95.
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of objectivity participates, while also betraying
it.1,39 This illeity is not experienced directly, but
by responding to the Other.
To be in the image of God does not signify 
being the icon of God, but to find oneself 
in his trace. . . .  He shows himself only 
by his trace, as is said in Exodus 33. To 
go toward Him is not to follow this trace 
which is not a sign; it is to go toward the 
others who stand in the trace of illeity.40
Substitution
In Otherwise than Being•, Levinas re-develops his
ethical theory without relying on ontological terms,
such as, 'face' and 'infinity1. Instead, he relies on
non-ontological, non-spatial terms, including,
'saying', 'proximity', and the 'trace'. Nevertheless,
the key conclusion remains. Before any ontological
proofs, before any intentional actions, the ego is
responsible for the Other. As in Totality and
Infinity, responsibility maintains the dual structure
of desire: separation and relation.
Levinasian responsibility is radically for-the-
Other, but it does not annihilate the ego. Without
the ego, without separation, responsibility is
39Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," 359.
40Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," 359.
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meaningless. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas had 
established separation by conducting a phenomenology 
of interiority. Before the face's epiphany, the self 
was immersed in the world, pursuing its own 
enjoyments. The appearance of the Other, who is 
radically exterior, pulled the self away from its 
interiority. According to Derrida, this formulation 
of the interior and exterior, was too indebted to 
oppositional logic and spatial language.
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas discovers the 
necessary separation in his phenomenology of 
recurrence. Recurrence is an extraction of the ego 
from the original for-itself, but an extraction which 
bends back to the ego. Before the confrontation with 
the Other, the self is involved in its own affairs. 
This for-itself is confronted with the Other in 
proximity and is called out of its lair. The for- 
itself is assigned by the Other to respond to the 
Other's vulnerability. The Other assigns the for- 
itself to respond as a unique, irreplaceable 
individual. The self is obliged to respond, because 
no one else has been called. The for-itself becomes 
for-the-Other.
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In the exposure to wounds and outrages, in 
the feeling proper to responsibility, the 
oneself is provoked as irreplaceable, as 
devoted to the others, without being able to 
resign, and thus as incarnated in order to 
offer itself, to suffer and to give. It is 
thus one and unique, in passivity from the 
start, having nothing at its disposal that 
would enable it to not yield to the 
provocation.41
Responsibility is so extreme that it is the very 
definition of the subject, a for-the-Other. This for- 
the-Other is even a radical substitution for-the- 
Other. This responsibility I cannot refuse nor can I 
be substituted by another. "I can substitute myself 
for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for 
me. Such is my inalienable identity of subject."43
The self only knows itself by a curving back upon 
itself, a recurrence. Having been assigned by the 
Other, having been pulled out of its lair, the subject 
has now discovered its true identity. The self is 
subjectivity in the sense that it knows itself only as 
subject to another. "To be in-oneself, backed up 
against oneself, to the extent of substituting oneself 
for all that pushes one into this null-place, is for
41Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 105.
43Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 101.
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the I to be in itsel£, lying in itsel£ beyond 
essence."*3
Levinas finds the proper separation because the 
self is two parts of a unicity. It is both for-itself 
and for-the-Other. "The for itself signifies self- 
consciousness; the for all, responsibility for the 
others, support of the universe."** So, Levinas has 
found interiority and exteriority, for-itself and for- 
the-Other .
This passivity undergone in proximity by the 
force of an alterity in me is the passivity 
of a recurrence to oneself which is not the 
alienation of an identity betrayed. What 
can it be but a substitution of me for the 
others? It is, however not an alienation, 
because the other in the same is tty 
substitution of the other through 
responsibility, for which I am summoned as 
someone irreplaceable. I exist through the 
other and for the other, but without this 
being alienation: I am inspired.*5
This recurrence maintains the Cartesian double
origin. Logically, the ego is antecedent, but
empirically, the Other is primary. Empirically, the
ego is called to respond in a proximity which comes
°Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 116.
** Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 116.
4SLevinas, Otherwise than Being, 114.
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from an an-archical past. The Other approaches and 
demands a response before any intentionality. 
"Responsibility for another is not an accident that 
happens to a subject, but precedes essence in 
it. . . . I have not done anything and I have always 
been under accusation— persecuted."4* The self as
subjectivity is produced from an immemorial past, 
which is diachronous to the self. It is a radical de­
posing of the self which occurs prior to the existence 
of the self. "It is a withdrawal in-oneself which is 
an exile in oneself, without a foundation in anything 
else, a non-condition. The withdrawal excludes all 
spontaneity, and is thus always already effected, 
already past."47 This past is beyond the realm of 
ontology. It is otherwise than Being.
From his new, non-ontological foundation, Levinas 
continues to extol a responsibility that is concrete, 
infinite, and asymmetrical. Responsibility must be 
concrete because the ego is not called to respond from 
a transcendent being or ideal imperative, but from the 
approach of an incarnate Other. The subject who
46Levinas, Otherwise fhan Being, 114.
47Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 107.
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responds is also an incarnate being, who can only 
respond with concrete hospitality. This hospitality 
is so extreme that the ego must be "capable of giving 
the bread out of his mouth, or giving his skin."48
Substitution has the structure of an infinite 
desire. The closer it is approached, the more the 
desire grows. The more the self discovers itself as 
for-the-Other, the more it becomes aware of its 
increasing responsibility. "The more I answer the more 
I am responsible; the more I approach the neighbor 
with which I am encharged the further away I am. This 
debit which increases is infinity as an infinition of 
the infinite, as glory."49 The ego as recurrence, 
that is, as de-position, can only discover itself 
through the Other. "The more I return to myself, the 
more I divest myself . . . the more I discover myself 
to be responsible; the more just I am, the more guilty 
I am."50
Finally, responsibility is asymmetrical because 
it is based on the substitution of a unique individual
48Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 77.
49Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 93.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 112.
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for the Other. "I can substitute myself for everyone, 
but no one can substitute himself for me."51 The 
ego is called by the Other to substitute himself 
completely, to take his place. The ego as Being-for- 
the-Other, by its very nature prohibits any 
reciprocity. "It is I who am integrally or 
absolutely ego, and the absolute is my business. No 
one can substitute himself for me, who substitutes 
myself for all."52
Oscillation Between the Saying and the Said
Starting from the an-archical saying Levinas has
re-developed his ethical philosophy. Although the
world of the saying is originary, Levinas does not
abolish the important place held by the ontological
said. The saying requires the said. For instance, to
communicate the saying, indeed, to write Otherwise
than Being-, Levinas must employ the said. The saying
must spread out and assemble itself into 
essence, posit itself, be hypostatized, 
become an eon in consciousness and 
knowledge, let itself be seen, undergo the 
ascendancy of being. Ethics itself, in its
5lLevinas, Ethics and Infinity, 101.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 126.
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saying which is a responsibility requires 
this hold.53
The an-archical saying must be thematized, but it
should not be forgotten. Steps must be taken to
maintain the potency of the ethical saying. According
to Levinas, this is the proper, albeit neglected, duty
of philosophy. Levinas by writing tomes is trying to
unsay the said. Strangely enough, producing more said
is the proper modality of unsaying. The task of the
philosopher is ceaselessly to move backward to the
time of the saying, to re-say continually the said.
This is a peculiar type of philosophical reduction.
The reduction is reduction of the said to 
the saying beyond the logos, beyond being 
and non-being, beyond essence, beyond true 
and non-true. It is the reduction to 
signification, to the one-for-the-other 
involved in responsibility (or more exactly 
in substitution), to the locus or non-lieu, 
locus and non-lieu, the utopia of the 
human.54
Although the saying is originary, it has been 
mostly forgotten in favor of the said in the Western 
philosophical tradition. "I wonder whether, in that 
whole tradition, language as Said has not been
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 44.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 45.
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privileged, to the exclusion or minimizing of its 
dimension as Saying.1,55 Levinas desires to 
resuscitate the underprivileged term, the saying, as a 
means of checking the thematizing discourse of the 
Said. However, Levinas is well aware that the pre­
original term requires the privileged term in order to 
be universalized.
This oscillation between the saying and the said 
serves as a paradigm for Levinas's later 
philosophy.56 Levinas's entire project was to 
resuscitate the forgotten terms in the Western 
philosophical tradition. His writings are filled with 
such hierarchical pairs as; Same/Other, Greek/Jew, 
philosophy/non-philosophy, autonomy/heteronomy, 
ontology/ethics, synchrony/diachrony, and most 
important for this essay, politics/ethics. Each pair 
is mutually interdependent, but the second unit of the 
pair, although pre-original, has been neglected in the
S5Levinas, "Everyday Language and Rhetoric 
without Eloquence," 141.
560n this point, I am indebted to Susan 
Handelman' s excellent exegesis of Levinas1 s method, 
especially as it relates to the dichotomies of 
philosophy / non-philosophy and Greek / Jew.
(Handelman, Fragments of Redemption, 233-249 and 263- 
275) .
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tradition, while the hegemonic first term has been 
unrestrained. Levinas seeks to restore balance to the 
pairs without ignoring either.
For example, Levinas will attempt to resuscitate 
a pre-original ethics to balance the political. 
Politics, left unrestrained by ethics, will devolve 
into tyranny. However, Levinas does not eschew the 
political. He understands that it is necessary to 
universalize the ethical. In many ways this structure 
mirrors the dual structure of desire. The desired or 
transcendent element is pre-original to the ego, but 
the ego has been privileged in the tradition. Levinas 
re-emphasizes the transcendent term, but does not wish 
to do away with the ego. The transcendent needs the 
ego, but also must restrain it. What is most 
important is the oscillation that Levinas maintains 
between the two terms. As Handelman writes, "in 
Otherwise than Being, this conjunction and becomes the 
back-and-forth 'oscillation* of saying and said, 
philosophy and skepticism, subject and other, ethics 
and ontology, ethics and politics."S7
S7Handelman, Fragments of Redemption, 234. This 
Levinasian "method" closely resembles the more formal 
aspects of Derridean deconstruction. It is beyond the
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Skepticism and An-archical Ethics as Non- Philosophy
Finally, the exposition returns to Derrida's most 
serious charge. Derrida argued that Levinas's thought 
failed in its attempt to move outside of philosophy. 
The parricide of Parmenides had been foiled. The 
analysis of oscillation in Levinas's work shows that 
he is not arguing for an overcoming of philosophy, nor
is he attempting a parricide. Levinas is simply
calling for a reprieve (or in Derrida's terminology a 
1 deferral') . He is asking that non-philosophy serve 
as a check on philosophy. Non-philosophy can only
check philosophy if it is not consumed by it, that is,
if they exist in separation. Levinas is seeking a 
pre-philosophical experience which is radically Other 
to philosophy. This non-philosophy can infuse 
philosophy and revive it, but cannot be entirely 
subsumed in philosophy.
Levinas does not have to go far to find an 
example of this peculiar constellation of thought 
which cannot be reduced to philosophy. He has already
scope of this essay to compare and contrast the 
Derridean and Levinasian methods. For a good 
introductory discussion of Derridean methodology see 
Irene Harvey, Derrida and the Economy of Di£f£rance 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) .
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argued that philosophy as thematizing discourse must
continually unsay the said. This unsaying, this
calling into question of philosophy has been the
traditional function of skepticism. "Philosophy's
other is skepticism, which disrupts the system and
universal reasoning. What skepticism objects to is
not important: what is important is the perennial need
for philosophy to apologize, to justify its answers to
another."58 Levinas is not calling for a return to
skepticism, but only employs it as an example of how
non-philosophy is not "to philosophize still."
Skepticism, by its very resilience, seems to be
diachronous to the philosophical said. Skepticism,
which maintains separation from philosophy, is a form
of non-philosophy.
Philosophy is not separable from skepticism, 
which follows it like a shadow it drives off 
by refuting it again at once on its 
footsteps. Does not the last word belong to 
philosophy? Yes, in a certain sense, since 
for Western philosophy the saying is
S8Gibbs, "A Jewish Context for the Social Ethics 
of Marx and Levinas," 173. Por an interesting 
comparison between Hegel and Levinas on skepticism and 
non-philosophy see John Llewelyn, The Middle Voice of 
Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading of 
Responsibility in the Neighborhood of Levinas, 
Heidegger, and Others (New York: St. Martin1 s Press, 
1991), 44-8.
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exhausted in this said. But skepticism in 
fact makes a difference, and puts an 
interval between saying and the said.
Skepticism is refutable, but it returns.59
Levinas also claims that his ethics which is
based on the an-archical responsibility for the Other,
is an example of non-philosophy. Or, to use Levinas's
metaphor, this an-archical ethics is the Jewish moment
in his philosophical thought. To reiterate, in his
philosophical works, Judaism does not refer directly
to the God of the Old Testament, but is a metaphor
that refers to those moments in Western philosophy
that exceed the grasp of totality and autonomy. These
moments include Plato's Good beyond Being, Aristotle's
active intellect, Descartes' idea of the infinite, and
many others. In these Jewish moments, Western
philosophy was aware of its limits and knew that there
was something beyond its reach. Although philosophy
must return to its Greek moment of ontology and
thematizing discourse, it must not forget these Jewish
moments. Non-philosophy must continually reinvigorate
philosophy. For Levinas, the Jewish moment, par
excellence, is found in the ethical relationship with
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 168.
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the Other. This moment lies outside the grasp of 
autonomy and totality. Philosophy cannot encompass 
the face of the Other. There is a place for non­
philosophy. Levinas responds to Derrida:
It is not always true that not-to- 
philosophize is still to philosophize.60 
Not to philosophize would not be to 
philosophize still.61
Conclusion
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas sought to 
establish an ethics that preceded ontology, an ethics 
based on the face of the Other. Levinas*s formulation 
was sharply rebuked by Derrida for failing to 
establish an originary ethics. In response, Levinas 
changed the foundations of his thought. Most 
importantly, Levinas re-thought how difficult it is to 
establish an originary transcendence. As Bemasconi 
wrote, "one cannot simply pass beyond the confines of 
Western ontology by edict alone. "62
Beginning with the modest claim that 
communication requires an approach of the Other,
60Levinas, "Ideology and Idealism," 235.
61Levinas, "God and Philosophy," 186.
“Bernasconi, "The Trace of Levinas in 
Derrida," 26.
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Levinas re-developed his theory of an-archical 
responsibility. Before the ego intends to speak, cne 
Other approaches and demands a response. This demand 
calls the ego out of itself, to become for-the-Other. 
The ego becomes the very definition of subjectivity.
It is subject before it ex-ists. Thus,
"responsibility for smother is not sm accident that 
happens to a subject, but precedes essence in it"63 
The approach of the Other leads to sm otherwise than 
Being.
The face of the other in proximity, which is 
more than representation, is an 
unrepresentable trace, the way of the 
infinite. . . .  it is because in sm 
approach, there is inscribed or written the 
trace of infinity, the trace of a departure, 
but trace of what is inordinate, does not 
enter into the present, and inverts the 
arche into anarchy, that there is 
forsakeness of the other, obsession by him, 
responsibility and a self. The non- 
interchangeable par excellence, the I, the 
unique one, substitutes itself for others.
Nothing is a game. Thus being is 
trsmscended.64
The most important aspect of Otherwise than Being 
is Levinas's attempt to resay the said. His method of 
repetition and oscillation is an attempt to revive a
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 114.
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 116-7.
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non-philosophy which will check the hegemony of
philosophy. Levinas's essay oscillates between the
saying and the said. This oscillation was used by
Levinas to refer to the relationship between
philosophy and non-philosophy.
This structure can also be used to analyze the
relationship between ethics and politics in Levinas's
thought. Ethics which is a manifestation of the
saying, has been subordinated by politics, a
manifestation of the said. What is needed is a
resuscitation of the ethical to check the political.
However, the political should not abandoned, because
it is needed by the ethical. This oscillating
relationship can be transformed using Levinas's
metaphors: the Hebraic has been subordinated by the
Greek. While the Hebraic, ethical tradition needs to
be resuscitated, it should not supplant the Greek
tradition of ontology and politics. They should
coexist. Thus, it was most appropriate for Derrida to
begin "Violence and Metaphysics" with this quotation
from Matthew Arnold.
Hebraism and Hellenism, — between these two 
points of influence moves our world. At one 
time it feels more powerfully the attraction 
of one of them, at another time of the
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other, and it ought to be, though it never 
is, evenly and happily balanced between 
them.*5
"Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 79.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ETHICS AND POLITICS: AN-ARCHY AND JUSTICE 
Chapters 3 and 4 showed how the ego, and 
philosophies that privilege the ego, are overturned by 
Levinas’s heteronomous philosophy. According to 
Levinas, the ego is called into question by the an­
archical relationship with the Other. The ego no 
longer strives for self-preservation, but rather is 
called to respond to the Other. Ethics begins not 
from the self, but from the Other.
This chapter will show how Levinas's radical, 
heteronomous ethics can be extended to the political 
realm. First, it must be demonstrated that Levinas's 
thought is not apolitical even though he is deeply 
suspicious of traditional political thought. Second, 
Levinas's phenomenology of the Third person, "the 
Third" (la tiers) will be presented as his theoretical 
move from ethics to politics.1 Although the Third 
universalizes the an-archical relationship with the
l"The Third" will be capitalized because it 
refers to a specific other person, an Other, who by 
pure circumstance stands outside the original 
relationship between the ego and the Other. The Third 
as (an-)Other demands the same infinite responsibility 
as the Other.
145
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Other into politics, it does not supplant the original 
ethical relationship with the other person, the Other. 
Instead, there is a never-ending oscillation between 
ethics and politics. This oscillation is discussed in 
the third section of the chapter. The final section 
describes the Levina si an state which balances the 
demands of both ethics and politics.
The Politics of Suspicion
Levinas begins Totality and Infinity by asking 
whether or not we are duped by morality.2 
Considering the unchanging conditions of man making 
weir on man, the century of genocide in which we live, 
and the repeated atrocities, is morality not 
meaningless? According to Levinas, morality can only 
have meaning when it has its own justification, when 
it is not absorbed by ontology and politics, when it 
exists outside of the violence of ontology and 
politics. In the terms of Totality and Infinity, 
ethics will have meaning "only if the certitude of 
peace dominates the evidence of war."3 Levinas 
responds that we are not duped by morality. He finds
2Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 21.
3Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 22.
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the certitude of peace in the non-ontological saying, 
in proximity, and in the an-archical substitution for 
the Other. The primordial relationship with the Other 
is originally peaceful. Ethics has its own 
justification.
On equal footing is the question: are we duped by 
politics? Is it worthwhile to theorize about 
politics, or is the existent regime, the one that is 
the strongest, always the best regime? Can there be 
another foundation for politics or does politics carry 
its own justification? In Levinasian terms, is it 
possible to construct a politics which maintains the 
ethical relationship with the Other, one which does 
not reduce the Other, but preserves alterity? To 
paraphrase Levinas, the crucial question is not "to be 
or not to be?" but rather: How can the state be 
justified in the face of the Other?
Despite the importance of the political question, 
Levinas very rarely discusses politics at length.
This neglect is best understood in relation to his 
suspicion of traditional ethics. Levinas is 
acknowledged to be one of the foremost ethical 
thinkers of our century. Yet, as Robert Bernasconi
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pointed out in a recent essay, Levinas rarely 
confronts traditional ethical thought, including the 
ethics of Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, or Hegel. 
"Alongside Levinas's relative silence about the 
tradition of philosophical ethics is his equally 
puzzling silence about the critiques of Jewish 
morality to be found in Hegel and Nietzsche."4
Like many other nineteenth and twentieth century 
philosophers (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault, and 
Derrida come to mind), Levinas harbors a deep 
suspicion toward traditional ethical theories. Why 
would such a highly regarded philosopher of ethics 
choose largely to ignore the ethical tradition?
Levinas disregards most of the tradition because his 
critique of ethics is radical, that is, he attacks the 
roots of the tradition. Levinas claims that the 
ethical tradition subordinates ethics to ontology; 
ethics is derived from an eminent being or the 
contemplation of an autonomous individual. Levinas, 
on the other hand, provides ethics with a 
justification beyond ontology. Thus, he confronts the
‘Robert Bernasconi, "The Ethics of Suspicion," 
Research in Phenomenology 20 (1990): 4.
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ontological foundations of traditional ethical 
theories, but rarely the theories themselves.
Levinas, the great ethical thinker of our century, is 
more of a metaphysician than an ethicist.
Levinas's assault on the foundations of 
traditional ethical philosophy changes the very nature 
of ethics. No longer is ethics a prescription for 
correct behavior that may be freely chosen or refused. 
No longer does ethics require that this prescription 
be capable of being carried out. No longer does 
ethical action have a limit. No longer is the 
conscience the final arbiter of ethical action.5 
Instead, Levinas claims that ethics is pre - originary, 
based on a bad conscience, and requires an infinite 
responsibility for the Other. In Levinas's ethics, 
the ego is no longer concerned primarily with itself, 
nor does it follow an abstract set of rules derived by 
reason. Instead, the ego is concretely, 
asymmetrically, and infinitely responsible for the 
Other. Levinas's suspicion leads to a radical 
transformation of ethics.
sThis "traditional" formulation of ethics is 
outlined in Bernasconi, "The Ethics of Suspicion," 3.
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Levinas's attitude toward traditional political 
thought parallels his attitude toward traditional 
ethical thought. Levinas rarely confronts the great 
thinkers of the Western political tradition. For 
example, he never discusses, at length, such prominent 
political thinkers as; Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, 
Montesquieu, or Rousseau. And when he discusses 
thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, 
and Hegel he emphasizes their metaphysical theories 
instead of their extensive political thought.
Just as he attacks the foundations of Western 
ethical thought, Levinas attacks the underlying 
presupposition of Western political thought; namely, 
that political thought begins with the self.
Levinas's critique of Western political thought is 
best applied to modern political thinkers such as 
Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, who base their political 
thought on self-preservation. For instance, Hobbes 
claims that men's actions are determined by desires 
and the highest desire is self-preservation, or in 
Spinoza's terminology, the conatus essendi, the effort 
to exist. According to Hobbes, to ensure
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sel£-preservation, men desire security and its 
corollary, power. To ensure power, men must have more 
power.
I put for a generall inclination of all 
mankind, a perpetual and restlesse desire of 
Power after power, that ceaseth onely in 
death. And the cause of this, is not 
alwayes that a man hopes for a more 
intensive delight, than he has already 
attained to; or that he cannot be content 
with a more moderate power: but because he
cannot assure the power and means to live
well, which he hath present, without the 
acquisition of more.*
Since other men also ceaselessly desire power, each is
an enemy to the others. In such a world there can be
no science, no knowledge, no arts, "no Society; and
which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short."7 To ameliorate this war
of all against all, a social contract is agreed upon,
under which individuals lay down their rights to
ensure peace. Politics is established to preserve
self-interest.
6Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Everyman's 
Library, 1973), 49.
7Hobbes, Leviathan, 65.
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Levinas argues that any politics, such as
Hobbes', which begins with self-preservation,
subordinates ethics to politics. Society is based on
self-interest, not ethics. Instead of the originary
peace necessary for ethics, there is an originary war
which is not destroyed by the social contract, but is
only concealed. As Pascal wrote,
They have used concupiscence as best as they 
could for the general good; but it is 
nothing but pretense and a false image of 
charity; for at bottom it is simply a form 
of hatred.
Men have contrived and extracted from 
concupiscence excellent rules of 
administration, morality and justice. But 
in reality this vile bedrock of man, this 
figmentvm malum, is only covered, not 
removed.8
Levinas's critique of the foundations of 
political thought changes the very nature of politics. 
A politics based on the battle between autonomous 
selves, like Hobbes', is a negative politics whose 
primary purpose is to constrain individual desires. 
Levinas, on the other hand, insists that politics must 
have a positive role. Politics must serve ethics.
“Blaise Pascal, PensSes, trans. John Warrington 
(London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1967), 404 and 405.
Levinas includes No. 404 in his series of epigraphs to 
Otherwise than Being.
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The occidental ethic always proceeds from 
the fact that the other is a limitation for 
me. Hobbes says you can come directly to 
philosophy from this mutual hatred. Thus we 
could attain a better society without love 
for the other, in which the other is taken 
into account. That would be a politics that 
could lead to ethics. I believe, on the 
contrary, that politics must be controlled 
by ethics: the other concerns me.9
Although Levinas is suspicious of the Western
political tradition, his thought is not apolitical as
many have charged.10 His philosophy begins and ends
with politics. Numerous commentators have noted the
political motivations of Levinas's work. For example,
Peperzak argues that "the point of orientation and the
background of all other questions" in Totality and
Infinity is "the question of how the violence that
seems inherent to all politics (and thus also to
history) can be overcome by true peace."11
9Levinas and Rotzer, "Emmanuel Levinas," 59.
10See, for example, Wingenbach, "Liberating 
Responsibility," 19-45; Andrius Valevicius, From the 
Other to the Totally Other: The Religious Philosophy 
of Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 89- 
91, 150; and Abner Weiss, "Ethics as Transcendence And 
the Contemporary World: A Response to Emmanuel 
Levinas," Modem Jewish Ethics: Theory and Practice, 
ed. Marvin Fox (Athens, Ohio: Ohio State University 
Press, 1975), 147.
11 Peperzak, To the Other, 122. Also, Simon 
Critchley wrote, "I would go further and claim that, 
for Levinas, ethics is ethical for the sake of
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Politics is also a necessary step that Levinas's 
ethical thought must take. Just as the an-archical 
saying requires the ontological said, an-archical 
ethics requires politics. The mutually interdependent 
relationship between the saying and the said serves as 
the paradigm for the relationship between ethics and 
politics. Ethics, which is a manifestation of the 
saying, has been traditionally subordinated by 
politics, a manifestation of the said. A 
resuscitation of the ethical is needed to check the 
political. However, the political should not be 
abandoned. Ethics requires the political to be 
universalized into laws and institutions.
Ethics to Politics: The Third
Levinas's philosophy champions the ethical 
relationship with the Other, but this is not the end 
of his philosophy. According to Levinas, the Other 
drags the ego out of its selfish lair, and leads to 
ethics. However, Levinas worries that the
politics— that is, for the sake of a new conception of 
the organization of political space. . . .  My claim 
is that politics provides the continual horizon of 
Levinasian ethics." (Critchley, The Ethics of 
Deconstruction, 223) .
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face-to-face relationship with the Other will devolve
into another selfish lair. In this relationship, the
ego can become infatuated with the Other to the point
of ignoring all others. As Kant wrote, "complaisance
toward those with whom we are concerned is very often
injustice towards others who stand outside our little
circle.1,12 This embrace of lovers, as Levinas calls
it, is interrupted by the appearance of another
person, "the Third" (la tiers) . With the appearance
of the Third, a host of new questions arise. Are both
others the Other? How can the ego be infinitely
responsible for more than one Other? Which Other
should receive its attention first? What if one Other
makes war on the other Other? Can the ego defend the
Other against attacks from an-Other? If so, can the
ego use violence, even kill an-Other in defense of the
Other? The question of the Third disrupts Levinasian
ethics and leads to politics.
If just the two of us were in the world, you 
and I, then this wouldn't be a question, 
then my system would work perfectly. I'm
12Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of 
the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. J. T. Goldthwait 
(London: University of California Press, 1960), 59. 
Quoted in Atterton, "Levinas and the Language of 
Peace," 66.
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responsible to the other in everything. In 
this anthropology his death, his being 
toward death, is more important to me than 
try being toward death. . . . But we're not 
only two, we're at least three. Bven now 
we're three. We're one humanity. Then 
comes the question, the political question:
Who's the first?13
The third party occupies an equivocal position.
It is "other than the neighbor, but also another 
neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not 
simply his fellow."3* If the ego is confronted with 
one Other, then ethics is straightforward: the ego is 
infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely responsible 
for the Other. However, with the appearance of the 
Third, the ego's attention is divided, no longer is it 
only intimate with the Other. Responsibility assumes 
a new appearance.
The appearance of the Third invariably extends 
the ego' s responsibility because its appearance is not 
necessarily an empirical fact, nor does it come 
chronologically after the exposure to the Other. 
Simultaneously, the ego is confronted with the face of 
the Other and the Third. "Because there are more than
13Levinas and R6tzer, "Emmanuel Levinas," 59-60.
14Levinas, Otherwise than Being-, 157.
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two people in the world, we invariably pass from the 
ethical perspective o£ alterity to the ontological 
perspective of totality. There are always at least 
three persons.1,15 Thus, in the face of the Other, 
the ego is confronted with the Third. Indeed, in the 
face of the Other, the ego is confronted with all of 
humanity. "It is not that there first would be the 
face, and then the being it manifests or expresses 
would concern himself with justice; the epiphany of 
the face qua face opens humanity."1* The ego is now 
called to respond to all of humanity. As Burggraeve 
writes, "in the meeting with another person's naked 
Face, I become confronted with all other people, who 
are just as much in need of my help as the one who 
stands before me."17 The ego can no longer 
prioritize those in proximity, it must give attention 
to all. The ego's dis-inter-ested-ness is now a 
concern for world peace. "To see a face is already to
“Levinas and Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas," 21.
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 213.
“Burggraeve, "The Ethical Basis for a Humane 
Society," 36.
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hear ' You shall not kill', and to hear ' You shall not 
kill1 is to hear 'Social justice."1*
However, it is impossible to have a face-to-face 
relationship with each member of humanity. Those far 
away can only be reached indirectly through language, 
justice, and politics. Thus, the appearance of the 
Third extends the an-archical responsibility for the 
Other into the realm of the said, ushering in the 
latent birth of synchrony, consciousness, knowledge, 
justice, and politics.
The appearance of the Third opens up the 
dimension of justice. Judgements must be made. The 
ego must compare incomparable Others. "It is 
consequently necessary to weigh, to think, to judge, 
in comparing the incomparable. The interpersonal 
relation I establish with the Other, I must also 
establish with other men."19 Therefore, Levinas
“Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics and Spirit," in 
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sein Hand 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 
8-9.
“Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 90.
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distinguishes the ethical relationship with the Other
from justice which involves three or mare people.20
The an-archical relationship with the Other is
the pre-linguistic world of the saying. Language is
unnecessary to respond to the Other. The Third,
however, demands an explanation, "in its frankness it
[language] refuses the clandestinity of love, where it
loses its frankness and meaning and turns into
laughter or cooing. The third party looks at me in the
eyes of the Other--language is justice."21 In order
to judge between Others, they must be co-present, or
synchronous. Thus, the Third also opens up the world
of knowledge and consciousness.
Here is the hour and birthplace of the 
question: a demand for justice! Here is the 
obligation to compare unique and
20This distinction between ethics and justice was 
not elucidated until Levinas1 s later writings. "In 
Totality and Infinity I used the word 'justice' for 
ethics, for the relationship between two people. I 
spoke of 'justice', although now 'justice' is for me 
something which is a calculation, which is knowledge, 
and which supposes politics; it is inseparable from 
the political. It is something which I distinguish 
from ethics, which is primary. However, in Totality 
and Infinity, the word 'ethical' and the word 'just' 
axe the same word, the same question, the same 
language." (Levinas et al., "Paradox of Morality, " 
171) .
2lLevinas, Totality and Infinity, 213.
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incomparable others; here is the hour of 
knowledge and., then, of the objectivity 
beyond or on the hither side of the nudity 
of the face; here is the hour of 
consciousness and intentionality.22
Finally, the Third introduces the realm of
politics. The ego's infinite responsibility must be
extended to all humanity, no matter how far off.
Ethics must be universalized and institutionalized to
affect the others.
To the extent that someone else's Face 
brings us in relation with a third party, My 
metaphysical relation to the Other is 
transformed into a He, and works toward a 
State, institutions and laws which form the 
source of universality.23
Before examining the relationship between ethics 
and politics, several implications of Levinas's move 
from the Other to the Third need to be addressed. 
First, does the ego still have an infinite 
responsibility for the Other? In Otherwise rhan 
Being, Levinas defines justice as "the limit of 
responsibility and the birth of the question."24
22Emmanuel Levinas, "Diachrony and 
Representation," in Time and the Other, trans. Richard 
A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1987), 106.
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 300.
24Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 157.
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However, in the same work, he also claims that "in no 
way is justice a degradation of obsession, a 
degeneration of the for-the-other, a diminution, a 
limitation of anarchic responsibility."35 How can 
these conflicting statements be resolved? Either 
justice limits the responsibility for the Other or it 
does not. The contradiction is resolved by 
considering, once again, Levinas's theoretical 
emphasis on the separation between the saying and the 
said. Ethics is found in the an-archical realm of the 
saying, while justice is a part of the totalizing 
realm of the said. Ethics and justice exist in both 
relation and separation. Neither can be reduced to 
the other. Thus, justice cannot diminish the infinite 
responsibility for the Other: the ego remains 
infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely responsible 
for the Other. This responsibility always maintains 
its potency. However, the ego is also invariably 
transported, by the Third into the realm of the said. 
The ego must weigh its obligations. It is not 
possible to respond infinitely to all Others. The 
original demand for an infinite responsibility
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 159.
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remains, but it cannot be fulfilled. Ethics must be 
universalized, but in attempting to do so, the ego has 
already reneged on its responsibility for the Other. 
Thus, Levinas's peculiar formulation; justice is un­
ethical and violent. "Only justice can wipe it 
[ethical responsibility] away by bringing this giving- 
oneself to my neighbor under measure, or moderating it 
by thinking in relation to the third and the fourth, 
who are also my 'others,' but justice is already the 
first violence."2*
The "logic" of separation between the saying and 
the said can also be applied to the question of self- 
interest and reciprocity. The realm of the said is a 
synchronic world where all of humanity, including the 
ego, is co-present. In this realm, the ego is bound 
by the same institutions, the same justice, and the 
same laws as all the others. In this world, the ego 
can reasonably expect to be treated with reciprocity 
from the others. "Subjectivity is a citizen with all 
the duties and rights."27 However, the reciprocity 
found in the world of the said does not negate the
2*Levinas and Rdtzer, "Emmanuel Levinas," 62.
27Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 160.
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prior asynmetry of the an-archical relationship with 
the Other. Since the Third is known through the 
Other, reciprocity is only a secondary movement. An­
archical responsibility remains.
Justice can be established only if I, always 
evaded from the concept of the ego, always 
desituated and divested of being, always in 
non-reciprocable relationship with the 
other, always for the other, can become an 
other like the others. Is not the Infinite 
which enigmatically commands me, commanding 
and not commanding, from the other, also the 
turning of the I into 'like the others, ' for 
which it is important to concern oneself and 
take care? My lot is important but it is 
still out of my responsibility that my 
salvation has meaning.28
Finally, the relationship with the Third begs the
question of violence in the name of justice. Can the
ego with its infinite responsibility for the Other
actually harm an-Other to protect the Other? While
never explicitly condoning the use of physical force,
Levinas insists that the ego must defend the Other.
Surely, humility is the greatest of virtues 
— one must be as dust which becomes trampled 
down. But justice is necessary to preserve 
the Others from evil ones. One cannot 
forgive violence in the place of those who 
have undergone it or died. This is the
28Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 160-1.
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limit of substitution. To make peace in the 
world implies justice.*9
However, Levinas does explicitly grant that force
is necessary to punish transgressors, but this
punishment must be tempered by the ethical
relationship with the Other. Punishment is necessary
or evil will run rampant. "The extermination of evil
by violence means that evil is taken seriously and
that the possibility of infinite pardon tempts us to
infinite evil. . . . Without a hell for evil, nothing
in the world would make sense any longer."30 In his
commentary on the lex talioais, the eye for an eye,
Levinas describes how this punishment is necessary but
must be tempered. The passage seems clear enough:
He who kills a man shall be put to death.
He who kills a beast shall make it good, 
life for a life. When a man causes a 
disfigurement in his neighbor, as he has 
done it shall be done to him, fracture for 
fracture, eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth. . . . You shall have one law for the 
sojourner and for the native; for I am the 
Lord your God.31
“Quoted in Burggraeve, "The Ethical Basis for a 
Humane Society," 56.
“Emmanuel Levinas, "As Old as the World?" in 
Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 87.
“Leviticus, 24:17-22.
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Even in such a strict commandment, Levinas finds a 
"humanizing of justice.” By placing the passage in 
context, Levinas concurs with the Talmudic Doctors, 
"the principle stated by the Bible here, which appears 
to be so cruel, seeks only justice."32 This justice 
is only possible by tempering the violence against 
evil.
Violence calls up violence, but we must put 
a stop to this chain reaction. That is the 
nature of justice. . . . Humanity is b o m  in 
man to the extent that he manages to reduce 
a mortal offence to the level of a civil 
lawsuit, to the extent that punishing 
becomes a question of putting right what can 
be put right and re-educating the wicked.
Justice without passion is the only thing 
man must possess. He must also have justice 
without killing.33
How can an eye for an eye be translated into a 
softening of justice? Levinas, following the Talmudic 
tradition, claims that an eye for an eye refers to a 
fine. This "fine" may be the only possible form of 
justice, but it leaves open the way to the rich who 
can afford the fine. "They can easily pay for the
32Bmmanuel Levinas, "An Eye for an Eye," in 
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sedn Hand 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 
147.
“Levinas, "An Eye for an Eye," 147.
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broken teeth, the gouged-out eyes and the fractured 
limbs left around them.1*34 The demand for a 
tempering of justice must be expressed in the harsh 
words of the lex talionis, so that the rich do not 
commit evil in good conscience. "Yes, eye for eye. 
Neither all eternity, nor all the money in the world, 
can heal the outrage done to man.n3S
In conclusion, the Third both extends and limits 
the responsibility for the Other. The ego's 
responsibility must be extended beyond the Other, to 
the Third, even to all of humanity. Further, the 
Third necessitates an extension of the ego's an­
archical responsibility into the realm of the said, 
that is, responsibility must be made concrete in 
language, justice, and politics. Conversely, the
34Levinas, "An Eye for an Eye," 147. Levinas is 
far from clear on how the lex talionis represents a 
fine. However, this argument is common among Old 
Testament scholars. See, for example, William W. 
Hallo, "Leviticus" The Torah: A Modem Commentary (New 
York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1981), 
939-40. As Levinas is quick to point out, the lex 
talionis is an extension of justice beyond the tribal 
system to all foreigners. (See, Leviticus 24:22) Cf. 
Plato who draws a long litany of distinctions between 
citizens and strangers. (See, for example, Plato,
Laws, 850, 865-79).
3sLevinas, "An Eye for an Eye," 148.
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Third also limits the responsibility for the Other.
Since the Third forces the ego to choose between
Others, the ego's responsibility for the Other must be
tempered by its responsibility for others. Moreover,
the Other may behave in a way which negates the ego's
infinite obligations. The Other can become an enemy.
If your neighbour attacks another neighbour 
or treats him unjustly, what can you do?
Then alterity takes on another character, in 
alterity we can find an enemy, or at least 
we sure faced with the problem of knowing who 
is right, and who is wrong, who is just and 
who is unjust. There sure people who are 
wrong.3*
Levinas uses the Third to move from the an­
archical realm of ethics to the totalizing realm of 
language, justice, and politics. Levinas is not only 
interested in the ethical relationship with the Other, 
he is a social and political thinker. However, by 
placing his emphasis on the ethical relationship with 
the Other, Levinas has radically altered the 
relationship between ethics, justice, and politics. 
Ethics and Politics: Hebraism and Hellenism
We should also say that all those who attack 
us with such venom have no right to do so
3*Emmanuel Levinas, "Ethics and Politics," in The 
Levinas Reader, ed. Sein Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989), 294.
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. . . along with this feeling of unbounded 
responsibility, there is certainly a place 
for defence, for it is not always a question 
of 'me' but of those close to me, who sure 
also my neighbors. I'd call such a defence 
a politics, but a politics that's ethically 
necessary. Alongside ethics, there is a 
place for politics.3'
Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and 
politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both 
the Jewish tradition of ethics and responsibility 
along with the Greek tradition of language, justice, 
and politics. This section will analyze the mutual 
necessity of both ethics and politics. According to 
Levinas, ethics and politics can both be needed only 
if there is separation, that is, if each has its own 
justification. Neither ethics nor politics should be 
taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the 
other. "I think there's a direct contradiction 
between ethics and politics, if both these demands are 
taken to the extreme.
Ethics must temper the political because politics 
unbounded leads to tyranny, absolute power of the
37Levinas, "Ethics and Politics," 292.
“Levinas, "Ethics and Politics," 292.
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strongest. Further, politics ignores the 
individuality of each citizen, treating each as 
a cipher, a member of a species. "In political life, 
taken unrebuked, humanity is understood from its 
works— a humanity of interchangeable men, of 
reciprocal relations. The substitution of men for one 
another, the primal disrespect, makes possible 
exploitation itself."39
Without a norm outside of the scope of the said, 
there is no standard to judge political regimes. The 
call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what 
Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the 
Republic, had used the good beyond being as his 
standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to 
restore "the independence of ethics in relation to 
history" and trace "a limit to the comprehension of 
the real by history."40 Levinas finds a standard in 
the ethical relationship with the Other.
The norm that must continue to inspire and
direct the moral order is the ethical norm
39Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 298. Note: 
"substitution" here refers to its everyday meaning and 
not to the technical meaning it acquires in Levinas's 
later works.
40Levinas, " Signature, " 295.
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of the Interhuman. If the moral-political 
order totally relinquishes its ethical 
foundation, it must accept all forms of 
society, including the fascist or 
totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate 
or discriminate between them. The state is 
usually better than anarchy— but not always.
In some instances,— fascism or 
totalitarianism, for example— the political 
order of the state may have to be challenged 
in the name of our ethical responsibility to 
the other. This is why ethical philosophy 
must remain the first philosophy.41
At the same time, ethics needs politics. To
reach those others who are far away, ethics must be
transfixed into language, justice, and politics. "As
prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for
society or produce rules of conduct whereby society
might be revolutionized or transformed."42 Although
this universalization distances the ego from the
Other, it must be done to reach the others.
We must, out of respect for the categorical 
imperative or the other's right as expressed 
by his face, un-face human beings, sternly 
reducing each one's uniqueness to his 
individuality in the unity of the genre, and 
let universality rule. Thus we need laws,
41 Levinas and Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas," 30.
42Levinas and Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas," 29.
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and— yes— courts of law, institutions and
the state to render justice.43
Further, politics is necessary because there are 
those who will refuse to heed the new law, "thou shall 
not kill." Levinas is well aware that this 
commandment is not an ontological impossibility. Many 
will take Cain's position and shun the responsibility 
for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to 
prohibit murder, in all its forms. "A place had to be 
foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler and 
his followers."44
Both ethics and politics have their own 
justification. The justification for ethics is found 
in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The 
justification for politics is to restrain those who 
follow Cain's position and ignore the responsibility 
for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but 
rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it 
must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls 
for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which
43Emmanuel Levinas, "On Jewish Philosophy," in In 
the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 174.
44Levinas, "As Old as the World?" 87.
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is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for 
the liberal state.
The Levinasian State
According to Levinas, the move from the Other to 
the Third is the beginning of all violence. In the 
realm of the said, the ego must necessarily weigh 
others in the name of justice, but this process 
reduces the Other to a cipher. Strangely enough, 
justice is un-ethical. When justice is universalized 
into laws and institutions it moves yet another step 
away from the an-archical responsibility for the 
Other. The necessary universalization of ethical 
responsibility into the state is inherently un-ethical 
and violent. In the state, the ego is unable to 
respond directly to the face of the Other. Further, 
the institutions of the state treat the Other as an 
interchangeable cog in its machinery, thereby denying 
the transcendent element in man. Even when the state 
functions perfectly it is, by its very nature, opposed 
to ethics.
For me, the negative element, the lament of 
violence in the state, in the hierarchy, 
appears even when the hierarchy functions 
perfectly, when everyone submits to 
universal ideas. There cure cruelties which 
are terrible because they proceed from the
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necessity o£ the reasonable order. There are, 
if you like, the tears that a civil servant 
cannot see: the tears of the Other.45
Vigilance against violence in the state is
essential. Institutions need to be constantly checked
by the ethical relationship with the Other.
In order for everything to run along 
smoothly and freely, it is absolutely 
necessary to affirm the infinite 
responsibility of each, for each, before 
each. . . . As I see it, subjective
protest in not received favourably on the 
pretext that its egoism is sacred, but 
because the I alone can perceive the "secret 
tears" of the other which are caused by the 
very reasonableness of the hierarchy.4*
The state must be constantly reminded of its
inherent violence. Levinas finds just such a self-
critical state in the modern liberal state. The
liberal state "always asks itself whether its own
justice really is justice."47
What qualities does the liberal state possess
that makes it self-critical? First, there is the
45Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 23.
4*Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 23.
47Emmanuel Levinas and Raoul Mortley, "Emmanuel 
Levinas," in French Philosophers in Conversation: 
Levinas, Schneider, Serres, Irigaray, Le Doeuff, 
Derrida (London: Routledge, 1991), 19.
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freedom of the press, the freedom to criticize the
government, to speak out against injustice.
You know the prophets of the bible, they 
come and say to the king that his method of 
dispensing justice is wrong. The prophet 
doesn't do this in a clandestine way: he 
comes before the king and he tells him. In 
the liberal state, it's the press, the 
poets, the writers who fulfill this role.4*
Second, in the liberal state, the leader is not
above the people, but is chosen from among the people.
A ruler who is in an ethical relationship, sees
humanity through the Other's eyes. Against the
Platonic formulation that the best ruler is the one
who is best in control of himself, Levinas argues that
the best ruler is the one who is in an ethical
relationship with the Other. "The State, in
accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if
the divine word enters into it; the prince is educated
in this knowledge."49
However, for Levinas, the most important
component of the liberal state is its call for a
48Levinas and Mortley, "Emmanuel Levinas," 19.
49Emmanuel Levinas, "The State of Caesar and the 
State of David," in Beyond the Verse: Talmudic 
Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Mole 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 180.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
175
"permanent revolution".50 The Levinasian liberal
state is always trying to improve itself, trying to be
more just. It is "a rebellion that begins where the
other society is satisfied to leave off, a rebellion
against injustice that begins once order begins."51
Although no state can be purely ethical, the liberal
state at least strives for ethics. Such a state is
the desideratum if politics cannot be ethical.
There is no politics for accomplishing the 
moral, but there are certainly some politics 
which are further from it or closer to it.
For example, I've mentioned Stalinism to 
you. I've told you that justice is always a 
justice which desires a better justice.
This is the way that I will characterize the 
liberal state. The liberal state is a state 
which holds justice as the absolutely 
desirable end and hence as a perfection. 
Concretely, the liberal state has always 
admitted— alongside the written law— human 
rights as a parallel institution. It 
continues to preach that within its justice 
there are always improvements to be made in 
human rights. Human rights are the reminder 
that there is no justice yet. And 
consequently, I believe that it is 
absolutely obvious that the liberal, state is 
more moral than the fascist state, and 
closer to the morally ideal state."52
S0This discussion is indebted to Burggraeve's 
excellent analysis (Burggraeve, "The Ethical Basis for 
a Humane Society," 52-5).
5lLevinas, "Ideology and Idealism," 242.
"Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality," 178.
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Conclusion: An-archy and Justice
Since "it is inpossible to escape the State, "s3 
Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as 
possible. The world of institutions and justice must 
be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for 
the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and 
justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for 
the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, 
which includes ontology, justice, and politics.
Levinas's thought is not apolitical as many have 
charged.54 His harsh critiques of the political 
realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For 
example, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas sees 
politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the 
Other. "The art of foreseeing war and winning it by 
every means--politics--is henceforth enjoined as the 
very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to 
morality, as philosophy to naivete."55 Politics,
53Levinas, "The State of Caesar and the State of 
David," 178.
54See, for example, Wingenbach, "Liberating 
Responsibility," 19-45; Valevicius, From the Other to 
the Totally Other, 89-91, 150; and Weiss, "Ethics as 
Transcendence And the Contemporary World," 147.
S5Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 21.
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left to itself, by necessity, totalizes the Other by
reducing him or her to abstract categories.
Levinas will call for a politics that is founded
on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be
answerable to the an-archical relationship with the
Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of
the Other. Levinasian heteronomic political thought
oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy
and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state
is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation.
Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the
Judaic traditions. Neither tradition should dominate.
The fundamental contradiction of our 
situation (and perhaps of our condition)
. . .  is the simultaneous necessity both of 
the hierarchical structure taught by Athens 
and of the abstract and somewhat anarchic 
ethical individualism, taught by Jerusalem, 
in order to suppress the violence. Each of 
these principles, left to itself, only 
hastens the contrary of that which it wishes 
to insure.ss
5SLevinas, "Transcendence and Height," 24.
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CHAPTER SIX
levtha s 's HETERONOMOUS POLITICAL 
THOUGHT IN PERSPECTIVE
The preceding chapter developed the foundations 
of Levinas's heteronomous political thought. Starting 
from the an-archical relationship with the Other, 
Levinas uses the Third to move to the realm of the 
said, which includes justice and politics. According 
to Levinas, the state must balance both the ethical 
realm of the saying and the universal, violent realm 
of the said. Levinas claims that this balance can be 
found in a liberal state that always strives to be 
more just.
This chapter places Levinas's heteronomous 
political thought in perspective. The first section 
distinguishes Levinas's heteronomous political thought 
from the autonomous political thought of Hobbes and 
Locke. Levinas, like Hobbes and Locke, embraces the 
liberal state but he provides it with a new, more 
ethical foundation. This new foundation changes the 
nature of key liberal concepts such as natural rights 
and freedom.
Levinas's critique of Hobbes and Locke is, in 
many ways, shared by Hegel. Both claim that
178
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traditional liberal theory has unethical foundations.
However, Levinas disagrees with Hegel's solution for
infusing ethics into liberalism. Levinas claims that
the Hegelian solution, the modem nation-state,
totalizes the irreducible alterity of the Other.
Against the totalizing politics of Hegel, Levinas
posits a radical pluralism based on the Other. The
second section of this chapter examines Levinas's
critique of Hegel's totalizing politics.
Heteronomy Contra Autonomy: Levinas Contra Hobbes anri 
Locke
Although Levinas embraces the liberal state, he 
distances himself from the classical liberal state of 
Hobbes and Locke. He claims that each grounds their 
political thought on the freedom of the self and thus, 
do violence to the Other. Politics is established to 
prevent the greatest harm (summum malum) , rather than 
to promote the greatest good (summum bonvm) . For 
example, Hobbesian political thought (outlined in 
chapter 5) begins with free individuals seeking to 
fulfill their personal desires. Conflicting desires 
leads to widespread enmity, a war of all against all. 
From fear of violent death men join together in a
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social contract. Politics does not originate in the 
summum bonum, but in the summum malum.1
Locke's political thought seems to originate from 
a more peaceful state of nature than Hobbes' because 
he supplements the drive for self-preservation with a 
concern for others. Locke's law of nature teaches 
that, "all being equal and independent, no one ought 
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possessions."3 Locke claims that Hobbes has confused 
the state of nature and the state of war. "Here we 
have the plain difference between the state of nature 
and the state of war, which however some men have 
confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, 
good will, mutual assistance and preservation, and a 
state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual 
destruction are one from another."3
lFor an excellent discussion of the consequences of
this replacement of the classical ideal of the summum 
bonum with the summum malum see Eric Voegelin, The New 
Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1952), 178-84.
3John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. 
B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1980), 
19.
3Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 15.
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However, Locke's peaceful state of nature quickly 
degenerates into a war of all against all with the 
invention of money. Originally, the state of nature 
provides all the resources that a person needs to 
survive. "In the beginning sill the world was America, 
and more so than that is now, for no such thing as 
money was anywhere known."4 However, once money, a 
non-perishable commodity, is introduced, those 
possessing better natural talents, will accumulate 
more resources than they need for their self- 
preservation. As some people gain large amounts of 
wealth, others soon find it more difficult to provide 
for their self-preservation. Contentions increase.
The state of nature is transformed from a state of 
peace to a state of war. Individuals are quickly 
driven into society for the protection of their 
property. Even in Locke's scheme, politics is 
justified to check a war of all against all.
Levinas, like Hobbes and Locke, embraces the 
liberal state, but he aims to found it, not on the 
summum malum, the war of all against all, but on the 
summum bonum, the face of the Other. In a recent
4Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 29.
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interview, Levinas rhetorically asked; if his
philosophy ends up embracing justice, politics, and
the liberal state, "why tell this long story about the
face, which is the opposite of justice?"5 In other
words, why begin with the phenomenology of the face if
Levinas's eventual political formulations echo
traditional liberal theory? Levinas answers that the
phenomenology of the face provides a new foundation
for politics. Politics no longer has its own
justification, it must answer to ethics. In the
traditional liberal state, on the other hand, ethics
serves individual desires and politics. The
individual enters and remains in civil society for
selfish reasons. A state that serves selfishness does
not call the ego's desires into question; the ego's
good conscience is not shaken in this politics.
As a free man beside other free men, the 
subject remains a 'prince' . Even though 
this sovereignty is shared equally with 
others, it is still power: the possibility 
to stone free men, criminal hostility with 
regard to the individual. Alternation of 
violence exercised by the one and the 
persecution undergone by the others.6
5Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality," 175.
6Quoted in Burggraeve, "The Ethical Basis for a 
Humane Society," 16.
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According to Levinas, politics must be based on 
the ethical relationship with the Other which shakes 
the good conscience of the ego. Without such a 
foundation, a state based on a social contract between 
autonomous individuals is perpetually on the verge of 
degenerating into chaos. The social contract is "the 
reasonable order of a tamed but not conquered violence 
that, at any moment, could explode again in the terror 
of a systematic destruction, unrestrained by absolute 
morality."7 Thus, Levinas's theorizing about the 
face provides a new foundation for justice. "It is 
ethics which is the foundation of justice. Because 
justice is not the last word; within justice, we seek 
a better justice. That is the liberal state."8
To illustrate concretely how Levinas's 
heteronomic political theory changes the nature of the 
liberal state, the next section will describe his re­
formulations of two key concepts of liberal thought, 
natural rights and freedom. Natural rights and 
freedom radically change when the self no longer feels
7Peperzak, To the Other, 130. This argument is 
greatly indebted to Burggraeve, "The Ethical Basis for 
a Humane Society," 15-7.
8Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality, " 175.
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itself to be a prince, but feels a responsibility for 
the Other.
Whereas other theories of natural rights rely on 
ontological assumptions, Levinas resurrects natural 
rights by grounding them on the an-archical 
relationship with the Other. According to Hobbes and 
Locke, natural rights are originary, that is, they 
exist before any social status or any action of the 
individual. In fact, natural rights are inherent to 
the definition of "man," and thus, they are 
inalienable. As originary to the nature of man, 
natural rights become the justification for both 
politics and ethics. "They are probably, however 
complex their application to legal phenomena may be, 
the measure of all law and, no doubt, of its 
ethics.”9 With natural rights as foundational, 
traditional liberal theory is based on a society of 
autonomous, unique individuals. Rights, "express the
9Emmanuel Levinas, "The Rights of Man and the 
Rights of the Other," in Outside the Subject, trans. 
Michael B. Smith (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1994), 116.
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alterity or absolute of every person, the suspension 
of all reference."10
To ensure the protection of natural rights, 
individuals agree to forfeit some of their rights, 
most importantly, the right to execute the law of 
nature, to the state. Thus, the state is established 
to adjudicate disputes between competing rights' 
claims. In the dispensation of justice, the balancing 
of competing rights claims, the state necessarily must 
treat the incomparable individual "as an object by 
submitting him or her (the unique, the incomparable)
to comparison, to thought, to being placed on the
famous scales of justice, and thus to calculation."ll 
The state which was created to ensure individual 
rights as its end, must treat the individual as an 
object.
This objectification is exacerbated in the modern 
world because of the inevitable expansion of rights.
In fact, the number of new rights increases 
exponentially, as each new right requires additional 
rights to be enforced.
10Levinas, "The Rights of Man," 117.
“Levinas, "The Rights of Man," 122.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
186
The right to oppose exploitation by capital 
(the right to unionize) and even the right 
to social advancement; the right (utopian or 
Messianic) to the refinement of the human 
condition, the right to ideology as well as 
the right to fight for the full rights of 
man, and the right to ensure the necessary 
political conditions for that struggle. The 
modem conception of the rights of man 
surely extends that far!12
The plethora of new rights may be ordered into
hierarchies, but they are very rarely deposed. This
burgeoning of rights exacerbates the fundamental
problems of rights theories. Egos, who were not
called into question, demand an increasing array of
new rights, that undoubtedly increases contentiousness
and selfishness in society. Autonomous liberal
society becomes an atomized liberal society. The
institutionalized scales of justice become
overburdened and the state must use more violence to
protect the rights of individuals.
Despite this situation, Levinas praises
traditional liberalism for attempting to create a
12Levinas, "The Rights of Man," 120. The 
exponential increase of rights is a recurrent theme 
among communitarian scholars. See, for example, Mary 
Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of 
Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991) and 
Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, 
Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 1993) .
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pre-political peace, that is, for founding politics on 
an extra-territoriality, something that exists outside 
of politics. However, by finding the extra­
territoriality within the individual, traditional 
liberal theory has created a tenuous peace. "The 
justice that is not to be circumvented requires a 
different 'authority' than that of the harmonious 
relations established between wills that are initially 
opposed and opposable. These harmonious relations 
must be agreed upon by free wills on the basis of a 
prior peace that is not purely and simply non- 
aggression. "13
Levinas discovers a more ethical originary peace 
in the responsibility for the Other. In this 
relationship, the ego is freed "from its egotism of a 
being persevering in its being, to answer for the 
other, precisely to defend the rights of the other 
man.1,14 With this foundation, the "rights of man 
takes on an immutable significance and stability 
better than those guaranteed by the state."15
“Levinas, "The Rights of Man," 123.
“Levinas, "The Rights of Man," 125.
“Levinas, "The Rights of Mem," 125.
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Rights now are not an extension of the freedom of the 
individual but sure a duty. Life, liberty, and 
property are replaced by the life of the Other. The 
face's expression, "Thou shalt not kill," is the first 
demand for rights.
Levinas also opposes traditional liberal theories 
of freedom. According to Locke and Hobbes, freedom is 
inherent to human nature. Locke writes, "Men being, 
as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and 
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and 
subjected to the political power of another, without 
his own consent."IS Levinas, on the other hand, 
claims that the responsibility for the Other exists 
prior to the ego's freedom. This shift provides a 
more adequate basis for politics.
Levinas concurs with Hobbes and Locke, that 
institutions must be created in order to protect man's 
freedom. Freedom by itself is illusory, it can be 
taken away by tyranny. The threats of tyranny are so 
great that the soul can be forced to obey, to go 
against its will, without realizing it.
lsLocke, Second Treatise of Government, 52.
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We know that the possibilities o£ tyranny 
are much more extensive. It has unlimited 
resources at its disposal, those of love and 
wealth, torture and hunger, silence and 
rhetoric. It can exterminate in the 
tyrannized soul even the very capacity to be 
struck, that is, even the ability to obey on 
command. . . . that one can create a servile 
soul is not only the most painful experience 
of modern man, but perhaps the very 
refutation of human freedom."17
Levinas claims that "protection against such a
loss of freedom can only be found in political
institutions that urge and sanction the exercise of
individual freedom. We can arm ourselves against
tyranny by setting up institutions and laws. The
setting up of a state, "is the only way to preserve
freedom from tyranny . . .  we must impose commands on
ourselves in order to be free. But it must be an
exterior command, not simply a rational law, not a
categorical imperative, which is defenseless against
tyranny; it must be an exterior law, a written law,
armed with force against tyranny."19
However, the establishment of institutions to
protect freedom introduces the strange conception of a
17Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 16.
19Peperzak, To the Other, 126.
19Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 17.
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finite freedom. The ego finds itself constrained by 
institutions that, in its prior freedom, it had agreed 
to inaugurate. As time passes, the ego changes. 
Perhaps, it will no longer perceive tyranny as the 
same threat. Perhaps, the institution now seems a 
greater threat than the previous potential for 
tyranny. The ego no longer recognizes its will in the 
impersonal institutions. Thus, the institutions that 
were set up to guard against tyranny present 
themselves as another tyranny.
Levinas asks whether the individual can be 
persuaded to establish institutions for a different 
motive than protection of individual freedom.
Perhaps, the ego can be persuaded by something prior 
to this rational decision to protect its freedom.
"Does not impersonal discourse presuppose discourse in 
the sense of this face-to-face situation? In other 
words, is there not already between one will and 
another a relationship of command without tyranny, 
which is not yet an obedience to an impersonal law, 
but is the indispensable condition for the institution 
of such a law?"20 The ego can be commanded to
20Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 18.
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establish institutions, not to protect its freedom, 
but to protect the Other. Thus, Levinas concludes, "I 
can be led without violence to the order of 
institutions and coherent discourse because beings 
have a meaning before I constitute this rational world 
along with them.1,21 In this creation, the freedom 
does not perceive institutions as tyrannical, but 
feels a responsibility to try always to make the 
institutions more ethical.
In the autonomic liberal state, "when one sets up 
freedoms alongside one another like forces which 
affirm one another in negating one another, one ends 
up with war, where each limits the others. They 
inevitably contest or are ignorant of one another, 
that is, exercise but violence and tyranny."22 
However, Levinas's philosophy starts with "the 
relationship that is nontyrannical, and yet 
transitive. We have sought to set forth exteriority, 
the other, as that which is nowise tyrannical and 
makes freedom possible. "23
21Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 22.
22Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 22.
“Levinas, "Freedom and Command," 23.
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In conclusion, liberal politics which began as 
the answer to the svamum malum has failed to create a 
permanent peace. With an ever increasing demand for 
rights, the tenuous peace threatens to sink into 
selfishness and war. Moreover, as modern states 
become more complex, the autonomous will feels even 
more distant from the impersonal institutions that it 
has created. Levinas calls for a new foundation for 
liberal society, one that emphasizes the rights of the 
Other and a command from the Other.
To create an ethical politics, ethics must have 
its own justification, an extra-territoriality.
Levinas still finds this possible in the liberal 
state, but only in one that is always trying to be 
more just. "The capacity to guarantee that extra­
territoriality and that independence defines the 
liberal state and describes the modality according to 
which the conjunction of politics and ethics is 
intrinsically possible."2*
Without a foundation in ethics, the liberal state 
is but a concealment of war. However, Levinas argues 
that it is possible to found the liberal state on the
2*Levinas, "The Rights of Man," 123.
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ethical responsibility for the Other. These new
foundations change the very nature of the liberal
state and two of its key concepts, natural rights and
freedom. So, in response to Levinas's question, yes,
there is a reason to tell the long tale about the
face, even if it leads once again to liberal politics.
The ethical face-to-face relationship with the Other
changes the meaning of liberal politics. No longer
are we driven to create a society for selfish reasons.
The raison d'etre of the liberal state is now ethics.
It is very important to know whether the 
state, society, law, and power are required 
because man is a beast to his neighbor (homo 
homini lupus) or because I am responsible 
for my fellowman. It is very important to 
know whether the political order defines 
man's responsibility or merely restricts his 
bestiality.25
Pluralism Contra Totality: Levinas Contra Hegel
A philosopher settling his views on Hegel is 
like a weaver installing a loom— a necessary 
preliminary task to all subsequent work.26
Hegel and Levinas share a disdain for the liberal
state of Hobbes and Locke, which is primarily a
contest between opposing wills seeking to maximize
2SLevinas, "Ideology and Idealism," 247-8.
“Levinas, "A Language Familiar to Us," 201.
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their desires. Levinas and Hegel both seek to infuse
ethics into this self-centered state through the
exteroalization of the ethical realm of human
existence into the universal realm of politics and the
state. For Hegel this means the extemalization of
the moral realm of the family into the state, while
for Levinas the an-archical responsibility for the
Other must be externalized into politics. Levinas
praises Hegel for his understanding of this necessary
universalization.
Hegel's great meditation on freedom permits 
us to understand that the good will by 
itself is not a true freedom as long as it 
does not dispose of the means to realize 
itself. . . . Freedom is not realized 
outside of social and political 
institutions, which open to it the access to 
fresh air necessary for its expansion, its 
respiration, and even, perhaps, its 
spontaneous generation.27
Although they agree that the liberal state must 
be made more ethical, Levinas disagrees with the 
Hegelian solution; that ethics should be actualized in 
the modern state and its functionaries, the civil 
servants. Levinas claims that the Hegelian state is a
27Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 241.
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form of totalization which, is violent to the 
individual.
According to Hegel, the state is the 
reconciliation of ethical life in history. The state, 
as the realization of the ethical life (sittlichkeit), 
is a synthesis of the altruistic, particular realm of 
the family and the egoistic, universal realm of civil 
society. In the family, a person is not an individual 
but a member whose ties are based on emotion rather 
than reason. Each member of the family is willing to 
sacrifice their well-being for the good of the family, 
but only for their own family. Inevitably, the 
members of the family are pulled out of the family 
structure and must interact with individuals from 
other families. The individual is thrown into the 
realm of civil society, a form of ethical life, that 
is only minimally ethical. In civil society each 
individual seeks to satisfy its own desires. However, 
civil society is to be commended for extracting the 
individual from the particularism of its family and 
forcing the individual to think in more universal 
terms. "In the course of the actual attainment of 
selfish ends--an attainment conditioned in this way by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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universality— there is formed a system of complete
interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness,
and legal status of one man is interwoven with the
livelihood, happiness, and rights of all."**
According to Hegel, neither civil society nor the
family are adequate for a true ethical life. Whereas
classical liberal theory praised the selfish order of
civil society as the end of political life, Hegel
argues that this selfishness needs to be overcome.
Hobbes and Locke are mistaken to think that this
selfish sphere is the aim of politics.
Contrary to the traditional liberal theories 
originating with Hobbes and Locke, Hegel 
views the state not as an arrangement aimed 
at safeguarding man's self-interest (this is 
done in civil society), but as something 
transcending I. The state to Hegel is 
universal altruism--a mode of relating to a 
universality of human beings not out of 
self-interest but out of solidarity.29
Hegel proposes a higher stage of ethical life
which overcomes (aufheben) the weaknesses of both
family life and civil society. Hegel argues that
**Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel' s Philosophy 
of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), 123.
29Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modem 
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973),
134.
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ethical life will be realized in the universal
altruism that only occurs in the modem nation-state.
Thus, "the state is the actuality of the ethical
Idea."30 In the modem state, the individual
identifies its will in the various institutions
(estates, legislature, bureaucracy or monarchy) that
represent its interests. The actions of the state,
for universal ends, correlate with the desires of the
individual. Thus, the individual's will serves its
freedom as in civil society and its duty as in the
family. The public and the private are reconciled.
The state is the actuality of concrete 
freedom. But concrete freedom consists in 
this, that personal individuality and its 
particular interests not only achieve their 
complete development and gain explicit 
recognition for their right (as they do in 
the sphere of the family and civil society) 
but, for one thing, they also pass over of 
their own accord into the interest of the 
universal, and, for another thing, they know 
and will the universal. They even recognize 
it as their own substantive mind; they take 
it as their end and aim and cure active in 
its pursuit.31
Levinas contra Hegel, claims that the modem 
state does not actualize the ethical idea in history,
30Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 155.
31Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 160-1.
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but rather, in its drive for unity, the Hegelian state 
reduces all alterity to a totality. The Hegelian 
State is not ethical, it is violent. The individual 
is reduced to a moment in the unfolding of history and 
a cog in the machinations of the state. In the 
Hegelian system history and politics subsume ethics. 
"Idealism completely carried out reduces all ethics to 
politics. The other and the I function as elements of 
an ideal calculus . . . they play the role of moments 
in a system, and not that of origin."32
Further, the Hegelian state is an extension of 
autonomy. The goal of the state is the self becoming 
conscious of itself. The self fulfills its needs 
through the state, regardless of its relationship to 
others. "Consciousness1 quest for recognition reveals
32Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 216. Moreover, 
the Hegelian state is not judged by the Other, but is 
judged by its place in the unfolding of reason through 
history. "The verdict of history is pronounced by the 
survivor who no longer speaks to the being he judges, 
and to whom the will appears and offers itself as a 
result and as a work. . . judgement taken as the 
judgement of history kills the will qua will. . . . The 
virile judgment of history, the vile judgment of pure 
reason is cruel." (Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 241- 
3.) Hegel's cunning of reason through history seems 
more concerned with "world-historical figures" than with 
the widow, orphan, and stranger.
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itself as a narcissistic longing and self-fulfilling
aggrandizement."33 In this drive for self-
recognition, the self is never called into question.
Man is conceived of as an I or as a citizen 
but never in the irreducible originality of 
his alterity which one cannot have access to 
through reciprocity and symmetry.
Universality and egalitarian law result from 
the conflicts in which one primitive egoism 
opposes another. The being of the real 
never ceases to signify its being for me.
In this sense, idealism is an egoism."3*
Against the totality of Hegel's political
thought, Levinas proposes a radical pluralism based on
the Other. The advocacy of pluralism against Hegelian
totality is shared by many other philosophers
including Kierkegaard and William James. For example,
Kierkegaard complains that Hegel's system shows a
"comic neglect" of the existing individual. To remedy
this neglect Kierkegaard creates a philosophy based on
the subjective individual. Society is then a
pluralism of individuals that cannot be reduced by the
totality. Levinas's opposition to Hegel, on the other
hand, is based not on the uniqueness of subjectivity,
“Brian Schroeder, A1 taxed. Ground: Levinas, 
History, and Violence (New York: Routledge, 1996), 70.
“Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 7.
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but is founded on the infinitude of the Other.
Levinas argues that only such an unname able, 
unthinkable, unutterable Other can break the Hegelian 
system.
To understand how the infinitude of the Other 
breaks the Hegelian totality, it is necessary to 
compare the Hegelian aufheben (overcoming) with the 
Levinasian oscillation between the saying and the 
said, between ethics and politics. As Derrida points 
out, aufheben is a multi-faceted term: "aufheben is 
relever, in the sense in which relever can combine to 
relieve, to displace, to elevate, to replace and to 
promote, in one and the same moment.n3S The Hegelian 
aufheben is an overcoming of two opposing forces, but 
in this overcoming each is retained, but raised to 
higher level.36 Thus, the Hegelian state which is
35Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man," in Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 121. Cf. Derrida's extended 
comparison of his concept of diffFrance with Hegel's 
aufheben. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Glas, 
trans. J. P. Leavey and R. Rand (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986.) and Derrida, Positions, trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 
39-47.
3*See the discussion in Charles Taylor, Hegel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 119.
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the aufheben of the particular morality of the family 
and the universal egoism of civil society should 
maintain both family life and egoism. Neither should 
be eliminated by the state.
Hegel might respond to Kierkegaard that his 
philosophy does not totalize the individual but admits 
a plurality. In fact, individuals are not only 
maintained, they are risen to a new level in the 
modem state. The freedom of the individual is only 
fully realized in the state and in history. Indeed, 
compared to the German state of his time, Hegel 
envisioned a rich pluralism, one that represents 
almost all interests in modem society.
Some have argued that Hegel's state, in its 
purely logical form, maintains a plurality, but that 
in his more empirical political writings, Hegel's 
state, due to Hegel's adulation of the state, 
overwhelms the individual. "The concrete reality of 
this logic, of Hegel, is that social plurality, the 
stuff of ethics, is subsumed in his system under the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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thematic of citizenry in the universal homogenous 
political state."37
Levinas, however, argues that even in the ideal 
state, which relieves but maintains the individual, 
Hegel has created a totality. Against this totality, 
Levinas does not advocate the glorification of 
subjectivity, as per Kierkegaard. Instead, Levinas 
advances a more subtle argument against the Hegelian 
totality. Levinas, using Hegel's own logic of 
opposition, claims that if an individual is only known 
in relation to its part in the state or in world 
history, then the individual even if it is an opposing 
force, such as Kierkegaard' s individual, is still 
subsumed in Hegelian totality. Levinas insists that 
the individual must have a justification beyond the 
totality. Such a justification can only be found on 
the hither side of spirit's (geist) unfolding in 
history. Hegel explicitly discounts this beyond of 
Geist as the "realm of the false.” Hegelian Geist, 
like Parmenidean Being, is all encompassing.
37Schroeder, Altered Ground: Levinas, History, and 
Violence, 71.
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Levinas's radical pluralism is based on the 
unique Other that cannot be totalized. The infinity 
expressed in the face-to-face relationship cannot be 
contained within the relationship of the state. The 
aufheben cannot account for the face of the Other. 
Thus, a politics that originates with the Other cannot 
totalize the Other. The infinity that remains 
unaccounted for in the totality restrains the 
political.
Levinas argues that a pluralism not based in 
transcendence, such as Kierkegaard's, is unable to 
resist the Hegelian totality. It is inpossible to 
create a pluralism based simply on the addition of 
individuals. "Numerical multiplicity remains 
defenseless against totalization. "“
Pluralism as opposition to totality is only 
possible in transcendence. "Insisting on the 
irreducibility of the personal to the universality of 
the State; we appeal to a dimension and a perspective 
of transcendence as real as the dimension and 
perspective of the political and more true than
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 220.
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it."39 Pluralism can only exist in radical 
alterity. "This radical transcendence with regard to 
society prevents the latter from degenerating into an 
inpersonal totality."40
In conclusion, Levinas's oscillation between the 
saying and the said (and Derrida's conception of 
diff§rance) shares a formal structure with Hegel's 
aufheben.*1 However, Levinas (and Derrida) posits a 
beyond or disruption that cannot be incorporated into 
the totality. Thus, Levinas offers a radical
39Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 300-1.
40Fabio Ciaramelli, "Hie Riddle of the Pre­
original," in Ethics as First Philosophy: The 
Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, 
Literature and Religion, ed. Adriaan Peperzak (West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1995), 92. 
Derrida and Levinas agree that Hegel's aufheben can only 
be overcome by something that is beyond the geist. "For 
Derrida, there is always a reserve or a remainder which 
the Aufhebung cannot integrate. It is the 'non- 
representable,' which is of course usurped by 'being- 
represented' anyways— the violence of the name. . . . 
Nevertheless, Derrida aims with DiffGrance— which is 
exorbitant, unnameable, and can never be made present, 
which escapes all formalizations, as do force, the idiom 
and thought with respect to language--to make a fold in 
the process of systematizing and the all-inclusiveness 
of the Aufhebung." (Harvey, Derrida and the Economy of 
DiffGrance, 208) .
41For the structural similarity between Derrida's 
differance and Hegel's aufheben, see Harvey, Derrida and 
the Economy of DiffSrance, 78.
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pluralism based on individuals that cannot be 
encompassed in the totality. Against Hegel's claim 
that the modem state reconciles the individual and 
the community, or in the terms of Hegel's 
Phenomenology, "I=We", Levinas claims that "we" can 
never be merely a plural of individuals because the 
Other can never be encompassed in a totality.*2 
Conclusion
This chapter showed how Levinas' radical break 
with the Western philosophical tradition leads to a 
new basis for several fundamental terms in political 
philosophy, namely, natural rights, freedom, and 
pluralism. Against the selfishness of the liberal 
state, Levinas proposes a heteronomous political 
thought, that is, a politics based on the Other.
Against Hegelian totality, Levinas proposes a radical 
pluralism based on the irreducible alterity of the 
Other. This pluralism places the Other person, not 
the State or impersonal history, as the ultimate 
value. Thus, Levinas's heteronomous is a humanism, a 
humanism of the Other. The next chapter will show how
*2See Emmanuel Levinas, "The Ego and the Totality," 
in Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 43.
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Levinas's humanism of the Other offers a viable 
alternative to the theoretical and methodological 
anti-humanisms of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
HDMANISM CONTRA ANTI-HUMANISM:LEVINAS CONTRA HEIDEGGER
This chapter shows how Levinas's heteronomous 
political thought contributes to one of the most 
important political debates of this century, the 
debate between humanism and anti-humanism. Levinas, 
while taking seriously the charges of anti-humanists, 
such as Heidegger, resuscitates humanism based on the 
responsibility for the Other. This chapter and the 
previous one combine to examine Levinas's critique of 
autonomous, totalizing, and anti-humanist politics. 
Therefore they mirror the second chapter, which 
discussed Levinas's critique of autonomic, totalizing, 
and anti-humanistic philosophies.
Humanism and Anti-Humanism
One of the most controversial debates in 
twentieth century political thought has been the 
debate between humanism and anti-humanism.1 This 
debate has led to a reappraisal of the foundations of
xFor good discussions of the political aspects of 
these debates see Kate Soper, Humanism and Anti- 
Humanism (London: Hutchinson, 1986) and Luc Ferry and 
Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An 
Essay on Antihumanism, trans. Mary H. S. Cattani 
(Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1990).
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traditional humanism. Traditionally, humanisms, in 
their various manifestations, have been predicated on 
two key propositions. First, humanisms posit the 
human as the foundation (arche) for all actions and 
second, humanisms claim that the human is to be highly 
valued, if not the supreme value. The most 
controversial aspect of humanism is its positing of 
the human as the arche, as the guiding principle of 
its own actions. In its most extreme formulations 
this has resulted in the various cults of mem., such as 
Comte's, which merely replace God with man. In 
positing man as the arche, humanisms have assumed that 
man has a universal human nature. "If one understand 
humanism in general as a concern that man become free 
for his humanity and find his worth in it, then 
humanism differs according to one's conception of the 
'freedom' and 'nature' of man."*
This view of human nature becomes the "telos" of 
man in all its original Greek senses. Man's telos 
means that man is the goal of man's existence, it also
*Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," trans. 
Frank A. Capuzzi in collaboration with J. Glenn Gray, 
in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: HarperCollins, 1977), 201.
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means that man is the supreme authority to determine 
value, and finally, the telos offers a vision of the 
perfected man.3 Thus, the various humanisms, by 
positing an essence (often idealized) of man, have 
created a standard by which to make moral judgements. 
And since, man has not reached his highest state, 
humanists are usually eager to provide a blueprint as 
to how to transport man toward his perfection. Since 
most humanists claim that man has not yet achieved his 
perfection, man is viewed as alienated or homeless. 
This alienation needs to be overcome by human action.
The traditional view of humanism was sharply 
attacked on both theoretical and methodological 
grounds in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Theoretical anti-humanists, including Marx and 
Nietzsche, claim that humanism is not the solution to 
man's alienation, but only serves to perpetuate it. 
According to Marx, all previous humanisms have been 
based on an idealization of the essence of man, when, 
in fact, the essence of man is determined by man's 
social and historical conditions. All previous
3Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott 
(compilers), A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968).
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humanisms are ideologies that serve a particular class 
interest in a particular epoch of history. "The 
corollary of theoretical Marxist anti-humanism is the 
recognition and knowledge of humanism itself: as an 
ideology. "4 These humanisms that perpetuate the
existing social conditions must be overcome.5 
Nietzsche concurs with Marx that any humanism based on 
a universal human nature, obfuscates man's 
potentiality. Nietzsche claims that any conception of 
man, or of value, is subjectivist, that is, man 
creates his own essence and value. Previous humanisms
‘Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster 
(London: Penguin, 1969), 230.
5In his early writings, Marx attempted to 
supplant atheistic humanism with a positive, natural 
humanism. See for example, Karl Marx, The Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin 
Milligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964), 
181, 187. Of course, one of the main controversies in 
Marxist thought has focused on the extent that Marx 
moved away from his own early humanism. For example, 
Althusser wrote, "any thought that appeals to Marx for 
any kind of restoration of a theoretical anthropology 
or humanism is no more them ashes, theoretically” 
(Althusser, For Marx, 229-30) . Others claim that Marx 
maintained, at least implicitly, a conception of human 
nature, that could be used to build a socialist 
humanism. See for example, Adam Schaff, Marxism and 
the Human Individual, trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1970) and the symposium edited by 
Erich Fromm, Socialist Humanism (Garden City, NY: 
Anchor Books, 1965).
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have been created by the weaker groups in society, the 
herd, in order to restrain the higher type of man. 
Thus, for Nietzsche, as with Marx, humanisms must be 
overcome.
Methodological anti-humanists, including 
Freudians such as Lacan, behaviorists such as Skinner, 
and sociobiologists such as E. 0. Wilson, also 
question the permanency of universal human nature. 
These anti-humanists devalue the human by reducing it 
to a creature determined by impulses, stimuli, or, in 
it is most recent form, DNA.‘ By reducing human 
action to such motives, the new human sciences destroy 
any notion of subjectivity or interiority. "All 
respect for the 'mystery of nan1 is henceforth 
denounced as ignorance and oppression."7 These 
sciences of man, by reducing man to external forces, 
are radical materialisms, that totalize the
6For Lacan's anti-humanism see Ecrits: A 
Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Rout ledge, 
1977) . For Skinner's reduction of man to stimuli and 
responses see, for example, Science and Human Behavior 
(New York: The Free Press, 1953) . For a defense of 
genetic determinism see Edward 0. Wilson, On Human 
Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).
’Emmanuel Levinas, "No Identity," in Collected 
Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 141.
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individual. "The inwardness of the self - identical ego 
is dissolved into the totality which is without 
recesses or secrets. The whole of the human is 
outside. That can pass for a very firm formulation of 
materialism. "8 In their most pernicious forms, 
these sciences conflate method and existence by 
assuming that their scientific method accounts for all 
of reality. Method determines existence. Levinas 
finds this reduction inexcusable, "to take methodic 
principles as affirmations concerning the depth of 
things . . .is, indeed, characteristic of simple and 
hasty minds."*
Methodological and theoretical anti-humanists 
share a distrust of subjectivity. Man is seen as 
desperately alienated from himself. These anti- 
humanisms often resemble humanisms by positing great 
projects of de-alienation to overcome the obfuscation 
of man. But the failure of these projects has only 
exacerbated man's alienation. "Today's anxiety is 
more profound. It comes from the experience of 
revolutions that sink into bureaucracy and repression,
“Levinas, "No Identity," 142.
*Levinas, "No Identity," 142.
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and totalitarian violences that pass as revolutions. 
For in them the disalienation itself is alienated."10 
The failure of disalienating projects calls into 
question the possibility of any future reconciliation 
of the self, "as if the adequation of the self with 
himself were impossible, as if inferiority where 
formerly values were experienced could not close 
itself in on itself, as if the self in his presence to 
himself failed to coincide with himself and missed 
himself."11 Thus, all subjectivity and inferiority 
where man usually found value was lost.
Atheistic Humanism: Jean-Paul Sartre
Against this intense attack, humanism received a 
short-lived revival through the writings of Jean-Paul 
Sartre.11 In a popular essay, Sartre argued for a 
rebirth of humanism in an existentialist framework. 
Building on what he perceived to be Heideggerian
10Levinas, "No Identity," 143.
11Emmanuel Levinas, "The Contemporary Criticism 
of the Idea of Value and the Prospects for Humanism," 
in Value and Values in Evolution, ed. Edward A. 
Maziarz (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1979), 183.
“Humanism received a concomitant revival in the 
many forms of Marxist humanism. See, for example, 
Erich Fromm ed., Socialist Humanism.
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foundations, Sartre responded to theoretical anti-
humanists, such as Marx and Nietzsche, by creating a
humanism without explicitly positing an essence of
man. Sartre agreed that all previous humanisms had
asserted that "man possesses a human nature; that
'human nature,1 which is the conception of human
being, is found in every nan."13 Sartre, on the
other hand, denies any universal essence of man. He
takes the atheistic position to its logical
conclusion: without a God, there is no one to create a
human essence except man himself. By existing, by
acting, nan defines his own nature. Existence
precedes essence.
Man first of all exists, encounters himself, 
surges up in the world--and defines himself 
afterwards. . . . Thus, there is no human 
nature, because there is no God to have a 
conception of it. Man simply is. Not that 
he is simply what he conceives himself to 
be, but he is what he wills. . . . Man is 
nothing else but that which he makes of 
himself. That is the first principle of 
existentialism.14
13Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a 
Humanism," trans. Philip Mairet in Existentialism: 
From Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: World Publishing, 1956), 290.
l4Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," 291.
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Concomitantly, Sartre maintained that man must be 
the source of all values. "If I have excluded God the 
Father, there must be somebody to invent values."15 
Sartre attempts to distance himself from an extreme 
relativism, a morality of mere caprice, but he can 
only offer a very limited morality. He claims that 
nan as alone in the world, is a free individual, free 
to create his own history. "We are left alone, without 
excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is 
condemned to be free."15 Thus, Sartre can pass 
judgement on those who ignore their radical freedom 
and subordinates their autonomy to a God or even a 
categorical imperative. "I can form judgments upon 
those who seek to hide from themselves the wholly 
voluntary nature of their existence and its complete 
freedom. "17 These he calls cowards and scum.
Beyond this radical freedom Sartre can only claim that 
man "chooses without reference to any pre-established 
values, but it is unjust to tax him with caprice.
lsSartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," 309.
15Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," 295.
17Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," 308.
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Rather let us say that the moral choice is comparable
to the construction of a work of art."18
Without a universal human nature, or a God to
provide values, the ultimate truth is human
subjectivity. "There must be an absolute truth, and
there is such a truth which is simple, easily attained
and within the reach of everybody; it consists in
one's immediate sense of one's self."19
Sartre takes Marx and Nietzsche to heart and
creates a humanism that does not require a universal
human nature. Further, his humanism distances itself
from traditional humanism by boldly claiming that man
cannot be the highest value.
That kind of humanism is absurd, for only 
the dog or the horse would be in a position 
to pronounce a general judgment upon man and 
declare that he is magnificent. . . . 
Existentialism dispenses with any judgment 
of this sort: an existentialist will never 
take man as the end, since man is still to 
be determined. And we have no right to 
believe that humanity is something to which 
we could set up [as] a cult, after the 
manner of Auguste Comte. The cult of 
humanity ends in Comtian humanism, shut-in 
upon itself, and--this must be said— in
18Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," 305.
19Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," 302.
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Fascism. We do not want a humanism like 
that.20
Sartre's existentialism is a humanism because it 
posits man as the arche, the principle of all its 
actions. Man, abandoned in the world, must make the 
most of its autonomous existence. "This is humanism, 
because we remind mem that there is no legislator but 
himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide 
for himself."21 Sartre's humanism is a humanism of 
hope or despair; it is our choice.
Ontological Anti-humanism: Martin Heidegger
Sartre's essay was widely read and, since he 
explicitly claimed a Heideggerian legacy, had the 
effect of making Heidegger's works more popular. Soon 
after the publication of Sartre's essay, the French 
Heideggerian, Jean Beaufret, sent his master a letter 
asking whether Sartre's work was consonant with 
Heidegger's own work. Heidegger replied, in his 
famous "Letter on Humanism, " that Sartre had 
altogether misread his own work, especially Being and 
Time.
20Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," 309-10.
21Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," 310.
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Although Sartre had borrowed from Being and. Time 
many key terms such as "thrownness", "anxiety", and 
"project", he had neglected the key theoretical 
advancement of that work, the ontological difference. 
In Heidegger's mind, the ontological difference, the 
distinction between Being and beings, subverted all 
previous metaphysics. Western metaphysics had 
overlooked the full weight of the most fundamental 
question in philosophy, Leibniz's question, "Why is 
there something and not nothing?." Instead, Western 
philosophy had jumped to the Platonic question of 
essence, "What is?" This Platonic question shifted 
the focus of philosophy to beings by themselves 
without examining the meaning of Being itself. 
According to Heidegger, only in relation to Being, can 
the essential, Platonic question be answered.
Heidegger claims that Sartre's humanism had 
ignored the ontological difference, and therefore was 
just another metaphysics. Sartre's humanism, like all 
previous humanisms, asked what it meant to be human, 
what is the essence of man, without considering man's 
relationship to Being. "Any determination of man's 
essence that, whether it knows it or not, already
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presupposes the interpretation of the beings without 
raising the question about the truth of Being, is 
metaphysical . . . [and] because of its metaphysical 
origin humanism even impedes the question by neither 
recognizing nor understanding it. "22 Even a
philosophy as radical as Sartre's, which had tried to 
subvert the existence-essence hierarchy, had not gone 
far enough. "The reversal of a metaphysical statement 
remains a metaphysical statement."23 Sartre's 
existentialism founded on the claim that "existence 
precedes essence" is just another example of man's 
forgetting of Being.
This forgetting of Being is Heidegger's 
definition of man's alienation, his homelessness. 
"Homelessness so understood consists in the 
abandonment of Being by beings. Homelessness is the 
symptom of oblivion of being."24 Man can only regain 
his place by recognizing his true relationship to 
Being. Man, properly understood, is a shepherd of 
Being. As a shepherd, man must not tyrannize Being,
22Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 202.
23Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 208.
24Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 218.
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but should let Being, be. Man's actions toward Being, 
should be limited to providing a voice for Being.
This voice will not be a rational voice, but a 
poetics, a poetics attuned to Being itself, such as 
the verses of Holderlin. "Holderlin does not belong to 
'humanism1 precisely because he thought the destiny of 
man's essence in a more original way than 1 humanism1 
could."25 Being is best understood by a poetics 
which clears out a place for Being. "Language is the 
abode of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who 
think and those who create with words are the 
guardians of this home."24
Heidegger debates whether to throw away the 
concept of humanism. On the one hand, he is 
vehemently opposed to previous humanisms. But he 
stresses that this "opposition to humanism in no way 
implies a defense of the inhuman but rather opens 
other vistas."27 Instead, Heidegger's "anti- 
humanism" claims that previous humanisms, including
2SHeidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 201.
2*Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 193.
27Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 227.
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Sartre's, had ignored the regal place of man as the
shepherd of Being.
The highest determinations of the essence of 
man in humanism still do not realize the 
proper dignity of man. To that extent the 
thinking in Being and Time is against 
humanism. But this opposition does not mean 
that such thinking aligns itself against the 
humane and advocates the inhuman . . . 
humanism is opposed because it does not set 
the humanitas of man high enough."38
Thus, Heidegger keeps open a place for a new
foundation of humanism, one perhaps found in the
poetry of Holderlin and the speculations of the pre-
socratics. "Humanism now means, in case we decide to
retain the word, that the essence of man is essential
for the truth of Being, specifically in such a way
that the word does not pertain to man simply as such.
So we are thinking a curious kind of 'humanism1 ."39
Metaphysical Anti-humanism: Jacques Derrida
Derrida, in one of his few explicitly political
essays, analyzes Heidegger's attempt to open an
exalted place for man without drifting into a
metaphysics. Derrida agrees with Heidegger, that
previous humanisms have not been radical enough. For
38Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 210.
“Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 224-5.
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instance, Sartre sought to remove metaphysics from 
man's nature: but maintained the unity of 'human- 
reality. ' Sartre had removed God, but not the God 
structure. "Atheism changes nothing in this 
fundamental structure."30
Derrida then analyzes the attempt of other French 
humanists to appropriate the works of Hegel, Husserl, 
and Heidegger to create new humanisms. Derrida claims 
that French humanists have misread Hegel, Husserl, and 
Heidegger. After all, each of these thinkers was 
explicitly anti-anthropological, and thus, anti­
humanist. Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, were asking 
more fundamental questions them the essence of man.
Nonetheless, at a deeper level, in a second 
reading, they each fall within the metaphysical, 
humanist tradition. By emphasizing the end (goal) of 
man Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger had failed to end 
(terminate) man. Derrida claims that the 
establishment of a goal (telos) for man, prescribes an 
essence of man, and thus, each philosopher remains in 
the metaphysical, humanist tradition. For instance, 
Hegelian philosophy, when understood by its telos,
30Derrida, "The Ends of Man," 116.
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defines man as the site of spirit's (geist) unfolding. 
Husserl finds the goal of man in reason unfolding 
through history: "transcendental phenomenology is in 
this sense the ultimate achievement of the teleology 
of reason that traverses humanity. "31
Heidegger's attempt to move beyond metaphysics is 
much more difficult. He has, on the surface, moved 
beyond thinking of the classical conception of man as 
a creature having rationality (zoon logon echon) .
Yet, there remains something like a magnetic 
attraction in Heidegger's writings between man and 
Being. Man is given a privileged place as shepherd of 
Being. Thus, it is man that must be questioned about 
the truth of Being. "This entity which each of us is 
himself and which includes inquiring as one of the 
possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the 
term "Dasein."32 By directing the questions of Being 
toward a particular being, Heidegger privileges man.
Of course, Heidegger went to great lengths to 
avoid making Dasein into a metaphysical creature. But 
Dasein1 s care structure reveals Dasein for what it is,
3lDerrida, "The Ends of Man," 123.
32Heidegger, Being and Time, 27.
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namely, man. "In the claim upon man, in the attempt
to make man ready for this claim, is there not implied
a concern about man? Where else does 'care' tend but
in the direction of bringing man back to his
essence."33 Thus, Heidegger has failed to move
outside of metaphysics.
It remains that the thinking of Being, the 
thinking of the truth of Being, in the name 
of which Heidegger de-limits humanism and 
metaphysics, remains as thinking of man.
Man and the name of Man are not displaced in 
the question of Being such as it is put to 
metaphysics. Even less do they disappear, 
on the contrary, at issue is a kind of 
revaluation or revalorization of the essence 
and dignity of man.34
Heidegger attempts to supplant the metaphysical 
underpinnings of traditional humanism but metaphysical 
humanism seeps almost surreptitiously into Heidegger's 
thought. Derrida's deconstruction of Heidegger's 
"Letter on Humanism" demonstrates how difficult it is 
to establish a humanism that is not tied to 
metaphysics. In fact, Derrida shows how difficult it 
is to think 'anything' outside of metaphysics.
Humanism, because it is based on either essence
“Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 199.
“Derrida, "The Ends of Man," 128.
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(being) or common language, is inevitably a 
metaphysics. "Being and Language— the group of 
languages— that the we governs or opens: such is the 
name of that which assures the transition between 
metaphysics and humanism via the we."3S But neither 
Derrida nor Heidegger cut off the possibility of a 
post-metaphysical humanism. If there could be a post­
metaphysical humanism it must follow Heidegger's lead 
and be based on an an-archy. It would be a "curious 
kind of humanism."
Any questioning of humanism that does not 
first catch up with the archaeological 
radicalness of the questions sketched by 
Heidegger . . . any metahumanist position 
that does not place itself within the 
opening of these questions remains 
historically regional, periodic, and 
peripheral, juridically secondary and 
dependent.3*
Humanism of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas
Levinas's essays on humanism, in response to 
Heidegger and Derrida, are an attempt to create an an­
archical humanism. Levinas wants to create a new 
foundation for humanism, one that privileges man, but 
remains outside of traditional metaphysics.
“Derrida, "The Ends of Man," 121.
“Derrida, "The Ends of Man," 128.
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Levinas, like Derrida, claims that Heidegger has 
failed in his attempt to find a higher place for the 
human. Indeed, Heidegger's attempt to elevate Dasein 
ends up subordinating Dasein to the neuter concept. 
Being. "Being would be without an exit, and man would 
be certainly one of the high places where the designs 
of being work themselves out, but a high place where 
these designs work themselves out without man's 
knowledge."37 Just as Hegel had reduced man to the 
totalizing system, Heidegger has reduced man to the 
neuter Being. Heidegger has failed to find a higher 
place for the human. Moreover, Heidegger has failed 
to resolve man's homelessness. Man, as a shepherd of 
Being, remains subservient to the totality.
Levinas, on the other hand, wonders whether man's 
alienation, his strangeness in the world, his 
homelessness, may be even more primordial than a 
forgetting of Being or Plato's misreading of 
Parmenides. Could it be that man's alienation is an 
inescapable part of the human condition? Is it 
possible that alienation could not be reconciled even
37Levinas, The Contemporary Criticism of the Idea 
of Value," 182.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
227
by the pre-Socratics or the venerable Holderlin? is 
it possible that value can be found not in the 
dealienation of nan, but in alienation itself?
Levinas argues that man has always been homeless. 
The goal of modem philosophy, the self-identity of 
the ego, is doomed to fail. Inferiority cannot be 
reconciled. Man is without identity. Thus, Levinas 
agrees with the theoretical and methodological anti­
humanists; inferiority, defined as the adequation of 
the ego, is impossible. "Here is the impossible human 
inferiority claimed by the anti-humanism of our times. 
It derives neither from metaphysics nor from the end 
of metaphysics. "3*
For Levinas, the strangeness of man to himself, 
the impossibility of inferiority, is not due to the 
forgetting of Being, but is due to an inability of man 
to cut himself off from the Other. The Other, before 
the ego has any conception of itself, demands a 
response. "There always being a distance between the 
I and the self. The recurrence of the I to the Self 
is impossible. It is impossible, for no one can
“Levinas, "The Contemporary Criticism of the 
Idea of Value," 185.
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remain in himself, for the humanity of nan is a 
responsibility for all."3* This impossibility of 
ego's adequation has been ignored by philosophy, which 
has always attempted to reconcile identity, to make 
man whole, apart from others. "Stranger to itself, 
obsessed by the others, dis-quiet, the ego is a 
hostage, a hostage in its very recurrence as an ego 
ceaselessly missing itself."40
Levinas often refers to a passage from Genesis to 
illustrate this inability to close oneself off from 
humanity. As the Bible explicitly tells us, it took 
God to close the door behind Noah when humanity was 
doomed to die in the flood. Noah was unable to close 
the door to humanity in distress. The ego cannot 
close itself in its little world and ignore others. 
This insurmountable alienation does not lead to 
nihilism. Instead, alienation leads to ethics. The 
inevitable alienation of men, the common experience or 
pathos of homelessness, brings men together.
3*Levinas, "The Contemporary Criticism of the 
Idea of Value," 185.
40Levinas, "No Identity," 149-50.
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According to Levinas, this is the principle lesson of
the Old Testament.
An echo of the Bible's permanent message and 
perhaps its principle message, this 
condition--or un-condition of stranger and 
"slave in the land of Egypt" draws man 
together with his neighbor. Men seek 
themselves out in the uncondition of 
strangers. This latter unites humanity.
The difference which accounts for this 
strangeness in the world is fundamentally a 
nonindifference in regard to men— in regard 
to value.41
In this response to the Other, this hospitality, 
the ego is able to find some inferiority. "Having no 
rest in one's self, without any bias in the world, 
this strangeness to every place, this being-on-the- 
other-side of being, this beyond— this is certainly an
41Levinas, "The Contemporary Criticism of the 
Idea of Value," 185. Levinas implicitly brings up the 
crucial role that hospitality toward strangers plays 
in an ethical system. Both the Hebrew and the Greek 
traditions use hospitality as a gauge for judging 
societies. For example, Odysseus asks "what are the 
people whose land I have come to this time, 
and are they violent and savage, and without justice, 
or hospitable to strangers, with a godly mind?" (The 
Odyssey, 5:119-120). For the diminished importance of 
hospitality in the modem world, see Michael 
Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1984) . Further research on Levinas's notion 
of hospitality is needed. For a brief discussion of 
Levinas's views on hospitality, see Thomas W.
Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions of 
Moral Understanding (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1985), 35-63.
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interiority in its own way."42 This is not a 
metaphysical interiority but a discovery of the 
subject as subject to the Other. Thus, Levinas 
provides a unique interpretation of Rimbaud's infamous 
line, "I am the Other." Rimbaud is correct, the I is 
the other, but not as alienation, or even as a 
Hegelian identity with the Other. I am the Other 
because I can only find myself through the Other. "Is 
it certain that already the most humble experience of 
him who puts himself in another's place, that is, 
accuses himself for another's distress or pain, is not 
animated with the most eminent meaning of this "I is 
the other?"43
In conclusion, Levinas seeks a revival of 
humanism, but on a new foundation, one that takes into 
account the arguments of the anti-humanists, but still 
elevates man as the highest value. Against the 
methodological anti-humanists, Levinas does not find 
in man's crisis of interiority, a justification for 
materialism. "In vulnerability there then lies a
42Levinas, "The Contemporary Criticism of the 
Idea of Value," 186.
43Levinas, "No Identity," 145.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
231
relationship with the other which causality does not 
exhaust, a relationship antecedent to being affected 
by a stimulus . . . vulnerability is obsession by the 
other or an approaching of the other. It is being for 
another, behind the other of a stimulus.1,44
Against the theoretical anti-humanists, Marx and 
Nietzsche, Levinas finds a place for value before any 
ideology or subjectivism. Man can be valued without 
positing man as an eurche. Levinas, like Plato, finds 
an ethical standard beyond being or essence. Unlike 
Plato, this standard is not an abstract form; it is 
the Other. "It is not the concept 'man1 which is at 
the basis of this humanism; it is the other man."45
Levinas agrees with Heidegger that man, as an 
individual, is not the highest part of reality. Also, 
Levinas agrees that subjectivity is not the proper 
source of humanism. "Modem antihumanism is no doubt 
right when in man conceived of as an individual in a 
genus or a being situated in an ontological region, 
persevering in being like all other substances, it
44Levinas, "No Identity," 146.
45Emmanuel Levinas, "Judaism and Revolution," in 
Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 98.
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does not discover a privilege which would make of him 
the aimed at end of reality or when it calls into 
question as a being belonging to no genus, to no 
ontological region but only to his interiority."4* 
Levinas and Heidegger agree that traditional humanism 
has failed to find something precursory to genus, 
species, and interiority.
However, modem anti-humanists, especially 
Heidegger, have greatly erred by not finding in man's 
alienation the relationship with the Other. The 
cogito is shaken, not by technology, but by the Other. 
The relationship to Being, or even a generation of 
supermen, will not resolve this alienation. Even in a 
world of alienation, a world where the telos of man 
does not resolve alienation, it is still possible to 
have value and to privilege man; if value stems from 
the Other. "I ask if in this way the Other Person is 
not a value. Modem anti-humanism is perhaps not 
right in not finding in man, lost in history and the 
order of things the trace of this responsibility which
4SLevinas, "The Contemporary Criticism of the
Idea of Value," 186.
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makes a subjectivity and, in the other person, the
trace of this value."47
Conclusion
Traditional humanisms have withered under severe 
attacks in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In 
the nineteenth century, Marx and Nietzsche began the 
onslaught by claiming that humanisms were merely a 
weapon of the bourgeoisie or they epitomized a slave 
morality. In the twentieth century, the 
deconstruction of the subject; the reduction of man to 
impulses, stimuli, or genes, has further called into 
question any defense of humanism. Levinas, while 
taking seriously these attacks, locates a new 
foundation for humanism. If man's responsibility for 
the Other stems from an an-archical past, then a 
source of value can be found beyond the scope of 
ideologies or the will to power. Moreover, if the 
basis for humanism is the Other, then the 
deconstruction of the subject is moot. In fact, 
Levinas concurs with those who deconstruct the 
subject. After all, Levinas's an-archical ethics
47Levinas, "The Contemporary Criticism of the 
Idea of Value," 187.
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based on the responsibility for the Other, places the
supreme value not in the self, but in the Other.
In a broader context, Levinas's resuscitation of
humanism shows that postmodern political thought, a
thought true to the arguments of Marx, Nietzsche, and
Heidegger, does not necessarily result in nihilism or
totalitarianism. It is possible to resuscitate
humanism and find value in a post-metaphysical world.
To contest that being is for me, is not to 
contest that being is in the view of man; it 
is not to give up on humanism; it is not to 
separate the absolute and humanity. It is 
simply to contest that the humanity of man 
resides in the positing of an I. Man par 
excellence— the source of humanity--is 
perhaps the other.4*
4*Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 7.
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CHAPTER BIGHT
CONCLUSION: THE QUESTIONING OF LEVINAS
The greatest virtue of philosophy is that it 
can put itself in question, try to 
deconstruct what it has deconstructed, and 
unsay what it has said. Science, on the 
contrary, does not try to unsay itself, does 
not interrogate or challenge its own 
concepts, terms, or foundations, it forges 
ahead, progresses.1
This chapter steps back and examines Levinas's 
thought from a broader and more critical perspective. 
The first section summarizes Levinas's metaphysical, 
ethical, and political thought using the structure of 
desire. Desire, as analyzed by Plato, includes the 
paradoxical structure of separation, relation, and 
oscillation. Each major aspect of Levinas's thought 
makes use of this structure. Examining Levinas's 
thought from the perspective of desire reveals how 
Levinas attempts to re-establish the tensional 
relationships between totality and transcendence, the 
ego and the Other, and ethics and politics.
Levinas's attempt to re-establish these tensional 
relationships has been sharply criticized by many 
scholars. His thought has most often been censured
xLevinas and Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas," 22.
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for being merely a justification for his Judaism, for 
failing to find a justification for a non-ontological 
philosophy, and for failing to establish the primacy 
of ethics. These criticisms will be examined in the 
second section of this chapter.
The chapter ends by presenting, in summary 
fashion, Levinas's key questions to the Western 
philosophical tradition. The forcefulness of 
Levinas's questioning shakes philosophy to its 
foundations.
Separation, Relation, and Oscillation: Levinas's 
Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Thought
The structure of desire or eros plays a crucial 
role in Levinas's metaphysical, ethical, and political 
thought. According to Plato, desire has the dual 
structure of relationship and separation. In Plato's 
analysis, the ego can never satisfy its desires, the 
desired is always out of reach. In this relationship 
the ego is pulled out of itself toward a beyond. In a 
relationship based on need, on the other hand, the ego 
is able to appropriate or com-prehend that which is 
outside of itself, to satisfy its needs. That which 
is exterior is made interior. In the desired 
relationship, the desired is not appropriated; it
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remains other to the ego. However, the ego is still 
in relation to it. The ego and the desired exist 
tensionally, that is, they are both related and 
separated. In this relationship neither term should 
dominate. At times, the ego forgets itself in the 
pursuit of the desired, and at other times the ego 
forgets the desired and is content with itself. This 
is an oscillating relationship where both the ego and 
the desired have their moment.
Each major facet of Levinas's thought relies on 
this structure of separation, relationship, and 
oscillation. Levinas's goal is to restore the 
tensional relationships that have been lost in the 
Western philosophical tradition, that is to restore 
the tensional balance between totality and infinity, 
the ego and the Other, and ethics and politics. The 
tension can only be regained by separating what has 
become fused or by relating what has been separated.
Metaphysically, the structure of desire allows 
Levinas to establish a place for transcendence outside 
of any totalizing systems. Previous theories of 
transcendence had either established a radical 
separation between the ego and transcendence (Plato's
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two-world problem) or fused the transcendent into an 
all-encompassing system (for example, Hegel's bad 
infinite) . A transcendence that can be reduced to a 
system is no longer transcendent.
Levinas, on the other hand, finds the structure 
of separation, relationship, and oscillation to be 
useful for restoring the tensional relationship 
between the ego and transcendence. He shows how 
Descartes' idea of the infinite has this paradoxical 
structure. In the Meditations, Descartes claims that 
he has an idea of the infinite, but he cannot account 
for how this idea was put in him. He claims that such
an idea could only be put in him by a transcendent
being. Thus, the ego has a relationship with the
transcendent, but the transcendent exists apart from
the ego's com-prehension. Levinas claims that 
Descartes "discovers a relation with a total alterity 
irreducible to interiority, which nevertheless does 
not do violence to interiority."2 Descartes' idea of 
the infinite represents an oscillation or a tension 
between the ego and the transcendent. The
2Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 211.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
239
transcendent is no longer radically separated from the
ego, nor is the transcendent reduced to a system.
According to Levinas, the concrete manifestation
of the idea of the infinite is the face of the other
person, the Other. This relationship is ethical.
Levinas uses the structure of separation, relation,
and oscillation, to base ethics on transcendence
without losing the ego. The Western ethical
tradition, from Aristotle to Descartes, has privileged
the ego at the expense of the Other. It is Levinas's
aim to restore a place for the Other, that is, to
separate the Other from the ego's grasp. However,
Levinas insists that a place must remain for the
responsible ego. This relationship between the ego
and the Other has the paradoxical structure of desire.
The alterity, the radical heterogeneity of 
the other, is possible only if the other is 
other with respect to a term whose essence 
is to remain at the point of departure, to 
serve as entry into the relation, to be the 
same, not relatively but absolutely. A term 
can remain absolutely at the point of 
departure of relationship only as I.3
In order to establish both separation and
relationship in the ethical relationship with the
3Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 36.
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Other, Levinas uses the structure of the idea of the 
infinite. The ethical command from the Other is 
analogous to Descartes' idea that has been somehow put 
in the ego. It overflows the ego's intentionality. "I 
am obliged without this obligation having begun in me, 
as though an order slipped into my consciousness like 
a thief, smuggled itself in."4 Further, 
responsibility is analogous to desire in that it can 
never be satisfied. The ego is called by the face of 
the Other to an infinite responsibility, a 
responsibility that grows as it is fulfilled. Thus, 
ethics is based on the tensional relationship between 
the responsible ego and the Other.
Politically, the structure of separation, 
relationship, and oscillation allows Levinas to infuse 
ethics into politics without abandoning the political. 
In modem political thought, politics has had its own 
justification, it is established to prevent the summum 
malum, the greatest evil. In this schema, politics 
does not have to answer to ethics. Politics governs 
ethics. Levinas insists that politics must answer to 
ethics. The universal, violent order of politics must
4Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 13.
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be restrained by the ethical relationship with the 
Other. Nonetheless, Levinas does not disregard 
politics. Against those who argue for a retreat from 
the political sphere to live merely an ethical life, 
Levinas maintains that the ethical relationship with 
the Other must be universalized into politics. Ethics 
and politics must exist tensionally, that is, in both 
separation and relation.
By re-establishing a tension between ethics and 
politics, Levinas's thought provides a corrective to 
several strands of modern political thought.
Levinas1s oscillation between ethics and politics 
balances the selfishness of the liberal state with the 
responsibility for the Other. Politics should not be 
established because of the summum malum, the ego's 
fear of its violent death, but from the summum bonum, 
the responsibility for the Other. Further, Levinas's 
radical pluralism, based on the irreducibility of the 
Other, balances the totality of the Hegelian state.
In the Hegelian state, individuals are known only by 
their place in the state apparatus or their role in 
the unfolding of impersonal history. Levinas, on the 
other hand, insists that the state should respect the
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irreducible alterity of the Other. Finally, Levinas's 
humanism of the Other challenges the predominant anti- 
humanisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Levinas concurs with the anti-humanist project of 
deconstructing the ego. However, while the anti­
humanists have grave difficulty in establishing ethics 
after the deconstruction of the ego, Levinas finds in 
this deconstruction the very source of ethics. In 
Levinas's philosophy, the ego is called into question 
because of the approach of the Other. The ego is 
unable to appropriate the Other. Instead, the ego is 
called out of itself to respond to the Other. In 
grammatical terms, the ego's relationship to the Other 
is not in the accusative case, but in the imperative 
case. Thus, the ego's alienation does not lead to the 
nihilism of anti-humanism but to a new foundation for 
ethics.
Levinas's adaptation of Plato's paradoxical 
structure of desire has transformed the way that 
metaphysics, ethics, and politics are conceived. 
Metaphysically, Levinas demonstrates "how a 
nontotalitarian transcendence is possible and how its 
recognition leads to a radical transformation of the
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very project of philosophy."5 Ethically, Levinas 
reverses the focus of philosophy from the self to the 
Other. "In a most dramatic reversal of the principles 
of modem ethics, Levinas accords the Other that 
priority which was once unquestionably assigned to the 
self."* Finally, Levinas has changed the focus of 
political thought from the summum malum to the summum 
bonum.
He is among the few philosophers to offer 
profound suggestions specifically regarding 
the ontology of war and peace, and the 
essential nature of the political.
Furthermore, his suggestions offer an 
interesting challenge to Anglo-Saxon 
empirical individualism, the traditions of 
the social contract or natural law, and 
especially to the dominance of rationalism 
and cognition in the domain of the political 
and social theory.7
Such a radical re-thinking of philosophy is bound to
provoke some opposition. The following sections
examine the three most prominent objections to
Levinas's thought.
sPeperzak, To the Other, 129.
‘Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 85.
7Durfee, "War, Politics, and Radical Pluralism,"
550.
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The Questioning of Levinas: Judaism
A common criticism levelled against Levinas's 
heteronomous philosophy is that it is merely a defense 
of his Judaism. For example, Salemohamed claims that 
Levinas's philosophy is "not much more than a 
justification of theology."8 He claims that although 
Levinas seems to analyze ethics from a stance that 
precedes ontology, his ethics are but a servant for 
his Judaism. Levinas vehemently objects to this 
criticism. He insists that his philosophical works 
are separate from his Jewish works. "Ultimately my 
point of departure is absolutely non-theological. I 
insist upon this. It is not theology that I am doing, 
but philosophy."9
However, the question of the Jewish influence on 
Levinas's philosophical thought is very complex.
There are, at least, two meanings of Judaism in 
Levinas's writings. First, Levinas, in his 
philosophical works, refers to Judaism as a metaphor 
for the an-archical, transcendent, and ethical moments
8Salemohamed, "Levinas: From Ethics to Political 
Theology," 192.
9Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 35.
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in any tradition, including even the Western 
philosophical tradition. Second, Judaism refers to 
the religion of Yahweh as expressed in the Bible and 
the Talmud. Of course, there is a relationship 
between these two types of Judaism. Levinas, the 
philosopher, cannot be expected to be unaffected by 
the recurrent themes in his Talmudic studies, just as 
he cannot be expected to purge his Talmudic 
commentaries of all philosophizing. In fact, Levinas 
often speaks of a common inspiration for both. For 
Levinas, philosophy and theology are both based on 
common pre-philosophical experiences, including man1 s 
homelessness, the desire to explain this homelessness, 
and the relationship with other people, the feeling of 
community. Thus, Levinas's philosophical and 
theological works are intertwined. However, the 
relationship between these two meanings of Judaism in 
Levinas' s works is beyond the scope of this essay.10
Nonetheless, to argue that Levinas's philosophy 
is but a justification of his religion is an argument
10Much excellent work has already been done on this 
topic. See, for example, Chalier, "Emmanuel Levinas: 
Responsibility and Election," and Handelman, Fragments 
of Redemption, 263-336.
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for trivial minds. It is not a refutation. Levinas's 
philosophical works need to be analyzed on their own 
merit. As the present essay has shown, it is possible 
to develop Levinas's philosophy without relying on the 
Judaism of Yahweh.
The Questioning of Levinas: Non-Philosophy
Another criticism of Levinas's thought is that he 
has failed in his attempt to conduct non-ontological 
philosophy, what he calls "non-philosophy". This 
argument is most forcefully made in Derrida's early 
essay, "Violence and Metaphysics." Chapter 4 explored 
how Levinas, in Otherwise than Being, responded to 
Derrida's main objections. In many ways, Levinas's 
later thought was influenced by Derrida' s criticisms 
and Derrida, in his most recent works, shifted his 
thought closer to Levinas's heteronomic ethics. Their 
philosophies have converged. However, one key 
difference remains. Levinas and Derrida disagree on 
the role that non-philosophy can play in philosophy. 
Both insist that it is the philosopher's duty to try 
and break from the grasp of philosophy, to move 
philosophy toward a beyond that can temper the violent 
excesses of philosophy. Yet, Derrida claims that
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ultimately it is impossible to break, out of the 
philosophical tradition. The totality will subsume 
everything, including all elements of non-philosophy. 
Levinas disagrees. He claims that it is possible to 
conduct non-philosophy.
This difference between Derrida and Levinas is 
partially, perhaps mostly, attributable to their 
divergent definitions of philosophy. For Levinas, 
philosophy usually refers to ontology. "Philosophy is 
disclosure of being, and being's essence is truth and 
philosophy."11 Therefore, metaphysics, in its more 
radical forms, such as the face-to-face relationship 
with the Other, is already outside of philosophy's 
border. Metaphysics "is the ultimate relation in 
Being. Ontology presupposes metaphysics."11 For 
Derrida, on the other hand, philosophy includes both 
ontology and metaphysics. Metaphysics is well within 
the margins of philosophy. Since Derrida's definition 
of philosophy is more encompassing, Derrida finds it 
more difficult to step outside of philosophy. With 
such an all-encompassing interpretation of philosophy,
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 29.
“Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 48.
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Derrida's attempts at non-philosophy must break 
radically with traditional thought. Non-philosophy 
would probably exist on a separate plane from 
metaphysics. Conceivably, such a radical non­
philosophy would require the overturning of method 
itself. At this extreme, might non-philosophy assume 
the form of parody?
For Levinas, on the other hand, non-philosophy is 
not foreign to the tradition of philosophy. Instead, 
Levinas argues that non-philosophy cannot be 
encompassed in philosophy itself, and yet, can be 
found squarely in the philosophical tradition. For 
Levinas, non-philosophy appears in the constant 
refutations of skepticism and in the an-archical, 
ethical moments in the Western philosophical 
tradition.
These disagreements between Derrida and Levinas 
have important consequences for their metaphysical, 
ethical, and political thought. Metaphysically, 
Levinas's non-philosophy is more stable them 
Derrida's. In other words, the disruption of 
philosophy is more complete. Non-philosophy does not 
only assume the negative role of skepticism, but it
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provides a refuge against the totality. It may not be 
possible for the philosopher to remain permanently in 
the non-philosophical realm, but it is possible to 
temper the excesses of totalizing philosophies with 
non-philosophy. "It is not always true that not-to- 
philosophize is still to philosophize. The 
forcefulness of the break with ethics does not 
evidence a mere slackening of reason, but rather a 
questioning of the validity of philosophizing which 
cannot lapse again into philosophy."13
The divergent views of Levinas and Derrida on 
non-philosophy also have important consequences for 
their ethical and political thought. Derrida, in his 
attempt to conduct non-philosophy, is pushing thought 
to a place without structured meanings, a value-less, 
apolitical world. Without a shelter, non-philosophy 
must be re-absorbed into the totality. Derrida cannot 
find a foundation outside of the totality on which to 
build ethics. Without such a place, ethics cannot 
temper politics. Derrida must choose between nihilism 
or abandoning politics to its own justification. 
Levinas, by insisting on the permanency of
“Levinas, "Ideology and Idealism," 238.
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non-philosophy, has discovered a foundation for ethics
and this ethics cam temper the excesses of politics.
The ethical foundation that Levinas discovers is the
an-archical responsibility for the Other. The
relationship with the transcendent Other cannot be
encompassed within ontology. It is non-philosophy.
The fact that philosophy cannot fully 
totalize the alterity of meaning in some 
final presence or simultaneity is not for me 
a deficiency or fault. Or to put it another 
way, the best thing about philosophy is that 
it fails. It is better that philosophy fail 
to totalize meaning--even though, as 
ontology, it has attempted just this— for it 
thereby remains open to the irreducible 
otherness of transcendence.14
The Questioning of Levinas: The Primacy of Ethics
The most important criticism of Levinas1 s
thought; the one that attacks the core of his
philosophy, has been concisely stated: "Levinas fails
in his attempt to ground first philosophy in
ethics."15 This charge is usually presented in one
of three forms. First, on an empirical level, many
claim that Levinas has developed an interesting
“Levinas and Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas," 22.
15Drabinski, "The Status of the Transcendental in 
Levinas' Thought," 157.
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ethics, but what use can it be when no one acts as if 
they are infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely 
responsible for the Other? The second version of this 
criticism, and the most common, is: how can ethics 
exist before the ego? After all, common sense tells 
us that the ego must exist before it can respond to 
the Other. The third version of this attack asks how 
can the responsibility for the Other be an-archical, 
when it seems to function as an arche in Levinas1 s 
thought?
The first objection, that no one acts as if they 
are radically responsible for the Other, cannot be 
refuted theoretically for it is an empirical question. 
However, Levinas's theoretical stance must be 
clarified. Having lived through Nazi prisoner of war 
camps, he was well aware that not all people will act 
as if they are infinitely, asymmetrically, and 
concretely responsible for the Other. Levinas's 
thought is not a description of the way that humans 
usually act. Instead, it describes the way that 
people act when they are truly human. Is not the 
human action, par excellence, the responsibility for 
the Other? "I believe that it is in saintliness that
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the human begins; not in the accomplishment of
saintliness, but in the value."16
Levinas's radical responsibility for the Other is
not a description as much as it is a prescription.
Levinas is providing a goal for ethical action. To be
truly human, the ego should respond to the Other.
"There is a utopian moment in what I say; it is the
recognition of something which cannot be realized but
which, ultimately, guides all moral action."17 This
ethical relationship for the Other is a utopian
moment, but not in the sense that it never occurs. It
is utopian, because when it does occur it seems out of
place; "always other than the ways of the world."18
Although they may seem out of place, there are those
who are infinitely, asymmetrically, and concretely
responsible for the Other.
I remember meeting once with a group of 
Latin American students, well versed in the 
terminology of Marxist liberation and 
terribly concerned by the suffering and 
unhappiness of their people in Argentina.
They asked me rather impatiently if I had
16 Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality," 172-3.
17Levinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality," 178.
18Levinas and Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas," 32.
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ever actually witnessed the utopian rapport 
with the other that ray ethical philosophy 
speaks of. I replied, "Yes, indeed— here in 
this room."19
The second version of the primacy of ethics 
question is, how can ethics precede the ego? After 
all, without an ego to respond, it is impossible to 
have responsibility. To answer this charge, Levinas 
(like Descartes) posits a double origin. Levinas is 
not arguing that the Other exists prior to the self in 
a strictly chronological way. Levinas holds that the 
ego exists contemporaneously with the Other. However, 
the responsibility for the Other exists prior to 
ontology, prior even to the existence of the ego. 
Responsibility does not originate in the ego, but 
originates in the Other. Before conceptualizing the 
world, including the Other, the ego is called to 
respond. "This saying to the Other--this relationship 
with the Other as interlocutor, this relation with an 
existent--precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate 
relation in Being. Ontology presupposes 
metaphysics. "20 By claiming that there is a double
19Levinas and Kearney, "Dialogue with Emmanuel 
Levinas," 32-3.
"Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 47-8.
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origin, Levinas opens himself up to the next 
criticism: how can his philosophy be an-archical if it 
creates another arche?
The final version of this critique is that 
Levinas's ethics cannot be an-archical because it 
functions as yet another arche. In philosophical 
thought, an arche usually serves two functions.
First, an arche is posited as a first cause or origin 
of the world, such as the unmoved mover in Aristotle's 
Metaphysics. In this way, philosophizing about an 
arche is an ontology, the reduction of all beings to a 
starting point, an origin. Archai also serve as 
principles that guide human affairs. In this sense, 
archai would include Plato1 s good beyond being,
Locke's state of nature, and even Marx's historical 
materialism. In this second sense, Levinas's ethical 
relationship with the Other is an arche. The face-to- 
face relationship with the Other guides both ethics 
and politics.
However, Levinasian ethics is an arche unlike any 
other. It is an an-archical arche. The face-to-face 
relationship with the Other may be the principle by 
which to guide human actions, but it is not a first
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cause or an origin. It is a guiding principle which 
disturbs all first causes or origins. Indeed,
Levinas's arche undermines the very language of first 
causes. "It undoes thematization, and escapes any 
principle, origin, will, or arche, which axe put forth 
in every ray of consciousness."21
Why does Levinas insist on the an-archical status 
of the face-to-face relationship with the Other? Why 
does he insist on transcending any philosophy based on 
ontology? In a word, ontologies kill. Even during 
Plato's time, the search for an ontological arche was 
"something like a battle of gods and giants going on 
between them over their quarrel about reality."12 
Since Plato's time, philosophy has become a raging 
battle between theories of being; an "ontologomachy". 
This battle assumed added weight in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries when it became mixed with 
ideologies and nationalism. Ontologomachies became 
world wars and cold wars. The final answers of 
ontologies were recast as final solutions.
21Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 101.
22Plato, Sophist, 246a.
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Levinas' s an-archical ethics transcends the 
ontologomachies. An an-archical ethics calls into 
question any final answer, be it an ideology, 
ontology, or the state. "Anarchy cannot be sovereign, 
like an arche. It can only disturb the State— but in a 
radical way, making possible moments of negation 
without any affirmation. The state then cannot set 
itself up as a Whole."23 
The Questions of Levinas
Often lost in the close analysis of various 
aspects of Levinas's thought is how much Levinas has 
re-oriented the philosophical tradition. To put 
Levinas fs thought back in perspective, this essay will 
conclude with a series of questions that Levinas asks 
the Western tradition. It seems fitting to give the 
last words to Levinas.
Metaphysically, Levinas asks whether the dominant 
theories of knowledge are adequate. Can philosophy, 
as the thinking of Being or the intentionality of 
consciousness account for all of reality? Is there 
something that transcends our philosophical knowledge?
“Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 194 n. 3.
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In. agreement with Plato and Plotinus who 
dared to pose, against all good sense, 
something beyond being, is not the idea of 
being younger than the idea of infinity?
Should we not concede that philosophy cannot 
confine itself to the primacy of 
ontology. . . . And that intentionality is 
not the ultimate spiritual relation?24
Ethically, Levinas asks whether that which lies
beyond our philosophical knowledge is the face of the
Other. If so, then by reducing the other to an
object, or even a genus of a species have we not done
violence to the Other?
Is it certain, however, that the ultimate 
and peculiar sense of man lies in what is 
exhibited, in what is manifested or in 
manifestation, in unveiled truth or in the 
noesis of knowledge? . . .  Is it certain 
that man has no sense beyond, precisely what 
man can be and what he can show himself to 
be?25
Does not the non-thematizable face of the Other, 
call the ego's selfishness into question and lead the 
ego to a responsibility that exceeds its own self- 
preservation? Does not the face of the Other call the 
ego to justify its very existence, to force it to 
ethical action?
24Levinas, "Transcendence and Height," 20.
2SLevinas et al., "The Paradox of Morality, " 175.
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One can uproot oneself from this 
responsibility, deny the place where it is 
incumbent on me to do something, to look for 
an anchorite's salvation. One can choose 
Utopia. On the other hand, in the name of 
spirit, one can choose not to flee the 
conditions from which one's work draws its 
meaning and remain here below. And that 
means choosing ethical action.2*
Politically, Levinas asks whether politics has
its own justification. Does not politics, left to
itself, become tyrannical? Is there not something
that stands outside of the scope of the ego, the
totality, and history that can temper the tyranny of
politics? Should it not be the goal of political
thought to infuse ethics into the violent realm of the
political? Instead of looking at world-historical
figures, should we not look at the history of the
widow, orphan, and stranger?
Is it not reasonable from now on for a 
statesman, when questioning himself on the 
nature of the decisions that he is making, 
to ask not only whether the decisions are in 
agreement with the sense of universal 
history, but also if they are in agreement 
with the other history?27
2‘Emmanuel Levinas, "Place and Utopia," in 
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Se&n Hand 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 
100.
27Levinas, "A Language Familiar to Us," 201.
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